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Abstract
Essays in Financial Economics
Kevin Zhao
2021
My dissertation consists of three chapters. In the first chapter, I show across three different
settings that an individual’s history of experiencing persistent processes can impact their beliefs.
First, I examine analyst forecasts of earnings and show that forecasters who have covered
firms with more autocorrelated earnings in the past are more extrapolative relative to their
peers: they are relatively optimistic after high past earnings and relatively pessimistic after low
past earnings. This generates predictable errors: after a good announcement in the previous
period, firms that are covered by more extrapolative analysts on average will tend to have
negative earnings surprises. Second, I examine individual investor trading behavior and find
that individuals who have directly experienced more trending stocks will be more likely to
purchase a stock following a positive return, and more likely to sell a stock following a negative
return. Finally, I study survey data on the aggregate stock market, and find that individuals
who have experienced the market being more autocorrelated in their years of financial experience
tend to be more extrapolative in their forecasts.
In the second chapter, I use data from Morningstar to study the relationship between re-
cent returns to certain investment styles (e.g. “Large Value”) and flows to mutual funds of
that particular style. Consistent with the style investing hypothesis of Barberis and Shleifer
(2003), mutual fund flows are positively related to recent returns of its associated Morningstar
category. However, I find evidence that investors compare funds within categories as well: after
controlling for a fund’s own past return, the relationship between flows and recent returns of
its category becomes negative. Furthermore, the comparison within-category is stronger than
across categories. Investors tend to compare funds at the “edge” of a category (e.g. between
Large Value and Mid Value) to other funds within its assigned category rather than funds on
the other side of the edge. Both retail and institutional investors engage in within-style com-
parisons, but institutional investors are better at identifying which fund category to compare
to.
In the third chapter, I construct a measure of risk aversion under prospect theory (PTRA).
The measure is based on how much a prospect theory agent is willing to pay to avoid a fair
gamble along each point of the curve. Using data on individual stock turnover and mutual fund
holdings, I calculate the PTRA of the average investor holding each stock. In the cross-section,
stocks with high PTRA investors tend to underperform compared to stocks with low PTRA
investors. The effect reverses over longer periods of time, consistent with price pressure from
irrational investors. Finally, I show that the positive relationship between risk and return holds
among stocks with low PTRA, but the opposite is true among stocks with high PTRA.
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Chapter 1
Who Extrapolates? Evidence from
Experience Effects
1.1 Introduction
How people form expectations and why beliefs may differ between people is a question that
has wide-ranging implications across a variety of disciplines. Financial markets are a good
venue to test theories of belief formation because of the high-stakes nature of the setting. In
recent years, a belief formation process that has drawn a large amount of interest from finance
researchers is extrapolation, the idea that people’s expectation of the future value of some
quantity is a positive function of its recent realizations.
Extrapolation has been empirically shown to be prevalent across a variety of financial set-
tings, including the aggregate stock market (Greenwood and Shleifer (2014)) and the cross-
section of individual stocks (Da et al. (2020)). In addition, models that incorporate extrapola-
tive investors (Cutler et al. (1990); De Long et al. (1990b); Barberis et al. (2015)) are able to
explain aspects of the data that are puzzling under the rational framework. However, evidence
on the source of extrapolative beliefs and on the type of investor that is likely to hold these
beliefs is relatively lacking. This is a particularly important question because across settings,
it has been shown that extrapolating more can be correlated with people making predictably
larger errors. Identifying a source of extrapolation could be a large step in mitigating the errors
caused by this bias.
In this paper, I posit that differing levels of extrapolation between individuals can in part
be attributed to experience effects. The experience effects literature has shown that personally
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observing a high level of a variable in the past is correlated with expecting a high level of
that same variable in the future. In their seminal paper on experience effects, Malmendier and
Nagel (2011) show that expectations about future stock market returns are influenced by the
past returns a person has directly observed during their lifetime. For example, an individual
that lived through the Great Depression tends to be more pessimistic about the stock market
and less likely to participate. In addition, they hypothesize and show that younger people’s
beliefs are more impacted by recent events due to the event making up a larger part of their
lifetime experience. The experience effects idea has since been applied across a multitude of
settings, including inflation expectations (Malmendier and Nagel (2016)), CEO decision making
(Malmendier et al. (2011)), and investment decisions at the industry level (Huang (2017)).
While previous studies have been about the level of a variable, I hypothesize that experience
with processes that have differing levels of persistence can distort beliefs as well. The central
idea of this paper is that individuals who have directly observed more autocorrelated series in
the past will tend to have more extrapolative beliefs. In addition, these individuals will make
predictable errors depending on the persistence of the process they are attempting to forecast.
This paper is, to my knowledge, the first to apply the idea of experience effects to the path of
processes.
This is not the first paper to test for heterogeneity in who is more likely to have extrapolative
beliefs. Cassella and Gulen (2018) find evidence that young people tend to extrapolate more.
They show that the degree to which people extrapolate in the aggregate stock market, mea-
sured using surveys, lines up with the proportion of young people participating in the market.
Hartzmark et al. (2020) show using both experimental and survey data that people who own an
asset will respond more strongly to recent signals about that asset, both positive and negative.
The results of this paper present another dimension along which we can predict heterogeneity
in who is more likely to extrapolate, a dimension that is independent of both the “age” effect
and the “ownership” effect.
I test my hypothesis across three different settings. First, I examine analyst forecasts of an-
nual earnings announcements. These analysts are finance professionals in a high-stakes setting.
I construct a measure of “extrapolation experience” that captures the idea that analysts cover
firms with different levels of earnings persistence. This measure is constructed for each analyst
in each year by looking at all firm-years for which an analyst previously issued a forecast. I
show that an analyst’s level of extrapolation experience influences their forecasts. For the main
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test, I isolate differences between analysts who issue a fresh forecast for the same firm in the
same month, and show that those who previously covered firms with more persistent earnings
(“high extrapolation experience”) are more extrapolative. Relative to other analysts issuing a
forecast for the same firm at the same time, analysts with high extrapolation experience are
more optimistic when the past earnings announcement is high and more pessimistic when the
past earnings announcement is low. The effect is not driven by systematic differences in how
firms are forecasted, the way analysts are assigned to cover firms, public news about firms,
or general time trends in earnings. I also show that analysts tend to rely more on their ex-
trapolation experience in situations where less outside information about a firm is available:
the effect I document is stronger for forecasts made closer to the date of the previous earnings
announcement and forecasts made for smaller firms.
Previous literature has shown that analyst forecasts of firm earnings tend to be too opti-
mistic on average. Combining this observation with the above result, I hypothesize and show
that analysts with high extrapolation experience make larger errors following high past earn-
ings, and smaller errors following low past earnings. This is because high past earnings makes
more extrapolative analysts even more optimistic, while low past earnings help to mitigate the
optimism bias.
Next, I aggregate forecasts to the consensus level by finding the mean forecast for each firm
each month and the mean extrapolation experience of all analysts issuing a fresh forecast. I
find that the mean forecast is related to the composition of analysts covering the firm. When
the average analyst covering a firm has high extrapolation experience and the past earnings
announcement is high, the mean forecast for next period’s earnings is high. Combined with
the observation that analysts are too optimistic on average, this leads to predictable errors in
the consensus forecast. Earnings surprise is predictable in a similar manner, by comparing the
extrapolation experience of the composition of analysts covering a firm and a proxy for the
firm’s true earnings persistence.
The second setting I explore is individual investor buying and selling decisions. I classify
investors based on the monthly return trends of stocks they directly held in their portfolio
in the beginning of the year. For each stock, I calculate a “trend” variable by computing the
number of times in the past year where a positive return month followed another positive return
month, or a negative return month followed another negative return month. I then build my
measure of “trending experience” at the investor-year level by aggregating the trend variable
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for all stocks held in the investor’s portfolio at the beginning of the year. I show that investors
with high trending experience are more likely to purchase stocks that performed well in the
past month. On the other hand, they are more likely to sell stocks that performed poorly in
the past month. This result holds within the same stock, so it is not driven by investors with
different experiences trading stocks with different characteristics. Rather, investors trade the
same stocks at different times due to their trending experience.
In the final setting, I study survey data on expectations about the aggregate stock market.
In individual-level surveys, I find that people who have experienced the stock market being
more autocorrelated in their lifetimes tend to have more extrapolative beliefs. This in turn
leads to predictable errors. Individuals with higher extrapolation experience make larger errors
when the past return is high, and smaller errors when the past return is low. This is due to
people being overoptimistic on average in the survey, so extrapolating more can either mitigate
or intensify this optimism bias depending on the level of past return.
I then study how aggregate level survey responses about stock market returns are related
to the recent level of autocorrelation in the stock market. I hypothesize and show that when
the autocorrelation of the stock market has been high in the recent past, the population will be
more extrapolative on average. Finally, I study the difference between how younger and older
people respond to recent autocorrelation levels in the market. The experience effects hypothesis
predicts that younger people are impacted more by recent events because these events make
up a larger portion of their lifetime. Applying this to my setting, I show that younger people
change their degree of extrapolation more than older people in response to recent trends.
This paper contributes to the large literature on behavioral biases in belief formation, and
in particular, the literature on heterogeneity in belief formation and disagreement. The effect
documented in this paper provides a potential microfoundation for heterogeneity in beliefs. In
all three settings, agents receive a public signal (past earnings announcement in the earnings
forecast setting, past firm return in the investor trading setting, past market return in the survey
setting), yet form different expectations for the future value depending on their experience with
persistent processes. The line of research on disagreement is particularly important because
it can help explain facts about financial markets that may seem puzzling under the rational
framework, such as excess trading volume (Hong and Stein (2007)). In my setting, fluctuations
in stock returns can generate disagreement and trading volume in individual stocks. A stock
with high past month return will attract an investor-base with high trending experience. If that
4
stock performs poorly in the next month, the high trending experience investors will expect poor
returns going forward, and become inclined to sell. On the other hand, low trending experience
investors expect high returns on the stock going forward, so they become inclined to buy. This
can generate trading volume between the two types of investors.
While this is the first paper to my knowledge to apply the idea of over-weighting personal
experience to the persistence of series, there is a growing literature on how individuals extrap-
olate from personal experience when forming beliefs. For example, Choi et al. (2007) find that
individual investors with the most rewarding outcomes from their savings plan increase their
savings rate the most, and Kuchler and Zafar (2019) document that individuals pay too much
attention to local house price movements when forming expectations about aggregate house
prices. The idea of experience effects has been applied to a variety of settings, but there is no
consensus yet on the deeper roots of the effect. Potential drivers include the availability heuristic
(Tversky and Kahneman (1973)) and associative recall (Kahana (2012), Kahana and Wachter
(2020)). The availability heuristic states that individuals judge the probability of an event by
how easily the event comes to mind. It provides a natural explanation for experience effects
because it may be easier to recall personally experienced events. Associative recall proposes
that people tend to remember similar states from the past when judging a current situation.
In my empirical settings, the agent observes a public signal for the previous level of a variable
she is trying to forecast. Associative recall would suggest that this signal triggers memories of
times when the agent has observed similar states of the world in the past. Her forecast for next
period is guided by these patterns drawn from memory.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sections 2, 3, and 4 explore analyst forecasts
of earnings, individual investor trading decisions, and aggregate market survey expectations
respectively. Section 5 concludes.
1.2 Analyst Forecasts of Earnings
The first setting I explore is analysts who give forecasts of firms’ annual earnings announce-
ments. These are finance professionals who are paid to forecast earnings and have large career
incentives for accuracy (Hong, Kubik, and Solomon (2000); Hong, and Kubik (2003); Wu and
Zang (2009)).
The majority of research in this area has been focused on detecting systematic behavior
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among analysts and thinking about its implications for error in the consensus estimate.1 My
results add to a more recent trend of trying to identify heterogeneity in analysts and more
importantly, the source of their biases and errors.2
1.2.1 Hypotheses
For each analyst in each year, I calculate a measure of their experience with persistent series
(“extrapolation experience”) based on the history of firms for which an analyst had previously
issued a forecast. The measure captures the idea that some analysts cover firms with more
autocorrelated earnings than other analysts. The construction of the extrapolation experience
measure is described in detail in Section 2.2. I first investigate extrapolation experience as a
source of heterogeneous beliefs at the individual level. Then, I aggregate forecasts up to the
firm-month level and test if the average extrapolation experience of analysts covering a firm can
impact the consensus forecast and earnings surprise.
The first hypothesis concerns individual analysts covering the same firm at the same time:
Hypothesis 1A: Analysts who previously covered firms where high earnings are followed by high
earnings (“high extrapolation experience”) will be more extrapolative when forecasting future
earnings. Relative to other forecasters issuing a forecast for the same firm at the same time,
they will be more optimistic if the firm’s previous earnings level was high, and more pessimistic
if the firm’s previous earnings level was low.
I compare all forecasts to others made for the same firm in the same month, so that forecasts
are only compared to others made for the same series with the same publicly available infor-
mation. By comparing forecasts within firm-month, the results cannot be driven by analysts
being more likely to be assigned to cover firms with earnings processes that are similar to their
experience. I test Hypothesis 1A both between and within analysts. By studying within-analyst
variation in extrapolation experience, I am able to rule out explanations for my findings based
on analyst characteristics that don’t change through time or evolve with experience.
The next hypothesis concerns forecast accuracy. Previous studies have documented that
analysts’ forecasts of earnings are too optimistic on average (Hirshleifer et al. (2020)). This is
1For example, analysts have been found to issue more optimistic forecasts at the beginning of the earnings
cycle (Richardson et al. (2010)) and not properly adjust for seasonality in earnings (Chang et al. (2017)).
2Some papers along this dimension find that analysts issuing bolder forecasts are more accurate than analysts
who herd (Clement and Tse (2005)), forecasts made later in the day are less accurate due to decision fatigue
(Hirshleifer et al. (2018)), and negative first impressions make analysts more accurate by mitigating some of the
optimism bias in the setting (Hirshleifer et al. (2020)).
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true in my sample as well: 58% of forecasts in the dataset are higher than the realized earnings.
Combining this observation with Hypothesis 1A leads to the following prediction about forecast
errors:
Hypothesis 1B: Following high past earnings, analysts with high extrapolation experience will
make larger errors on average. Following low past earnings, they will make smaller errors on
average.
A unique feature of my setting is that the level of extrapolation experience alone does not
lead to more optimistic or pessimistic forecasts, or larger or smaller errors. It is entirely context-
dependent: after high past earnings, analysts with high extrapolation experience will be even
more optimistic than they would be otherwise, leading to larger errors. On the other hand,
low past earnings will lead to relative pessimism, mitigating some of the optimism bias in this
setting.
Next, I test if the composition of analysts covering a firm can directly impact the consensus
forecast through their extrapolation experience. I find the mean forecast for each firm in each
month (“monthly consensus forecast”) and the mean extrapolation experience of analysts issuing
a forecast in the firm-month. I predict:
Hypothesis 1C: The consensus forecast for a firm will be higher if the past earnings announce-
ment was high and the average analyst covering the firm has high extrapolation experience.
I test this both between and within firms. The within-firm analysis rules out any explanation
based on analysts being more likely to cover firms that have earnings persistence similar to their
experience, unless the these levels tend to vary together in time. If that is the case, however, error
in the consensus forecast should not be predictable. Similar to the individual-level forecasts,
the consensus forecast is on average optimistic, which leads to the following hypothesis about
error in the consensus forecast:
Hypothesis 1D: The error in the consensus forecast will be higher if the past earnings an-
nouncement was high and the average analyst covering the firm has high extrapolation experi-
ence.
Finally, I try to predict earnings surprises. Surprise is defined as the difference between
actual announced earnings and the mean forecast made between 2 and 30 days before an-
nouncement. Because surprise is a signed variable which can be positive (when forecasted
earnings is too low) or negative (when forecasted earnings is too high), I need to compare the
mean extrapolation experience of analysts issuing a forecast to a baseline which proxies for the
7
autocorrelation of the true earnings process of the firm. Assuming I have a good baseline, I can
make the following prediction about earnings surprise:
Hypothesis 1E: If the mean extrapolation experience among analysts issuing a forecast is too
high relative to the baseline, they will extrapolate too much. If the mean extrapolation experience
is low relative to the baseline, they will extrapolate too little.
This is because analysts with high extrapolation experience relative to the baseline will
expect the firm’s true earnings process to be more autocorrelated than it is in reality, while
analysts with low extrapolation experience relative to the baseline will expect the firm’s true
earnings process to be less autocorrelated than it is in reality. Following high past earnings,
analysts with higher extrapolation experience than the baseline will extrapolate too much and
overshoot the realized earnings, leading to negative surprise. On the other hand, analysts with
lower extrapolation experience than the baseline will not extrapolate enough and undershoot
the realized earnings, leading to positive surprise.
1.2.2 Data and Extrapolation Experience Measure
I use analyst forecasts for annual earnings announcements in the I/B/E/S dataset between
1980-2019. I use annual rather than quarterly earnings announcements in order to avoid issues
with seasonality that can simultaneously impact analyst experiences and forecasts. I adjust the
sample in a number of ways, detailed below:
• Firms with a share price below $5 at the time of their previous announcement are excluded.
• I require that a forecast was made after the previous annual earnings announcement date
of the firm so that it can incorporate information from that previous announcement.
Forecasts made less than two days before the next announcement date are also excluded.
• I restrict the sample to only earnings announcements that happened between 270 and
450 days after the firm’s previous earnings announcement. This allows for firms to adjust
their announcement date within three months of the date from the previous year.
• The measure of extrapolation experience is based on previously covered firms, so only
analysts who covered at least 10 firm-years prior to the year of the current forecast are
included.
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• I compare forecasts to those made by other analysts in for the same firm-month, so if an
analyst makes multiple forecasts for a firm-month, I use their mean forecast.
Each observation corresponds to an analyst issuing a fresh forecast for a given firm in a given
month. In the end, the sample includes 11,694 unique analysts who make a total of 2,506,239
forecasts on 12,499 firms.
The measure of extrapolation experience in this setting should capture the idea that some
analysts observe that high earnings levels are typically followed by high earnings levels in the
next year, while others observe that high earnings levels are followed by low earnings levels. I
want a measure of extrapolation experience for each analyst i that gives a forecast in year t,
so I extract a list of analyst-years from the forecast dataset. For each analyst-year, I make a
list of all of the firm-years (j,τ) previously covered by the analyst. In this context, “previously
covered” refers to firms j for which analyst i gave a forecast in year τ < t.
For each analyst-year, I merge the list of previously covered firms with the set of annual
earnings announcements made by firms between 1980-2019 from I/B/E/S. To keep the measure
of earnings consistent across firms, I follow DellaVigna and Pollett (2009) and Hartzmark and
Shue (2018) and scale the announced earnings per share by the price of the firm three days before
the announcement. Henceforth, earningsj,t will refer to this scaled annual earnings value for




Throughout the paper, earnings is winsorized at the 99% level.3
This measure of scaled earnings is simple, but it may be disproportionately impacted by
firms with extreme earnings and it does not control for market-wide fluctuations in earnings.
I construct an alternative measure, rank, that avoids these potential issues. rankj,t is the
rank of earningsj,t for firm j in year t divided by the number of firms that made an earnings
announcement in year t :
rankj,t :=
rank(earningsj,t)[within year]
Total Number of F irms in Y ear t
A firm whose earningsj,t is higher than 70% of firms in year t will have a rankj,t of 0.7.
Throughout the paper, I show results using both the original earnings measure as well as the
rank measure.
3All results are similar using winsorizations at the 98% and 99.5% levels
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I construct a simple and parsimonious measure of extrapolation experience. For each analyst-
year (i,t), I take the list of firm-years (j,τ) previously covered by the analyst and run the following
regression (using either the earnings or rank measure):
earningsj,τ = α+ β1earningsj,τ−1 + εj,τ → expi,t := β̂1
rankj,τ = α+ β1rankj,τ−1 + εj,τ → expri,t := β̂1
I take the measure of extrapolation experience to be the coefficient β1. An analyst who in the
past directly observes that high earnings in year τ − 1 are normally followed by high earnings
in year τ will have a high exp, while one who sees that high earnings are normally followed by
low earnings will have a low exp. exp and expr are winsorized at the 99% level.
Table 1 Panel A shows summary statistics at the analyst-year level. There are a total of
11,694 unique analysts and 69,336 analyst-years in the sample. The mean years of experience is
11 and the mean number of unique firms previously covered is 24. In a given year, the typical
analyst covers 11 firms. Figure 1 Panel A shows a density plot of extrapolation experience in
the sample using the earnings variable; it has a mean of 0.63 with a standard deviation of 0.44.
Figure 1 Panel B shows a density plot of extrapolation experience in the sample using the rank
variable. It has a slightly higher mean (0.67) and a smaller standard deviation (0.23).
Table 1 Panel B shows summary statistics for the dataset at the forecast level, so each
observation is an analyst issuing a fresh forecast for a firm they are covering in a particular
month. There are 2,506,239 forecasts for 86,754 unique earnings announcements. The typical
firm-month in the sample has eight analysts issuing a fresh forecast. At the forecast level, the
distribution of extrapolation experience is very similar to the analyst-year level, which lessens
the concern that analysts are more or less likely to issue a forecast based on their extrapolation
experience.
1.2.3 Analyst Forecast Level
Individual Forecasts for the Same Firm in the Same Month
I want to test if certain forecasts are optimistic or pessimistic as a result of the extrapolation
experience of the analyst issuing the forecast. To get a standardized forecast measure, each






Here, I scale EPS by firm price one day before the forecast issue date (rather than three days
before which was used for earnings announcements) because there is little concern of information
leakage about individual forecasts influencing firm prices. Using price one day before help ensure
that I incorporate all information available to an analyst on the day of her forecast. Throughout
the paper, forecasts are winsorized at the 99th percentile.
To test Hypothesis 1A, I run the following regression:
forecasti,j,m = α+ β1earningsj,t−1 ∗ expi,j,m + β2earningsj,t−1 + β3expi,j,m + controls+
γ1Analyst+ γ2Firm−Month+ εi,j,m
I run a similar regression using the rank measure, where earnings is replaced with rank and exp
is replaced with expr. The coefficient of interest is on the interaction term, β1. Hypothesis 1A
predicts that β1 is positive, which would mean that following a high earnings announcement in
the past year, the analysts with high extrapolation experience give a higher forecast. Standard
errors are clustered by analyst.
Importantly, I include a firm-month fixed effect in all specifications. By including a firm-
month fixed effect, all comparisons are made between forecasts for the same series with the
same publicly available information. Therefore, results cannot be driven by different types of
analysts covering different types of firms, or analysts being assigned to cover firms with similar
levels of earnings persistence to their own experience.
I control for the analyst’s number of years experience and the number of firms covered
by the analyst, each interacted with past earnings. This helps address concerns that analysts
may extrapolate more or less based on how many years they have been working as an analyst,
or how many firms they are currently covering. I also control for the number of days before
announcement that a forecast was issued. Previous literature has found that analysts start with
an optimistic forecast and then “walk-down” their estimates as the official announcement draws
closer (Richardson et al. (2010)). By controlling the number of days before announcement, I
ensure the results are not driven by analysts with different levels of extrapolation experience
issuing their forecasts earlier or later in the announcement cycle.
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The results are shown in Table 2. All specifications include a firm-month fixed effect, so
forecasts are only compared to others made for the same announcement at the same time.
In columns (1)-(4), I use the earnings and exp measures that are constructed using scaled
earnings levels. Column (1) shows the baseline regression without an analyst fixed effect, and
the coefficient on the interaction term is positive and significant. Column (2) adds in analyst
fixed effects, and the coefficient on the interaction term is nearly identical. So, the observed effect
is not driven by specific analysts being more optimistic or extrapolative on average. Instead,
an analyst becomes more or less extrapolative as she accrues different levels of extrapolation
experience through direct observation of covered firms. Because all results are shown within
firm-month, the results cannot be driven by systematic differences between the analysts assigned
to cover a given firm at a given time.
In response to a 1 standard deviation increase in the past earnings variable, an analyst
with extrapolation experience at the 10th percentile increases their estimate by 0.004, while an
analyst with extrapolation experience at the 90th percentile increases their estimate by 0.034.4
The difference between these two values represents 12.8% of the median within firm-month
standard deviation of estimates.
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 2 show results splitting the earnings variable into five quintiles
in order to check if the documented effect is monotonic. earnings1 is an indicator equal to 1
if earnings is in the top 20th percentile of all earnings in its year, earnings2 is an indicator
equal to 1 if earnings is in the 20th to 40th percentile, and so on. The coefficients on all of the
interaction terms are compared to the bottom 20th percentile earnings, which is the group that
is left out of the regression. Column (3) shows the results with only firm-month fixed effects,
while column (4) adds in analyst fixed effects. In both specifications, the coefficient on the
interaction term is monotonically decreasing from the top 20th percentile to the bottom 20th
percentile earnings. This provides evidence that the main results are not driven only by the
extremes.
Columns (5)-(8) of Table 2 repeat the previous analysis using rank and expr in place of
earnings and exp. Results and magnitudes are similar across all specifications. In response to a
1 standard deviation increase in the past rank variable, an analyst with extrapolation experience
at the 10th percentile increases their estimate by 0.018, while an analyst with extrapolation
410th: 0.11 ∗ 0.08 ∗ 0.41 = 0.0036; 90th: 1.03 ∗ 0.08 ∗ 0.41 = 0.0337
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experience at the 90th percentile increases their estimate by 0.041.5 The difference between these
two values represents 9.9% of the median within firm-month standard deviation of estimates.
Heterogeneous Effects
Next, I examine if analysts are more likely to rely on their extrapolation experience when
information other than the past earnings level is less available. I directly test this for two
subsamples: forecasts made earlier in the announcement cycle and forecasts made for smaller
firms. To do so, I run the following regression using either the earnings or rank measure:
forecasti,j,m = α+β1subj,t ∗earningsj,t−1 ∗expi,j,m+β2subj,t ∗earningsj,t−1 +β3sub∗expi,j,t
+β4earningsj,t−1∗expi,j,t+β5subj,t+β6earningsj,t−1+β7expi,j,m+controls+γ1Analyst+γ2Firm−Month+εi,j,m
where sub is an indicator variable for either forecasts made close to the realization of the previous
announcement (within 3 months) or forecasts made for smaller firms (market capitalization less
than the median). The prediction is that β1 > 0, which would mean that analysts making
forecasts in environments with less outside information tend to rely more on their extrapolation
experience.
The results are shown in Table 3. Columns (1) and (2) show results for the early subsample
using the earnings and rank variables respectively. I find that the coefficient on the triple
interaction term, β1, is positive and significant for both specifications. This shows that analysts
may extrapolate more from the past earnings announcement if that information is fresh and
there is less outside information impacting their forecasts. Columns (3) and (4) show results
for the small subsample, a proxy for firms with less publicly available information. Again, β1 is
positive and significant. Because all specifications include a firm-month fixed effect, the result
cannot be driven by systematic differences in forecasts made earlier or later in the announcement
cycle or for smaller or larger firms.
Individual Forecast Errors
The next prediction concerns the error made by analysts in their forecast. A unique feature
of this setting is that higher or lower extrapolation experience does not directly lead to bigger
or smaller errors. It is entirely context dependent: high extrapolation experience is beneficial
510th: 0.39 ∗ 0.27 ∗ 0.17 = 0.0179; 90th: 0.90 ∗ 0.27 ∗ 0.17 = 0.0413
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when the previous earnings announcement is low, and harmful when the previous announcement
is high.
I do not yet want to take a stand on what the firm’s actual earnings process is, so I instead
leverage the observation that analysts are too optimistic on average. In the sample, 58% of
forecasts are too high relative to the realized earnings announcement. Taken together with the
results in the previous section, this implies that analysts with higher extrapolation experience
should be less accurate after high past earnings as they become even more optimistic than they
would be otherwise. On the other hand, analysts with low extrapolation experience become
relatively pessimistic after high past earnings, leading to more accurate forecasts by mitigating
some of the optimism bias. Following low past earnings, I expect the opposite: analysts who
extrapolate more are the relatively pessimistic ones, while analysts who extrapolate less are the
relatively optimistic ones. This leads more extrapolative analysts to be more accurate following
low past earnings.
My measure of error for analyst i covering firm j in month m, errori,j,m, is calculated as:
errori,j,m = |forecasti,j,m − actualj,t|
where actual is the value of the actual earnings per share at announcement scaled by share
price three days before. I take the absolute value of the difference between forecast and actual
because I want a measure of the accuracy of each forecast. A low error corresponds to a more
accurate forecast, while a high error corresponds to a less accurate forecast.
To test Hypothesis 1B, I run the following regression using either the earnings or rank
measure:
errori,j,m = α+β1earningsj,t−1∗expi,j,t+β2earningsj,t−1+β3expi,j,t+controls+γ1Analyst+γ2Firm+εi,j,m
The hypothesis is that β1 > 0. This would correspond to analysts with higher extrapolation
experience making relatively larger errors when the previous earnings level is high, while making
relatively smaller errors when the previous earnings level is low. After high past earnings,
extrapolating more works in the same direction as the optimism bias, leading to even larger
errors. After low past earnings, extrapolating more induces pessimism, bringing the forecast
closer to the actual.
Controls in the regression include the analyst’s number of years of experience, the number
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of firms covered by the analyst, their interactions with past earnings, and the number of days
before announcement the forecast was made. This ensures that results are not driven by more
experienced analysts or analysts making forecasts later in the announcement cycle being more
accurate.
For errors, I am able to compare between firm-months because the error variable is stan-
dardized between announcements: I am able to directly compare two error variables for different
earnings announcements because it is calculated as the difference between the analyst forecast
and the actual announced earnings. By looking across firm-months, the results suggest that a
certain extrapolation experience level can make an analyst more accurate in one situation while
making her less accurate in another. For example, high extrapolation experience can be helpful
for an analyst forecasting firm A with low past earnings, while being hurtful when forecasting
firm B with high past earnings.
Table 4 shows the results for forecast error. Using both the earnings and rank variables,
the coefficient on the interaction between past earnings and extrapolation experience is positive
and significant. This suggests that high extrapolation experience leads to higher error when
forecasting a firm with high past earnings, and lower error when forecasting a firm with low
past earnings. Columns (2) and (4) show results separating the past earnings level into five
bins. Although the results are strongest for firms with past earnings in the top quintile, there
is a general downward trend as we move from the top quintile to the bottom quintile.
The magnitudes are economically significant. If the past earnings level (rank) was higher by
1 standard deviation, an analyst with extrapolation experience at the 10th percentile makes an
error that is 0.241 (0.272) larger. On the other hand, an analyst with extrapolation experience
at the 90th percentile makes an error that is 0.641 (0.405) larger. The difference between the
two represents 16.7% (5.6%) of the mean error in the sample.67
1.2.4 Firm Consensus Forecast Level
Monthly Consensus Forecasts
Next, I aggregate forecasts up to the monthly consensus level in order to test if the consensus
forecast is directly related to the composition of analysts covering the firm, and in particular to
the extrapolation experience of these analysts.
6earnings: 10th: 2.65 ∗ 0.07 + 6.05 ∗ 0.07 ∗ 0.11 = 0.241; 90th: 2.65 ∗ 0.07 + 6.05 ∗ 0.07 ∗ 1.03 = 0.641
7rank : 10th: 0.63 ∗ 0.27 + 0.96 ∗ 0.27 ∗ 0.39 = 0.272; 90th: 0.63 ∗ 0.27 + 0.96 ∗ 0.27 ∗ 0.90 = 0.405
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For each firm in each month, I find the mean forecast, consensusj,m, and the mean extrap-
olation experience among analysts issuing a fresh forecast, meanexpj,m (or meanexprj,m):
consensusj,m = mean(forecasti,j,m) meanexpj,m = mean(expi,j,m)
After aggregating, consensus, meanexp, andmeanexpr are winsorized at the 99% level. earnings
is also winsorized at the 99% level to reduce the impact of outliers. Table 1 Panel C shows sum-
mary statistics at the firm-month level. Each firm-month has an average of nine analysts issuing
a fresh forecast. The aggregated extrapolation experience variable has a similar mean to ex-
trapolation experience at the individual level (0.63), but slightly smaller standard deviation
(0.34).
I want to test if the monthly consensus estimate is related to the average extrapolation
experience of the analysts covering the firm. To do so, I run the following regression at the
firm-month level (for both the earnings and rank measures):
consensusj,m = α+β1earningsj,t−1∗meanexpj,m+β2earningsj,t−1+β3meanexpj,m+controls+γ1Firm+εj,t
Standard errors are clustered by firm.
Hypothesis 1C predicts that the coefficient on the interaction term β1 is positive. This would
mean that the consensus estimate will be high when previous earnings for a firm is high and
the mean analyst covering the firm has high extrapolation experience.
Controls in this regression include market capitalization of the firm, the number of analysts
covering the firm, the mean years of experience across the analysts, and the mean number of
firms covered by analysts issuing a forecast. I also include the interaction terms between these
terms and past earnings, which controls for mechanisms whereby certain groups of analysts are
more or less extrapolative for reasons other than extrapolation experience.
The results are shown in Table 5, columns (1)-(4). The earnings measure is used in columns
(1) and (2), while the rank measure is used in columns (3) and (4). The coefficient on the
interaction term is positive and significant across all specifications. This indicates that high
past earnings induces a group of analysts with high mean extrapolation experience to produce a
higher mean forecast. Following a past earnings announcement level (rank) that is one standard
deviation higher, the change in the mean estimate is 0.011 (0.013) higher if the mean analyst
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has extrapolation experience at the 90th percentile compared to the 10th percentile.89 This
difference represents a 0.15 (0.17) standard deviation change in mean estimate in the sample.
After adding in firm fixed effects, the magnitude of the coefficient drops slightly but remains
positive and significant. With the inclusion of firm fixed effects, the effect cannot be driven
by analysts being assigned to cover firms with earnings persistence similar to their experience,
unless the levels vary together through time. This is less of an issue because analyst coverage
is sticky in the sample. If an analyst covered a firm in a given year, there is an 82% chance she
will cover the same firm in the next year. On the firm side, 75% of analysts covering the median
firm are the same in consecutive years. Furthermore, I show in the next section that errors in
the consensus estimate are predictable with extrapolation experience, so the effect cannot be
driven solely by analysts forecasting firms with similar earnings persistence to their experience.
Monthly Consensus Forecast Errors
The results in the previous section show that the level of the consensus estimate is related to
the interaction between past earnings and the extrapolation experience of the analysts covering.
However, it is possible that analysts with higher extrapolation experience are assigned to forecast
firms with more persistent earnings, so that they correctly extrapolate more or less based on
their experience. In order to directly test if this is the case, I check if errors in the consensus
estimate are predictable.
I calculate the error in the consensus forecast for each firm in each month as the absolute
value of the difference between the mean forecast in a month and the value of the actual earnings
per share at announcement scaled by share price three days before:
consensuserrorj,m = |consensusj,m − actualj,t|
I test if the error made by the consensus estimate varies with extrapolation experience:
consensuserrorj,m = α+ β1earningsj,t−1 ∗meanexpj,m + β2earningsj,t−1 + β3meanexpj,m
+ controls+ γ1Firm+ εj,t
Hypothesis 1D predicts that β1 > 0. The intuition is similar to the individual case. The
8earnings: 10th: 0.08 ∗ 0.24 + 0.18 ∗ 0.08 ∗ 0.22 = 0.022; 90th: 0.08 ∗ 0.24 + 0.18 ∗ 0.08 ∗ 0.99 = 0.033
9rank : 10th: 0.21 ∗ 0.27 + 0.11 ∗ 0.27 ∗ 0.45 = 0.070; 90th: 0.21 ∗ 0.27 + 0.11 ∗ 0.27 ∗ 0.87 = 0.083
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consensus estimate is too optimistic on average: in the sample, 59% of consensus estimates are
higher than the actual announced earnings. Therefore, high earnings in the previous period
should lead analysts with high extrapolation experience to be less accurate by exacerbating
their optimism bias.
Results are shown in Table 5, columns (5)-(8). The earnings measure is used in columns
(5) and (6), while the rank measure is used in columns (7) and (8). Using both measures,
the coefficient on the interaction term is positive and significant both with and without firm
fixed effects. This indicates that the previous result for consensus estimates is not simply a
consequence of analysts covering firms with similar earnings persistence to their experience.
For the baseline regression, for a firm with a past earnings announcement level (rank) that
is one standard deviation higher, the change in error is 0.008 (0.002) higher if the mean extrap-
olation experience is at the 90th percentile compared to the 10th percentile.1011 This difference
represents 33.2% (8.0%) of the mean error in the sample.
Earnings Surprise
Finally, I test if a firm’s earnings surprise is predictable through the extrapolation experience
of analysts covering. To calculate the final consensus estimate for each firm-year (j,t), I consider
only the final estimate made by each analyst between 2 and 30 days before the date of the actual
announcement. The earnings surprise for each firm is calculated as the difference between the
value of the actual announcement scaled by the price three days before announcement and the
mean scaled forecast, each winsorized at the 99% level:




surprise is winsorized at the 99% level to reduce the impact of outliers. Table 1 Panel D shows
summary statistics for earnings surprise. 52% of announcements have positive earnings surprise,
although the mean level of surprise in the sample is slightly negative (-0.08).
There are two main differences between surprise and consensuserror. First, surprise is
constructed using only forecasts made at most 30 days before announcement date. Second,
surprise is signed, meaning it can take on both positive or negative values. This makes it
difficult to predict surprise because we do not know the “correct” level of experience that would
10earnings: 10th: −0.73 ∗ 0.08 + 0.13 ∗ 0.08 ∗ 0.22 = -0.056; 90th: −0.73 ∗ 0.08 + 0.13 ∗ 0.08 ∗ 0.99 = -0.048
11rank : 10th: 0.27 ∗ (−0.07) + 0.02 ∗ 0.27 ∗ 0.45 = -0.017; 90th: 0.27 ∗ (−0.07) + 0.02 ∗ 0.27 ∗ 0.87 = -0.015
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lead to an accurate prediction. For example, consider the case where the analysts covering a
firm have high extrapolation experience. If the firm has low persistence in its earnings, these
analysts will overextrapolate. However, if the firm’s actual earnings persistence is even higher
than the analysts’ experience, these same analysts will not extrapolate enough. Therefore, in
order to make predictions about earnings surprise, we need to compare the analysts’ experience
to a “baseline experience”, where baseline experience is a proxy for the persistence of the firm’s
actual earnings process.
I test two possible measures of baseline experience. The first is based on a firm’s past
earnings persistence, calculated for firms with at least 10 prior years in the sample. For each
firm j at time t, I run a regression with all previous announcements (j, τ) for firm j:
earningsj,τ = α+ β1 ∗ earningsj,τ−1 + εj,τ → firmbaselinej,t := β̂1
The first proxy for baseline experience, firmbaselinej,t, is the coefficient β1 in this regression. A
disadvantage of this measure is that it requires a firm to have at least 10 prior announcements
in the dataset to reduce the noisiness of the measure. I create a second proxy for baseline
experience, based on cross-sectional persistence in the firm’s industry in the past year, that
avoids this issue. For firm j at time t, I run a regression with all announcements by firms k in
the same Fama-French 12 industry as firm j at time t− 1:
earningsk,t−1 = α+ β1 ∗ earningsk,t−2 + εk,t−1 → indbaselinej,t := β̂1
The second proxy for baseline experience, indbaselinej,t, is the coefficient β1 in this regression.
Hypothesis 1E states that the difference between the mean extrapolation experience of an-
alysts issuing a forecast and a suitable baseline will predict if the composition of analysts
extrapolates too much or too little. I calculate finexpj,t as the mean extrapolation experience
of analysts issuing a forecast for firm j between 2 and 30 days before the actual announcement,
and find the difference between finexp and each of the baselines:
difffirmexpj,t = finexpj,t − firmbaselinej,t diffindexpj,t = finexpj,t − indbaselinej,t
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To test Hypothesis 1E, I run the following regression:
surprisej,t = α+β1earningsj,t−1 ∗ diffexpj,t +β2earningsj,t−1 +β3diffexpj,t + controls+ εj,t
where diffexp is either difffirmexp or diffindexp. Standard errors are double-clustered by firm
and announcement date.
The prediction is that the coefficient β1 is negative. This would mean that following high past
earnings, analysts with high extrapolation experience relative to the baseline will extrapolate too
much and overshoot the actual, leading to negative surprise. On the other hand, analysts with
extrapolation experience lower than the baseline will not extrapolate enough and undershoot
the actual, leading to positive surprise.
Controls in the regression include firm and analyst characteristics that may impact surprise,
including market capitalization of the firm, the number of analysts covering the firm, the ana-
lysts’ mean years of experience, and the analysts’ mean number of firms covered. I additionally
control for the interaction between each of these variables and past earnings level, in order to
account for their possible impact on extrapolation.
The results are presented in Table 6. Panel A shows results using the firm’s past earnings
as a baseline, using both earnings and rank variables. The dependent variable in columns (1)
and (2) is surprise, while the dependent variable in columns (3) and (4) is the sign of surprise.
Across all specifications, the coefficient on the interaction term is negative and significant. This
means that following high past earnings, if the composition of analysts covering the firm has
a higher extrapolation experience than the firm’s past earnings persistence, the firm will have
lower earnings surprise and a higher chance of negative surprise. Panel B shows results using the
cross-sectional earnings persistence of the firm’s industry as the baseline experience. Because
the industry baseline measure does not require a firm to have at least 10 prior announcements
in the dataset, the number of observations increases by almost three times. The coefficient on
the interaction term remains negative and significant across all specifications.
The effects are economically meaningful: following a one standard deviation increase in past
earnings, if the difference between mean extrapolation experience and the baseline is at the 90th
percentile (compared to the 10th percentile), earnings surprise is lower by around 0.10 standard
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deviations 1213 and the chance of negative surprise is around 2.0% higher (off a baseline of
48.3%)1415.
1.3 Individual Investor Trading
The second setting I explore is individual investor buying and selling decisions. This setting
has been investigated in past research to provide evidence for a multitude of biases.16
1.3.1 Data
I use transaction and holdings data of 78,000 households from a large discount brokerage
firm between 1991 and 1996. This dataset has been used extensively, first by Odean (1998). I
adjust the sample in a number of ways, detailed below:
• Some households have multiple accounts. I aggregate transaction and holdings data up
to the household level.
• I drop all transactions with negative commission, indicating cancelled trades.
• Following Huang (2017), households who made short sales are excluded.
• Households holding fewer than five stocks at the beginning of the year are excluded.
• I restrict the sample to only “new buys” and “new sells”. A new buy is a stock that did
not exist in the household’s portfolio at any point prior to the purchase, and is the first
time a household purchases a particular stock in the transactions dataset. A new sell is
the first time a household sells a particular stock in the transactions dataset.
• I merge the dataset with CRSP data on daily returns, and restrict to transactions involving
common stocks with valid daily returns for the twenty days prior to the transaction date.
12firm baseline: 10th: 0.11∗0.06+(−0.02)∗0.061∗(−0.46) = 0.007; 90th: 0.11∗0.06+(−0.02)∗0.061∗(0.65) =
0.006
13ind baseline: 10th: 0.05 ∗ 0.08 + (−0.02) ∗ 0.08 ∗ (−0.49) = 0.005; 90th: 0.05 ∗ 0.08 + (−0.02) ∗ 0.08 ∗ (0.49) =
0.003
14firm baseline: 10th: 0.06∗0.26 + (−0.28)∗0.06∗ (−0.46) = 0.023; 90th: 0.06∗0.26 + (−0.28)∗0.06∗ (0.65) =
0.004.
15ind baseline: 10th: 0.23 ∗ 0.08 + (−0.24) ∗ 0.08 ∗ (−0.49) = 0.027; 90th: 0.23 ∗ 0.08 + (−0.24) ∗ 0.08 ∗ (0.49) =
0.009.
16For example, investors are more likely to invest in stocks headquartered in their local area (French and
Poterba (1991), Seasholes and Zhu (2010)), attention-grabbing stocks (Barber and Odean (2008)), and stocks
they have previously sold for a gain (Strahelivitz et al. (2011)).
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1.3.2 Hypotheses
Under the basic assumption that purchasing a stock indicates positive expectations about a
stock’s future return and selling a stock indicates negative expectations about a stock’s future
return, I make the following predictions:
Hypothesis 2A: An investor who has experienced more “trending” stocks will be more likely
to purchase a stock that has recently gone up.
I define a “trending” stock as a stock where a positive monthly return is more often followed
by another positive monthly return, and a negative monthly return is more often followed by
another negative monthly return. The hypothesis states that investors who have experienced
more of this type of stock will be more likely to purchase a stock that has done well in the past
month, expecting that positive return to continue. The precise trending experience measure is
shown in Section 3.3.
Hypothesis 2B: An investor who has experienced more “trending” stocks will be more likely
to sell a stock that has recently gone down
The same investor will be more likely to sell a stock in her portfolio that has gone down
recently, expecting that poor return to continue. Sell decisions are driven by many factors, such
as liquidity needs, the disposition effect (Odean (1998)), and tax considerations. Therefore, the
effect I am studying may be less pronounced for sales compared to purchases.
1.3.3 Trending Experience
I build a measure of experience that captures the proportion of stocks a household has
directly observed whose monthly returns follow a “trending” pattern as opposed to a “reverting”
pattern. In this context, a “trending” pattern is a positive monthly return followed by another
positive monthly return, or a negative monthly return followed by another negative monthly
return. A “reverting” pattern is a positive monthly return followed by a negative monthly
return, or a negative monthly return followed by a positive monthly return.
For each household i, I look at its portfolio at the beginning of year t and use that as a
proxy for the stocks they directly observe in year t-1. For each stock j in the portfolio, I record
its monthly raw returns in the past year. I compute a variable trendj,t−1 as:
trendj,t−1 =
∑12
m=1 1(retj,m>=0|retj,m−1>=0) + 1(retj,m<0|retj,m−1<0)
12
22
At the stock level, this variable captures the proportion of monthly returns in the past year
that had the same sign as the return in the month before. Results are similar using a stock’s
market-adjusted returns as opposed to raw returns (see Appendix 1B).
At the household level, the main measure of experience for household i is the equal-weighted
mean of trendj,t−1 across the stocks held in the household’s portfolio at the beginning of the
year:
expi,t = mean(trendj,t−1)
Alternatively, I calculate a value-weighted experience measure that puts more weight on stocks
investor i has more money invested in, and may pay closer attention to. Details about the
construction of the alternative measure and results using that measure are shown in Appendix
1B.
Table 7 Panel A shows summary statistics for household-level portfolio holdings and trending
experience. The mean number of stocks held in the portfolio is around 10, and the mean size
of the portfolio is around $105,000. Trending experience has a mean of 0.51 with a standard
deviation of 0.06. Figure 2 shows a density plot for the exp variable. The equal-weighted
trending experience spikes around some round numbers (0.5, for example), due to the way it is
constructed.
Table 7 Panel B shows summary statistics at the transaction level. In total, there are around
180,000 buy transactions and around 180,000 sell transactions. Purchases tend to happen
following positive returns (4.0%, 2.7% market-adjusted) for the targeted stock in the past month,
which is evidence that people extrapolate on average at the monthly level. Sales are also more
likely for stocks with a positive return (4.0%, 3.1% market-adjusted) in the past month. This
is consistent with the disposition effect, as stocks are more likely to be at a gain relative to
purchase price if they performed well in the past month.
1.3.4 Methodology
I test if households that have experienced more trending stocks purchase stocks that have
performed well in the past month while selling stocks that have performed poorly in the past
month. To do so, I run the following regression at the transaction level, separately for purchases
and sales:
retj,m = α+ β1expi,t + controls+ γ1Firm+ εj,m
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retj,m is the return over the last month (past 20 trading days) of a stock bought or sold by
a household, winsorized at the 99% level. expi,t is the trending experience of the household
making the transaction. Standard errors are double-clustered by household and stock.
For purchases, Hypothesis 2A predicts that β1 > 0, which would mean that households with
higher trending experience typically buy stocks that have a larger return in the past month.
For sales, Hypothesis 2B predicts that β1 < 0, which would mean that households with a higher
trending experience typically sell stocks that have a smaller return in the past month.
The transactions sample is restricted to only the first time a particular household buys and
sells a specific stock. Restricting to only new transactions ensures that I am not picking up
on trading motives unrelated to expectations about the stock’s return going forward, such as
rebalancing. It also rules out the concern that a stock currently held in the portfolio will impact
the experience measure for the household along with being more likely to be repurchased.
For each trade, I control for the size of the trade, the size of the portfolio of the household
making the trade, and the number of positions the household has in its portfolio. This helps
alleviate concerns that households with different levels of trading experience or wealth may have
different return chasing tendencies.
I run specifications of the main regression that include firm fixed effects. Including firm
fixed effects shows that two households with different trending experience purchase the same
stock but at different times. It is more difficult to identify variation within household because
the dataset only runs for six years, and the median household has a valid exp value in only
two years. I do control for demographic information when available in order to ensure that the
effect is not driven by observable characteristics of the household.
1.3.5 Results
Purchase Decisions
I first explore purchases made by households. Hypothesis 2A predicts that households with
higher trending experience will purchase stocks that have done well in the past month.
Figure 3 (top panel) plots the relationship between the past month return of a new stock
purchased by a household and the trending experience of that household. Transactions are
sorted by trending experience into five bins with the same number of observations in each bin.
There is a generally upward sloping relationship: the higher the trending experience of the
household, the greater the past month’s return of the stock they purchase. The pattern remains
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similar after adding in firm fixed effects. So, two different households who buy the same stock
will do so at different times depending on their trending experience. The relationship between
trending experience and past month return of a purchased stock is not solely driven by interest
in different sets of stocks.
Table 8 shows the results for purchases in regression form. The coefficient on the trending
experience variable is positive and significant across all specifications, signifying that households
with higher levels of trending experience typically purchase stocks that have done better in the
past month. This effect holds both across and between firms. Column (1) shows the baseline
regression, which does not include firm fixed effects. Column (2) adds in firm fixed effects, and
the coefficient remains similar in magnitude. This tells us that households with different levels
of trending experience will purchase the same stock at different times, rather than selecting
from a different pool of stocks altogether. For the baseline specification, moving from the 10th
percentile to the 90th percentile of expi,t is associated with a household purchasing a stock that
has a 308 basis point higher return in the past month. After the inclusion of a firm fixed effect,
the magnitude drops slightly to 222 basis points.17
Columns (3) and (4) add in demographic controls. The results are largely similar, although
the number of observations drops by about half due to missing demographic information. The
relationship between trending experience and past month’s return of a purchased stock is not
driven by observable differences in household age, gender, or years of experience.
Sale Decisions
Next, I study sale decisions. Hypothesis 2B predicts that households with higher trending
experience will sell stocks after they have performed poorly in the past month.
Figure 3 (bottom panel) plots the relationship between the past month’s return of a new
stock sold by a household and the trending experience of that household. There is a generally
downward sloping relationship: the higher the trending experience of the household, the lower
the past month return of the stock they sell. Investors with higher trending experience expect
the low past month return to continue, making them more likely to sell the stock. The pattern
is similar after adding in firm fixed effects. For two households who sell the same stock, the one
with the higher trending experience tends to do so when the past month’s return of the stock
was worse.
17Baseline: 0.146 ∗ 0.211 = 0.0308; With Firm FE : 0.146 ∗ 0.152 = 0.0222
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Table 9 shows the results in regression form. Column (1) shows the results of the baseline
regression. The coefficient on expi,t is negative and significant. This indicates that sales made by
households with higher trending experience tend to be for stocks that have performed relatively
poorly in the past month. Column (2) adds in firm fixed effects, and the result is similar.
This suggests that investors with different trending experience decide to sell the same stock at
different times, rather than selling different sets of stocks altogether. The results are similar
after including demographic controls. For the baseline specification, moving from the 10th to
the 90th percentile of expi,t is associated with a household selling a stock with a 85 basis points
lower past month return. After including a firm fixed effect, the magnitude increases slightly to
115 basis points.18
The coefficients for sales are negative and significant for all specifications, but the point
estimates are smaller than their counterparts for purchases. This may be due to the fact that
the decision to sell a stock is often influenced by factors other than beliefs about the stock’s
prospects going forward. Alternate motives such as tax-related reasons, liquidity needs, and
the disposition effect have been shown to play a large role in the selling decision. To see if
any of these factors are impacting my results, I test whether the effect holds across different
subsamples.
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 10 show results when restricting the sample to only sales made
outside of the month of December. Most tax-loss sales are made in December as that is the
end date for locking in a capital loss for the next tax cycle. When I limit to sales made in
January-November, the coefficient on the main variable of interest is nearly identical. Columns
(3) and (4) restrict to sales that were not made on the same day as a buy order, to proxy for
sales that were not made for liquidity reasons. The results are not significantly different from
the full sample. Finally, columns (5)-(8) split the sample into sales that were made at a gain
(relative to the most recent purchase price) and sales that were made at a loss. This is done
in order to capture possible differential impacts of disposition-effect motivated transactions.
There is a sizeable drop in the number of observations here because I am not able to observe
the purchase price of stocks that were bought prior to the beginning of the dataset. Nevertheless,
the effect I find is similar in magnitude for both subsamples. So, the relationship between a
household’s trending experience and recent return of a sold stock is not driven by tax, liquidity,
or disposition effect related factors.
18Baseline: 0.144 ∗ 0.059 = 0.0085; With Firm FE : 0.144 ∗ 0.080 = 0.0115
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Mitigating the Disposition Effect
The disposition effect is the phenomenon that investors are more prone to sell stocks that
have risen in value since purchase, rather than those that have fallen in value. Using the same
discount brokerage dataset, Odean (1998) found that 57% of sales are made at a price higher
than their purchase price, and that these transactions are suboptimal on average. In my context,
trending experience can either mitigate or intensify the disposition effect. Investors with high
trending experience are more likely to sell stocks after they have performed poorly in the past
month, mitigating the disposition effect by making it less likely that the sell price is above the
purchase price. On the other hand, investors with low trending experience are more likely to
sell stocks after they have performed well in the past month, intensifying the disposition effect
by making it more likely that the sell price is above the purchase price.
There are a total of 98,599 sell transactions where I am able to track the purchase price.
Of those, 55,903 (56.7%) were sold at a price greater than the purchase price, similar to Odean
(1998). I split the sell transactions into quintiles based on the trending experience of the
household making the transaction. Investors in the top trending experience quintile only exhibit
minor disposition effect selling tendencies: out of the 20,565 sales, only 10,425 (50.7%) were
made at a gain. In contrast, out of the 19,212 sales made by investors in the bottom trending
experience quintile, 11,295 (58.8%) were made at a gain.
1.3.6 Discussion
The effect I document on trading behavior differs from the majority of previous studies
because it speaks to the timing of the decision to buy or sell, rather than the actual choice of
stock itself. In addition, the effect is about cross-sectional changes in demand among individual
investors, whereas most previously documented biases speak to aggregate demand from individ-
ual investors. A stock that currently looks appealing to a high trending experience investor is
unappealing to a low trending experience investor, and vice versa. A related paper is Dhar and
Kumar (2001), who classify investors into momentum traders and contrarian investors based
on their past trading decisions. They find that more sophisticated investors are often contrar-
ian, and that these contrarian strategies exhibit better performance. The results of this paper
present a potential source of the trend chasing or contrarian behavior, and taken together with
the results from Dhar and Kumar (2001) suggest that past experience can be both beneficial or
harmful to household wealth.
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1.4 Aggregate Market Survey
The final empirical setting investigates survey data on expectations for the aggregate stock
market. In this setting, people have been shown to be overextrapolative on average (Greenwood
and Shleifer (2014)). In my context, I test if it is possible to identify who is more extrapolative
in the cross-section, given their level of experience with stock market return autocorrelation.
1.4.1 Data
Data on individual-level expectations for the aggregate stock market comes from the Gallup
investor survey, which has previously been used in Vissing-Jorgensen (2004) and Greenwood
and Shleifer (2014). For my main tests, I require individual-level data on expectations and
years of financial experience. The Gallup survey has responses to these questions at a monthly
frequency between 1999 and 2007, with between 800 to 1000 respondents per month. The survey
is restricted to individuals who are responsible for making decisions about how to handle savings
and investments within the household, and to households that have at least $10,000 invested in
stocks, bonds, mutual funds, or a self-directed retirement account. I use the following questions
from the survey:
• How long have you been investing in the financial markets?
• On a five-point scale, as far as the general condition of the economy is concerned, how
would you rate the performance of the stock market over the next twelve months?
• Thinking about the stock market more generally, what overall rate of return do you think
the stock market will provide investors during the coming twelve months? (1999-2003.4)
• Investor characteristics (gender, income, amount invested in stocks, employment status,
retirement status)
Table 11 Panel A shows summary statistics on the individuals surveyed. There is a mix
of people of different ages (10th percentile: 33 years; 90th percentile: 70 years), financial
experience (10th percentile: 5 years; 90th percentile: 30 years), and gender (58% male). People
are in general optimistic, with the median level of optimism being a 4 out of 5.
For aggregate-level tests, I turn to data from the University of Michigan survey of U.S.
consumers, which has the benefit of being a longer time series (monthly between 2002-2020).
The question I use from this survey is:
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• Suppose that tomorrow someone were to invest one thousand dollars in a mutual fund
known as a diversified stock fund. What do you think is the percent chance that this one
thousand dollar investment will increase in value in the year ahead?
The Michigan dataset is aggregated within three age groups: 34 and younger, between 35 and
54, and 55 and older. The reported number is the mean response to the survey question in each
of the three age groups. Table 11 Panel B shows summary statistics for this dataset. There are
a total of around 1000 responses per month, with around 15% from the youngest group, 35%
from the middle group, and 50% from the oldest group each month. In general, younger people
are more optimistic: they respond an average of 58% chance of stock market increase compared
to 55% for the middle group and 49% for the oldest group.
I supplement the survey data with aggregate stock market returns from CRSP to calculate
autocorrelation of yearly returns and the level of past return.
1.4.2 Hypotheses
The survey asks individuals for their expectations on the return on the aggregate market
over the next 12 months. Therefore, I proxy for an individual’s extrapolation experience as the
autocorrelation of annual stock market returns in their years of financial experience, and use
past 12-month returns as the measure of recent returns.
Hypothesis 3A: Individuals who have experienced the stock market being more autocorrelated
in their years of financial experience will be more extrapolative in their forecasts.
This prediction is analogous to the main prediction in the previous settings. When the
return in the past year is high, I predict that individuals with higher extrapolation experience
will be more optimistic. When return in the past year is low, these individuals will be more
pessimistic.
Hypothesis 3B: When the past return is high, individuals with higher extrapolation experience
will make larger errors. When the past return is low, individuals with higher extrapolation
experience will make smaller errors.
In this survey, people are too optimistic on average: 73% of responses to the question about
numerical estimate are higher than the actual realized return on the market in the next year.
Combining this with my measure of extrapolation, I hypothesize that the people with high
extrapolation experience will become even more optimistic when past return is high, leading to
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predictably larger errors. On the other hand, when the past return is low, the people with high
extrapolation experience will be relatively pessimistic, and make relatively smaller errors.
Hypothesis 3C: At the aggregate level, people will be more extrapolative after periods of high
autocorrelation.
When recent levels of autocorrelation are high, the mean level of extrapolation experience
will increase. I predict that this will lead to people being more extrapolative on average.
Hypothesis 3D: At the aggregate level, younger people will become relatively more extrapolative
(compared to older people) after periods of high autocorrelation.
The experience effects hypothesis predicts that younger people will be more impacted by
recent events, as it makes up a larger portion of their experience. Applying that to the main
hypothesis of this paper yields the prediction that younger people will believe stock market
returns are more persistent if the recent level of autocorrelation in the market is high.
1.4.3 Extrapolation Experience Measure
I calculate extrapolation experience at the individual level as the autocorrelation of the
yearly aggregate stock market over the years of financial experience that the individual has.
For example, for someone who has 20 years of financial experience in the year 2003, I take their
extrapolation experience to be the autocorrelation of the market between 1983 and 2002. Thus,
the main measure of (“demeaned”) extrapolation experience for an individual in year t with k
years of experience is:
expt,k =
∑t−1
i=(t−k)(ri − r̄)(ri+1 − r̄)∑t
i=(t−k)(ri − r̄)2
where ri is the return of the aggregate stock market in year i and r̄ is the mean yearly aggregate
return between years t − k and t. Intuitively, this measure is larger when an individual has
experienced that a return greater than the mean is normally followed by another return that is
greater than the mean.
I also construct an alternative measure of (“non demeaned”) extrapolation experience, or









This measure is larger when an individual has experienced that a return greater than zero is
normally followed by another return that is greater than zero. This alternative measure may
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be more suitable in this context because of the nature of the questions asked in the surveys.
The survey questions ask if a person is optimistic about the stock market, or how likely they
think the market will go up in the next 12 months. An obvious (and valid) interpretation of
this question is if the stock market will have return greater than zero in the next year, rather
than a return greater than their mean experienced level. When I calculate exp0, it captures
the idea that if a person believes the stock market will increase by a small amount like 3% in
the next period, she can still be “optimistic” because the return is positive, even if it is smaller
than the average return in her experience.
Table 11 Panel A shows summary statistics on both measures of extrapolation experience
in this setting. exp has a mean of 0.05 and a standard deviation of 0.23, while exp0 has a mean
of 0.49 and a standard deviation of 0.17.
1.4.4 Methodology and Results
Individual-Level Forecasts
The main hypothesis of this section is that individuals who have experienced the aggregate
stock market being more autocorrelated in their years of financial experience will be more ex-
trapolative in their beliefs. When using demeaned extrapolation experience, I run the following
regression:
esti,t = α+ β1(rett−1 − r̄i,t−1) ∗ expi,t + β2(rett−1 − r̄i,t−1) + β3expi,t + controls+ εi,t
where esti,t is either the level of optimism on a 1-5 scale or the numerical estimate for next
12-month return (winsorized at the 99% level) given by the survey respondent. rett−1 is the
return on the aggregate stock market and r̄i is the mean return on the aggregate stock market
over the years of financial experience for individual i. expt is the extrapolation experience of
the individual, using the demeaned autocorrelation function. Standard errors are clustered by
survey date.
When using exp as the measure of extrapolation experience, I use the past 12-month return
relative to experienced return of the individual (rett−1− r̄i) as the measure of recent past return.
By doing this, I keep consistent the way in which the individual perceives stock market returns.
She evaluates both the persistence of the stock market as well as the level of past returns relative
to the level that she has experienced.
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When using exp0 as the measure of extrapolation experience, I modify the regression slightly:
esti,t = α+ β1rett−1 ∗ exp0i,t + β2rett−1 + β3exp0i,t + controls+ εi,t
Here, I use the raw level of returns over the past 12 months, rett−1, as the measure of recent
past returns. Again, this is done to keep the measures consistent: both the persistence of the
stock market and the level of past returns are evaluated relative to zero. In both regressions,
Hypothesis 3A predicts that β1 > 0. This would mean that following a high past return, the
survey respondents with high extrapolation experience are more optimistic about the stock
market in the next year.
I control for the number of years of financial experience (and years of financial experience
squared), age (and age squared), gender, income, stock market holdings, employment status,
and retirement status, all interacted with the level of past return. These controls ensure that I
am not picking up on other characteristics that may impact an individual’s likelihood to have
more extrapolative beliefs. The age control ensures that I am picking up on a different effect
than Cassella and Gulen (2018), who find that younger people are more likely to extrapolate.
The stock market holdings variable controls for the effect found in Harzmark et al. (2020) that
individuals who hold an asset extrapolate more on that asset.
Column (1) of Table 12 shows the results of the baseline regression using optimism on
a 1-5 scale as the dependent variable. Column (2) shows the same regression, but using the
actual numerical estimate given by survey respondents during shorter sample for which data are
available. As predicted by Hypothesis 3A, the coefficient on the interaction term between past
return relative to experience and extrapolation experience is positive and significant for both
specifications. This means that, following a high relative aggregate market return over the past
12 months, people with a high level of extrapolation experience will become more optimistic
and give a higher estimate for future return. Columns (4) and (5) repeat the optimism and
estimate regressions, but instead use the non-demeaned autocorrelation experience and the
absolute level of past aggregate market return. The results are qualitatively and quantitatively
similar to before.
Following a one standard deviation increase in past excess return, someone with exp at
the 10th percentile increases their optimism level by 0.00 and their estimate by 0.90%19, while
19Optimism: 0.17 ∗ 0.17 + 0.71 ∗ 0.17 ∗ (−0.24) = 0.00; Estimate: 0.09 ∗ 0.17 + 0.11 ∗ 0.17 ∗ (−0.31) = 0.88%
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someone with exp at the 90th percentile increases their optimism by 0.07 and their estimate by
2.08%.20 The difference in optimism represents a 0.07 standard deviation change in optimism
in the sample, while the difference in estimates represents a 0.11 standard deviation change in
estimates in the sample. Using exp0, following a one standard deviation increase in past return,
someone with exp0 at the 10th percentile increases their optimism by 0.15 and their estimate
by 1.76%21 while someone at the 90th percentile increases their optimism by 0.19 and their
estimate by 2.97%.22
Consistent with Greenwood and Shleifer (2014), the average person is extrapolative: even
someone with a low level of extrapolation experience increases their optimism after high past
returns. However, the results suggest that people with higher levels of extrapolation experience
tend to increase their optimism and estimate by a larger amount following high past returns.
Individual Forecast Errors
Next, I test if the size of the error made by respondents is related to the interaction of recent
past return and extrapolation experience. I define errori,t as the absolute value of the difference
between the estimated return on the stock market in the next 12 months and the actual realized
return:
errori,t = |rt − esti,t|
The errori,t variable is a measure of forecast accuracy. A lower error corresponds to a more
accurate forecast, while a higher error corresponds to a less accurate forecast. I run a similar
regression as before, but instead use error as the dependent variable:
errori,t = α+ β1(rett−1 − r̄i,t−1) ∗ expi,t + β2(rett−1 − r̄i,t−1) + β3expi,t + controls+ εi,t
errori,t = α+ β1rett−1 ∗ exp0i,t + β2rett−1 + β3exp0i,t + controls+ εi,t
Hypothesis 3B predicts β1 > 0, which would mean that following high past return, people
with high levels of extrapolation experience make larger errors. Following low past returns,
these same people make smaller errors. This is because people in the survey are over-optimistic
on average: 73% of respondents give an estimate for next year’s return that is too high, and
20Optimism: 0.17 ∗ 0.17 + 0.71 ∗ 0.17 ∗ 0.37 = 0.07; Estimate: 0.09 ∗ 0.17 + 0.11 ∗ 0.17 ∗ 0.32 = 2.06%
21Optimism: 0.66 ∗ 0.17 + 0.70 ∗ 0.17 ∗ 0.36 = 0.15; Estimate: 0.01 ∗ 0.19 + 0.22 ∗ 0.19 ∗ 0.40 = 1.76%
22Optimism: 0.66 ∗ 0.17 + 0.70 ∗ 0.17 ∗ 0.68 = 0.19; Estimate: 0.01 ∗ 0.19 + 0.22 ∗ 0.19 ∗ 0.70 = 2.97%
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forecasts are on average 13% higher than the actual realized return. Extrapolating more after
a large return makes the forecast even more optimistic, and further from the actual return.
Extrapolating more after a small return makes the forecast relatively pessimistic, mitigating
some of the optimism bias.
Columns (3) and (6) of Table 12 show the results with error as the dependent variable.
The coefficient on the interaction between past return and extrapolation experience is positive
and significant using both exp and exp0. The effect is economically meaningful: following a
one standard deviation increase in past excess return, someone with exp at the 10th percentile
reduces their error by 7.9% more than someone with exp at the 90th percentile. The difference
represents a reduction of 37.6% of the mean error in the sample. For exp0, following a one
standard deviation increase in past return, someone with exp0 at the 10th percentile reduces
their error by 10.0% more than someone at the 90th percentile, a reduction in error of 48.1%
of the mean.23
Aggregate-Level Forecasts
Next, I test if the aggregate level of extrapolation is related to recent levels of autocorrelation
in the market. Here, the data comes from the Michigan Survey of Consumers, which is a longer
time series running monthly between 2002-2020. I run a regression of the form
avgoptt = α+ β1rett−1 ∗ acrt + β2rett−1 + β3acrt + εt
where rett−1 is the return on the market in the past year (either in excess of the mean return
over the past 10 years or raw return), acrt is autocorrelation of the market in the past 10 years
(either demeaned or not demeaned), and avgoptt is the mean response to the survey question
about the percentage chance of the stock market increasing in value in the next year. This
is calculated as the mean of the percentages given by the three age groups, weighted by the
number of responses in each group. Under the same reasoning as before, I use return in excess
of the mean with demeaned autocorrelation, and absolute level of return with non-demeaned
autocorrelation. The results are qualitatively similar using the past eight, 12, or 15 years as the
proxy for recent autocorrelation.
Hypothesis 3C predicts that β1 > 0, which would mean that, following periods of high return
2310th: −1.51 ∗ 0.19 + 1.81 ∗ 0.19 ∗ 0.40 = -14.59%; 90th: −1.51 ∗ 0.19 + 1.81 ∗ 0.19 ∗ 0.70 = -4.56%
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in the market, people are more optimistic on average if the recent level of autocorrelation in the
market is high. Table 13 shows the results of the mean optimism level regression. Panel A uses
the demeaned measure of autocorrelation, while Panel B uses the non-demeaned measure of
autocorrelation. The coefficient on the interaction term is positive and significant across most
specifications. Following a one standard deviation increase in past excess return (past absolute
return), if the demeaned autocorrelation (non-demeaned autocorrelation) of the market in the
past 10 years was at the 10% level, the mean level of optimism is 0.44% (2.52%) higher. If
the recent autocorrelation was at the 90% level, the mean level of optimism is 5.86% (5.79%)
higher. This difference of 5.42% (3.27%) represents a 0.88 (0.53) standard deviation change in
mean optimism in the sample. The results suggest that people extrapolate more on average
when recent autocorrelation is high.
Finally, I test if younger people increase their degree of extrapolation more than older people
following periods of high stock market autocorrelation. To do so, I run a regression of the form:
optdifft = α+ β1 ∗ rett−1 ∗ acrt + β2 ∗ rett−1 + β3 ∗ acrt + εt
where optdifft is the difference in the optimism level between the 54 and younger group and
the 55 and older group. I combine the 34 and younger and the between 35 and 54 groups by
taking the mean response weighted by the number of respondents in each age group. A higher
value of optdiff corresponds to the younger group being more optimistic than the older group.
Hypothesis 3D predicts that β1 > 0, which would mean that younger people become relatively
optimistic following high levels of past return if autocorrelation of returns in the recent past
was high.
Table 14 shows the results of the difference in optimism regression. Panel A uses the de-
meaned measure of autocorrelation, while Panel B uses the non demeaned measure of autocor-
relation. With most proxies for recent autocorrelation, the coefficient on the interaction term is
positive and significant for both specifications. Following a one standard deviation increase in
past excess return (past absolute return), if the demeaned autocorrelation (non-demeaned auto-
correlation) of the market in the past 10 years was at the 10% level, the difference in optimism
between the younger and older groups is 0.35% (0.20%) higher. If the recent autocorrelation
was at the 90% level, the difference between the younger and older groups is 1.47% (1.16%)
higher. This difference of 1.12% (0.96%) represents a 0.47 (0.40) standard deviation change in
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optimism difference in the sample.
1.5 Conclusion
In this paper, I document across three different financial settings that experience with differ-
ent levels of persistent processes can impact beliefs. First, analysts who previously covered firms
with more persistent earnings are more extrapolative in their forecasts, leading to predictable
errors. Second, extrapolation experience impacts trading behavior as well: investors who previ-
ously held more trending stocks are more likely to purchase a stock following a positive return,
and are more likely to sell a stock following a negative return. Finally, using survey data on
the aggregate stock market, I find that individuals who have experienced more autocorrelated
market returns are more extrapolative in their forecasts. The results suggest that experience
with characteristics of series other than the level can also be important in guiding beliefs.
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1.6 Tables and Figures
Figure 1.1: Extrapolation Experience Density Plots for Earnings Analysts
This figure shows density plots for extrapolation experience (using earnings level and rank measures) in
the earnings analyst setting. See Section 2.2 for a detailed explanation of the extrapolation experience
measure. The dashed blue line represents the mean of the distribution.
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Figure 1.2: Trending Experience Density Plot for Individual Investors
This figure shows a density plot for equal-weighted trending experience in the individual investor
trading setting. See Section 3.3 for a detailed explanation of the trending experience measure. The
dashed blue line represents the mean of the distribution.
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Figure 1.3: Trending Experience and Return of Transacted Stock
These figures plot the relationship between trending experience of a household and the past month
return of a stock transacted by that household. Transactions are sorted into five bins by trending
experience with the same number of observations in each bin. The top figure shows the relationship for
purchases and the bottom figure shows the relationship for sales. The light blue bars show the baseline
relationship and the dark blue bars show the relationship after adding in firm fixed effects. Vertical
lines represent 95% confidence intervals.
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Table 1.1: Earnings Analyst Summary Statistics
This table presents summary statistics for the I/B/E/S analyst forecast dataset between 1980 and
2019. Only forecasts made by analysts who previously covered at least 10 firm-years are included in the
sample. Panel A contains information at the analyst-year level. Panel B contains information at the
monthly forecast level. Panel C contains information at the monthly consensus level. Panel D contains
information on earnings suprises. For analysts who give multiple forecasts for a given firm in a given
month, I take their mean forecast. Earnings, forecasts, and extrapolation experience are winsorized at
the 99th percentile. Detailed descriptions of the variables can be found in Table A1.
Panel A: Analyst-Year Level (N=69,336)
Mean SD 10% 25% 50% 75% 90%
Extrapolation Experience (Earnings) 0.63 0.44 0.10 0.40 0.68 0.92 1.06
Extrapolation Experience (Rank) 0.67 0.23 0.37 0.55 0.70 0.82 0.92
Extrapolation Experience (Industry Rank) 0.66 0.21 0.39 0.56 0.69 0.80 0.89
Years of Experience 10.76 7.06 4 5 9 15 21
Unique Firms Previously Covered 24.27 19.08 8 12 19 31 47
Firm-Years Previously Covered 74.53 81.30 13 22 47 98 170
Firms Currently Covering 10.80 7.63 2 6 10 14 19
Panel B: Monthly Forecast Level (N=2,506,239)
Mean SD 10% 25% 50% 75% 90%
Extrapolation Experience (Earnings) 0.62 0.42 0.11 0.40 0.67 0.90 1.03
Extrapolation Experience (Rank) 0.66 0.21 0.39 0.55 0.69 0.80 0.90
Extrapolation Experience (Industry Rank) 0.66 0.19 0.41 0.56 0.68 0.79 0.87
Past Year Earnings 0.05 0.07 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.10
Forecast (x100) 5.13 6.78 0.54 2.22 4.70 7.05 9.96
Error (x100) 2.39 6.89 0.09 0.27 0.74 1.82 4.38
Years of Experience 10.90 7.06 4 5 9 15 22
Firms Currently Covering 16.85 11.63 8 11 15 21 27
Analysts Covering 8.10 6.70 2 3 6 11 18
Days Before Next Announcement 204.44 102.88 71 111 200 289 354
Panel C: Monthly Consensus Level (N=677,981)
Mean SD 10% 25% 50% 75% 90%
Mean Extrapolation Experience (Earnings) 0.63 0.34 0.22 0.45 0.66 0.85 0.99
Mean Extrapolation Experience (Rank) 0.67 0.18 0.45 0.58 0.69 0.79 0.87
Mean Extrapolation Experience (Industry Rank) 0.67 0.16 0.47 0.58 0.69 0.77 0.85
Past Year Earnings 0.05 0.08 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.10
Mean Forecast (x100) 5.11 7.17 0.48 2.17 4.62 7.06 1.00
Error (x100) 2.58 7.46 0.09 0.26 0.74 1.91 4.70
Analysts Covering 3.70 4.04 1 1 2 5 9
Market Capitalization ($1,000,000) 5.87 21.33 0.13 0.33 1.04 3.49 11.47
Months Before Next Announcement 5.54 3.53 1 3 6 9 10
Panel D: Earnings Surprises (N=38,960)
Mean SD 10% 25% 50% 75% 90%
Firm Baseline Persistence (Earnings) 0.54 0.37 0.04 0.29 0.57 0.81 0.97
Firm Baseline Persistence (Rank) 0.51 0.32 0.07 0.31 0.54 0.76 0.89
Industry Baseline Persistence (Earnings) 0.63 0.28 0.26 0.44 0.64 0.83 0.96
Industry Baseline Persistence (Rank) 0.68 0.12 0.54 0.62 0.68 0.74 0.80
Earnings Surprise (x100) -0.08 1.44 -0.96 -0.23 0.01 0.27 0.84
Earnings Surprise Sign 0.52 0.50 0 0 1 1 1
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Table 1.2: Individual Forecast Regression Results
This table examines the relationship between the forecast made by an analyst and the interaction between the past earnings announcement for the firm and the
extrapolation experience of the analyst. The dependent variable is the analyst’s forecast for a firm’s next earnings announcement scaled by the firm’s price on
the day before the forecast. The independent variables are the firm’s past earnings (earningsj,t−1), the analyst’s extrapolation experience (expi,t), and their
interaction. The earnings and exp variables are in levels in columns (1) to (4), while they are in rank in columns (5) and (8). earnings1j,t−1 is an indicator
equal to 1 if the firm’s past year earnings level is in the top quintile, earnings2j,t−1 is an indicator equal to 1 if the firm’s past year earnings level is in the
second quintile, and so on. See Section 2.3.1 for a detailed description of the independent variables. All specifications include a firm-month fixed effect, so
forecasts are only compared to other forecasts given for the same firm in the same month. Controls include the log of the number of firms covered by the
analyst, the log of the number of years experience the analyst has, their interactions with the firm’s past earnings level, and the number of days before
announcement the forecast was made. Standard errors are clustered at the analyst level.
Dependent variable: Forecast (x100)
earnings & exp in: Level Rank
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
earningsj,t−1 ∗ expi,t 0.374∗∗ 0.409∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗ 0.172∗∗∗
(0.176) (0.185) (0.057) (0.059)
earnings1j,t−1 ∗ expi,t 0.042∗ 0.040∗ 0.119∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.023) (0.050) (0.051)
earnings2j,t−1 ∗ expi,t 0.034∗∗ 0.040∗∗ 0.038 0.063∗
(0.016) (0.016) (0.038) (0.038)
earnings3j,t−1 ∗ expi,t 0.029∗ 0.032∗∗ 0.041 0.058∗
(0.015) (0.015) (0.035) (0.035)
earnings4j,t−1 ∗ expi,t 0.021 0.025∗ 0.019 0.040
(0.014) (0.014) (0.033) (0.034)
expi,t −0.021∗∗ −0.022∗ −0.029∗ −0.030∗ −0.054∗ −0.084∗∗ −0.024 −0.058
(0.009) (0.013) (0.015) (0.017) (0.032) (0.037) (0.037) (0.040)
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm-Month Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Analyst Fixed Effect NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
Observations 2,506,239 2,506,239 2,506,239 2,506,239 2,506,239 2,506,239 2,506,239 2,506,239
R2 0.976 0.977 0.976 0.977 0.976 0.977 0.976 0.977
Note: SE clustered by analyst ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 1.3: Heterogeneous Effects
This table examines if the extrapolation experience effect is stronger for certain subsamples. The
dependent variable is the an analyst’s forecast for a firm’s next earnings announcement. The
independent variables are the firm’s past earnings level (earningsj,t−1), the analyst’s extrapolation
experience (expi,t), an indicator for the firm belonging to a subsample (subj,t), and their interaction.
Columns (1) and (2) examine forecasts made within 3 months of the previous announcement. Columns
(3) and (4) examine forecasts made for firms with smaller than the median market capitalization in the
sample. The earnings and exp variables are in levels in columns (1) and (3), while they are in rank in
columns (2) and (4). See Section 2.3.2 for a detailed description of the independent variables. Controls
include the log of the number of firms covered by the analyst, the log of the number of years experience
the analyst has, their interactions with the firm’s past earnings level, and the number of days before
announcement the forecast was made. Standard errors are clustered at the analyst level.
Dependent variable: Forecast (x100)
Subsample=Early Subsample=Small
earnings & exp in: Level Rank Level Rank
(1) (2) (3) (4)
earningsj,t−1 ∗ expi,t ∗ subj,t 0.608∗ 0.222∗∗ 0.804∗ 0.274∗∗
(0.364) (0.106) (0.425) (0.139)
earningsj,t−1 ∗ expi,t 0.266 0.118∗∗ 0.139 0.109∗
(0.168) (0.160) (0.194) (0.061)
expi,t ∗ subj,t −0.023 −0.111∗∗ −0.042∗∗ −0.082
(0.018) (0.056) (0.019) (0.065)
expi,t −0.017 −0.057 −0.009 −0.062
(0.012) (0.036) (0.014) (0.038)
Controls YES YES YES YES
Firm-Month Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES
Analyst Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES
Observations 2,506,239 2,506,239 2,506,239 2,506,239
R2 0.977 0.977 0.977 0.977
Note: SE clustered by analyst ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 1.4: Individual Forecast Error Results
This table examines the relationship between the forecast error made by an analyst and the interaction
between the past earnings announcement for the firm and the extrapolation experience of the analyst.
The dependent variable is the analyst’s forecast error. The independent variables are the firm’s past
earnings (earningsj,t−1), the analyst’s extrapolation experience (expi,t), and their interaction. The
earnings and exp variables are in levels in columns (1) and (2), while they are in rank in columns (3)
and (4). earnings1j,t−1 is an indicator equal to 1 if the firm’s past year earnings level is in the top
quintile, earnings2j,t−1 is an indicator equal to 1 if the firm’s past year earnings level is in the second
quintile, and so on. See Section 2.3.3 for a detailed description of the independent variables. Controls
include the log of the number of firms covered by the analyst, the log of the number of years experience
the analyst has, their interactions with the firm’s past earnings level, and the number of days before
announcement the forecast was made. Standard errors are clustered at the analyst level.
Dependent variable: Error (x100)
earnings & exp in: Level Rank
(1) (2) (3) (4)
earningsj,t−1 ∗ expi,t 6.055∗∗∗ 0.964∗∗∗
(0.786) (0.238)
earnings1j,t−1 ∗ expi,t 0.716∗∗∗ 0.783∗∗∗
(0.114) (0.198)
earnings2j,t−1 ∗ expi,t 0.083 0.332∗∗
(0.072) (0.152)
earnings3j,t−1 ∗ expi,t 0.018 0.266∗
(0.066) (0.142)
earnings4j,t−1 ∗ expi,t 0.019 0.303∗∗
(0.064) (0.133)
expi,t 0.254
∗∗∗ 0.390∗∗∗ 0.261∗ 0.352∗∗
(0.056) (0.080) (0.155) (0.178)
Controls YES YES YES YES
Firm Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES
Analyst Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES
Observations 2,505,438 2,505,438 2,505,438 2,505,438
R2 0.577 0.577 0.577 0.577
Note: SE clustered by analyst ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 1.5: Consensus Level Results
This table examines the relationship between the consensus estimate or consensus error and the interaction between the past earnings announcement for the
firm and the mean extrapolation experience of analysts issuing forecasts. In columns (1) to (4), the dependent variable is the mean estimate for all analysts
issuing a forecast for a firm-month. In columns (5) to (8), the dependent variable is the absolute value of the difference between the mean forecast and the
realized earnings level of the forecasted firm. The independent variables are the firm’s past earnings level (earningsj,t−1), the mean extrapolation experience of
analysts issuing a forecast (mean(exp)i,t), and their interaction. Control variables include the number of months before the next announcement, the log of the
number of analysts issuing a forecast, the log of the market cap of the firm, the log of the mean number of years experience of analysts covering, the log of the
mean number of firms covered by analysts covering, and their interactions with the firm’s past earnings level. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
Dependent Variable: Mean Estimate (x100) Error (x100)
earnings & exp in: Level Rank Level Rank
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
earningsj,t−1 ∗mean(expi,t) 17.620∗∗∗ 5.457∗∗∗ 10.541∗∗∗ 2.304∗∗∗ 13.422∗∗∗ 6.218∗∗∗ 1.720∗ 1.015∗∗
(1.923) (1.247) (0.874) (0.438) (3.098) (1.849) (0.952) (0.462)
earningsj,t−1 24.059
∗∗∗ −20.261∗∗∗ 21.033∗∗∗ 3.484∗∗∗ −73.217∗∗∗ −26.424∗∗ −7.248∗∗∗ −2.327∗
(8.379) (7.410) (2.191) (1.216) (14.822) (10.550) (2.056) (1.269)
mean(expi,t) −1.162∗∗∗ −0.225∗∗∗ −5.990∗∗∗ −1.066∗∗∗ −0.128 0.057 −1.332∗∗∗ −0.535∗∗
(0.081) (0.060) (0.344) (0.228) (0.153) (0.091) (0.467) (0.240)
Constant 3.846∗∗∗ −6.163∗∗∗ 15.482∗∗∗ 15.855∗∗∗
(0.400) (0.890) (0.745) (1.029)
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm Fixed Effect NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
Observations 677,975 677,975 677,975 677,975 677,720 677,720 677,720 677,720
R2 0.577 0.744 0.357 0.727 0.062 0.599 0.026 0.598
Note: SE clustered by firm ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 1.6: Earnings Surprise Results
This table examines the relationship between earnings surprise and the interaction between the past
earnings announcement for the firm and the difference between the mean extrapolation experience of
analysts issuing forecasts and a baseline. In Panel A, the baseline is the firm’s past earnings
persistence. In Panel B, the baseline is the earnings persistence in the firm’s industry in the past year.
See section 2.4.3 for a detailed description of construction of these variables. In columns (1) and (2),
the dependent variable is the surprise level. In columns (3) and (4), the dependent variable is the sign
of the surprise, which takes a value of 1 for positive surprise and 0 otherwise. The independent
variables are the firm’s past earnings level (earningsj,t−1), the difference between the mean
extrapolation experience of analysts issuing a forecast between 2 and 30 days before announcement and
the baseline (diffexpj,t), and their interaction. Control variables include the log of the number of
analysts issuing a forecast, the log of the market cap of the firm, the log of the mean number of years
experience of analysts issuing a forecast, the log of the mean number of firms covered by analysts
issuing a forecast, and their interactions with the firm’s past earnings. Standard errors are
double-clustered by firm and announcement date.
Panel A: Using Firm’s Past Earnings Experience as Baseline
Dependent Variable: Surprise Surprise Sign
earnings & diffexp in: Level Rank Level Rank
(1) (2) (3) (4)
earningsj,t−1 ∗ diffexpj,t −0.015∗∗ −0.004∗ −0.279∗∗ −0.097∗
(0.008) (0.002) (0.117) (0.050)
earningsj,t−1 0.114 0.001 0.274 −0.257
(0.123) (0.013) (1.440) (0.242)
diffexpj,t 0.001 0.002 0.007 0.046
(0.0004) (0.001) (0.012) (0.031)
Controls YES YES YES YES
Observations 13,549 13,562 13,549 13,562
R2 0.042 0.004 0.002 0.002
Panel B: Using Industry Earnings Persistence as Baseline
Dependent Variable: Surprise Surprise Sign
earnings & diffexp in: Level Rank Level Rank
(1) (2) (3) (4)
earningsj,t−1 ∗ diffexpi,t −0.025∗∗∗ −0.006∗∗∗ −0.240∗∗∗ −0.107∗∗
(0.005) (0.002) (0.083) (0.050)
earningsj,t−1 0.051 −0.008 0.242 −0.203∗
(0.041) (0.006) (0.442) (0.110)
diffexpi,t 0.001
∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗ −0.003 0.028
(0.0003) (0.001) (0.008) (0.028)
Controls YES YES YES YES
Observations 38,985 38,985 38,385 38,385
R2 0.042 0.008 0.005 0.003
Note: SE double clustered by firm and announcement date ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 1.7: Individual Investor Trading Summary Statistics
This table presents summary statistics for the dataset containing individual investor trading records
from a large discount brokerage between 1991 and 1996. Panel A shows summary statistics at the
household-year level and Panel B shows summary statistics at the transaction level, split by buys and
sells. Only holdings and trades in common stocks are considered. Households that engaged in short
sales or did not hold at least five common stocks in their portfolio at the beginning of the year are
excluded. Only the first time each household buys and sells a specific stock is included in transaction
level statistics.
Panel A: Household-Year Level
N Mean SD 10% 25% 50% 75% 90%
# Positions 42,491 9.76 8.24 5 6 7 11 17
Portfolio Size ($1,000) 42,491 104.88 314.50 12.34 21.95 43.25 96.43 221.72
Trending Experience 42,491 0.51 0.06 0.44 0.47 0.51 0.55 0.58
Trending Experience (VW) 42,491 0.52 0.08 0.42 0.47 0.52 0.57 0.62
Age 21,108 52.73 13.53 36 42 52 62 72
Gender 22,028 0.90 0.30 0 1 1 1 1
Years of Experience 42,491 5.71 3.39 1.10 2.78 5.66 8.31 9.89
Panel B: Transaction Level
N Mean SD 10% 25% 50% 75% 90%
Buys
Past Month Return 182,181 0.04 0.20 -0.15 -0.06 0.01 0.11 0.25
Trending Experience 182,181 0.52 0.06 0.45 0.48 0.52 0.55 0.59
Trending Experience (VW) 182,181 0.52 0.07 0.43 0.48 0.52 0.57 0.62
Size ($1,000) 182,181 7.71 13.55 1.25 2.31 4.29 8.25 16.06
Sells
Past Month Return 179,277 0.04 0.16 -0.12 -0.04 0.03 0.10 0.22
Trending Experience 179,277 0.52 0.06 0.45 0.48 0.51 0.55 0.59
Trending Experience (VW) 179,277 0.52 0.07 0.43 0.48 0.52 0.57 0.61
Size ($1,000) 179,277 8.75 17.80 1.06 2.25 4.50 9.23 18.85
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Table 1.8: Results for Individual Investor Purchase Decisions
This table examines the relationship between the past month return of a newly purchased stock and
the trending experience of the household making the transaction. The analysis is conducted at the
transaction-level and only includes transactions made by households that held at least five common
stocks in their portfolio at the beginning of the year. The dependent variable is the past month return
of a stock purchased for the first time by a household. The independent variable is the trending
experience of the household (expi,t). Control variables include the log of the size of the transaction, the
log of the number of positions held in the household’s portfolio at the beginning of the year, and the
log of the size of the portfolio at the beginning of the year. Columns (3) and (4) add demographic
controls for the household, which include the log of the age, the gender, and the log of the number of
years trading experience. Standard errors are double-clustered by household and stock.
Dependent variable: Past Month Return
(1) (2) (3) (4)
expi,t 0.211
∗∗∗ 0.181∗∗∗ 0.181∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.016) (0.023) (0.019)
log(Trans Size) −0.006∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ −0.009∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
log(# Positions) 0.004 0.011∗∗∗ 0.004 0.011∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
log(Port Size) −0.003∗ −0.010∗∗∗ −0.002 −0.010∗∗∗









Firm FE NO YES NO YES
Observations 182,181 182,181 83,360 83,360
R2 0.005 0.236 0.006 0.284
Note: SE clustered by household and stock ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 1.9: Results for Individual Investor Sales Decisions
This table examines the relationship between the past month return of a newly sold stock and the
trending experience of the household making the transaction. The analysis is conducted at the
transaction-level and only includes transactions made by households that held at least five common
stocks in their portfolio at the beginning of the year. The dependent variable is the past month return
of a stock sold for the first time by a household. The independent variable is the trending experience of
the household (expi,t). Control variables include the log of the size of the transaction, the log of the
number of positions held in the household’s portfolio at the beginning of the year, and the log of the
size of the portfolio at the beginning of the year. Columns (3) and (4) add demographic controls for the
household, which include the log of the age, the gender, and the log of the number of years trading
experience. Standard errors are double-clustered by household and stock.
Dependent variable: Past Month Return
(1) (2) (3) (4)
expi,t −0.059∗∗∗ −0.073∗∗∗ −0.063∗∗∗ −0.080∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.012) (0.017) (0.016)
log(Trans Size) 0.023∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
log(# Positions) 0.014∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
log(Port Size) −0.024∗∗∗ −0.024∗∗∗ −0.025∗∗∗ −0.025∗∗∗









Firm FE NO YES NO YES
Observations 179,277 179,277 82,681 82,681
R2 0.025 0.160 0.028 0.206
Note: SE clustered by household and stock ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 1.10: Sales Results for Subsamples
This table examines the relationship between the past month return of a newly sold stock and the trending experience of the household making the transaction
for different subsamples. The analysis is conducted at the transaction-level and only includes transactions made by households that held at least five common
stocks in their portfolio at the beginning of the year. Columns (1) and (2) show the subsample of sales made in January-November in order to exclude
December sales that may be influenced by tax incentives. Columns (3) and (4) show the subsample of sales that were not made on the same day as a purchase
in order to avoid liquidity-motivated sales. Columns (5) to (8) split the sample into stocks sold at a gain and stocks sold at a loss, to separately examine
transactions that are and are not influenced by the disposition effect. Standard errors are double-clustered by household and stock.
Dependent variable: Past Month Return
Subsample Non-December Non-Liquidity Sold at Gain Sold at Loss
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
expi,t −0.073∗∗∗ −0.084∗∗∗ −0.059∗∗∗ −0.076∗∗∗ −0.041∗∗ −0.051∗∗∗ −0.045∗∗ −0.028∗
(0.015) (0.013) (0.014) (0.012) (0.019) (0.015) (0.020) (0.017)
log(Trans Size) 0.021∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
log(# Positions) 0.013∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
log(Port Size) −0.023∗∗∗ −0.023∗∗∗ −0.024∗∗∗ −0.024∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗ −0.013∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗ −0.014∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Constant 0.140∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗ 0.217∗∗∗ −0.005
(0.013) (0.011) (0.018) (0.016)
Firm FE NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
Observations 163,044 163,044 138,534 138,534 55,903 55,903 42,696 42,696
R2 0.022 0.172 0.024 0.173 0.007 0.335 0.018 0.197
Note: SE clustered by household and stock ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 1.11: Gallup and Michigan Survey Summary Statistics
Panel A presents summary statistics for the Gallup aggregate market survey dataset, which contains
around 1000 respondents monthly between 1999-2007. Each data point represents an individual
response. The estimate variable is only available between 1999 and mid-2003. Detailed descriptions of
the variables can be found in Table A2 Panel A. Panel B presents summary statistics for the Michigan
Survey of Consumers dataset, which runs monthly between 2002-2020. Each month, the mean
optimism level is reported for three age bins: 34 and under, between 35 and 54, and 55 and older.
Recent autocorrelation is calculated over 4 different time periods (8, 10, 12, and 15 years), both
demeaned and not demeaned. Detailed descriptions of the variables can be found in Table A2 Panel B.
Panel A: Gallup Survey
N Mean SD 10% 25% 50% 75% 90%
Extrap Experience (Demean) 91,928 0.05 0.23 -0.24 -0.10 0.04 0.20 0.37
Extrap Experience (No Demean) 91,928 0.49 0.17 0.36 0.44 0.51 0.58 0.64
Optimism 90,131 3.30 1.11 2 2 4 4 5
Estimate 37,236 0.10 0.10 0.03 0.05 0.10 0.12 0.20
Financial Experience 91,928 17.14 10.73 5 10 15 20 30
Past Year Return 91,928 0.06 0.19 -0.20 -0.10 0.11 0.16 0.23
Relative Past Year Return 91,928 0.17 -0.09 -0.34 -0.26 -0.05 0.02 0.09
Error 37,326 0.21 0.14 0.04 0.10 0.21 0.29 0.36
Age 90,909 50.81 13.94 33 40 50 60 70
Gender 91,928 0.58 0.49 0 0 1 1 1
Income 91,928 0.29 0.45 0 0 1 1 1
Holdings in Stocks 91,928 0.42 0.49 0 0 0 1 1
Employment Status 91,928 0.72 0.45 0 0 1 1 1
Retirement Status 91,928 0.44 0.26 0 0 0 1 1
Panel B: Michigan Survey
N Mean SD 10% 25% 50% 75% 90%
Monthly Summary Statistics
Mean Optimism 195 52.92 6.18 43.68 48.56 54.72 57.02 59.92
Optimism Difference 195 6.39 2.39 3.19 4.63 6.31 7.89 9.46
Past 12 Month Return 195 0.10 0.16 -0.16 0.05 0.13 0.18 0.25
8 Year Autocorr (Demean) 195 -0.00 0.25 -0.30 -0.17 -0.00 0.15 0.39
10 Year Autocorr (Demean) 195 0.02 0.26 -0.23 -0.18 -0.13 0.32 0.40
12 Year Autocorr (Demean) 195 0.06 0.24 -0.19 -0.14 -0.11 0.32 0.39
15 Year Autocorr (Demean) 195 0.09 0.17 -0.11 -0.08 0.12 0.25 0.30
8 Year Autocorr (No Demean) 195 0.15 0.30 -0.19 -0.03 0.13 0.43 0.57
10 Year Autocorr (No Demean) 195 0.17 0.27 -0.21 -0.03 0.10 0.49 0.52
12 Year Autocorr (No Demean) 195 0.22 0.27 -0.12 -0.05 0.16 0.52 0.53
15 Year Autocorr (No Demean) 195 0.28 0.20 0.00 0.09 0.26 0.50 0.53
Age Less Than 35 Years
# Respondents 195 144.86 48.47 85.0 102.5 134.0 182.5 217.2
Optimism (%) 195 57.91 6.59 47.82 54.05 59.70 62.35 65.92
Age 35 to 54 Years
# Respondents 195 392.98 54.40 313.4 341.0 404.0 439.0 460.0
Optimism (%) 195 55.06 6.49 45.30 50.85 56.90 59.90 62.20
Age More Than 54 Years
# Respondents 195 466.19 95.69 355.8 416.0 486.0 532.0 585.2
Optimism (%) 195 49.43 6.02 40.74 45.50 50.10 53.45 57.66
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Table 1.12: Individual-Level Survey Results for Aggregate Market Return
This table examines the relationship between forecasts of aggregate market return and the interaction
between past return and extrapolation experience. In columns (1)-(3), the measure of extrapolation
experience (expi,t) is demeaned and the measure of past return (rett−1) is the past 12 month return in
the aggregate stock market relative to the individual’s experienced level of market return. In columns
(4)-(6), the measure of extrapolation experience is not demeaned and the measure of past return is the
raw return on the market over the past 12 months. The dependent variable in columns (1) and (4) is
the survey taker’s level of optimism for the market in the next 12 months on a 1-5 scale. The
dependent variable in columns (2) and (5) is the numerical estimate for stock market returns in the
next 12 months. The dependent variable in columns (3) and (6) is the absolute value of the difference
between the numerical estimate and the actual realized return over the next 12 months. Control
variables include the survey respondent’s number of years of financial experience (and years of
experience squared), age (and age squared), indicators for gender, high income, high market holdings,
employment status, retirement status, and their interactions with past 12 month market return.
Standard errors are clustered by survey date.
Dependent Variable Optimism Estimate Error Optimism Estimate Error
Autocorr/Past Return: Demeaned/Relative to Experience Not Demeaned/Raw
rett−1 ∗ expt 0.705∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.749∗∗∗ 0.701∗∗∗ 0.217∗∗∗ 1.811∗∗∗
(0.380) (0.036) (0.235) (0.261) (0.073) (0.423)
rett−1 0.168 0.087
∗∗ −0.341∗∗∗ 0.655∗ 0.008 −1.509∗∗∗
(0.295) (0.040) (0.086) (0.337) (0.062) (0.295)
expt −0.328∗∗∗ −0.017∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗ 0.196∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.317∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.008) (0.039) (0.050) (0.013) (0.073)
rett−1 ∗ FinExp 0.075∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗ −0.006 0.002∗ 0.023∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.001) (0.006) (0.006) (0.001) (0.006)
rett−1 ∗ FinExp2 −0.001∗∗∗ −0.0001∗∗ −0.0002∗∗ 0.00005 −0.00002 −0.0002∗∗∗
(0.0002) (0.00002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.00002) (0.0001)
rett−1 ∗Age 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.014 −0.0003 0.003
(0.012) (0.002) (0.002) (0.013) (0.001) (0.002)
rett−1 ∗Age2 −0.0001 −0.00001 −0.00002 −0.0001 −0.00000 −0.00003∗
(0.0001) (0.00001) (0.00002) (0.0001) (0.00001) (0.00002)
rett−1 ∗Holdings 0.117∗∗ 0.013∗∗ −0.001 0.108∗ 0.015∗∗ −0.003
(0.056) (0.006) (0.008) (0.059) (0.006) (0.007)
Constant 3.511∗∗∗ 0.189∗∗∗ 0.208∗∗∗ 3.334∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗ 0.018
(0.052) (0.011) (0.023) (0.052) (0.011) (0.053)
Other Demographic Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Non-Interacted Terms YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 89,169 36,964 36,964 90,586 37,654 37,654
R2 0.042 0.076 0.100 0.044 0.079 0.075
Note: SE clustered by survey date ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
51
Table 1.13: Aggregate-Level Survey Results for Aggregate Market Return
This table examines the relationship between aggregate forecasts of stock market return and the
interaction between past return and recent levels of autocorrelation. The dependent variable is the
mean level of optimism among all survey respondents in a given month, where optimism is the response
to a survey question about the percentage chance of aggregate stock market increase in the next year.
The independent variables are the past 12 month return on the market, the recent level of
autocorrelation in the market (over the past 8, 10, 12, or 15 years), and their interaction. Panel A uses
the demeaned measure of autocorrelation and past year return in excess of the mean return, while
Panel B uses the not demeaned measure of autocorrelation and raw return over the past year.
Panel A
Dependent Variable: Mean Optimism
Autocorrelation/Past Return: Demeaned/Relative to Recent Window
# Years: 8 10 12 15
rett−1 ∗ acrt 36.701∗∗∗ 42.401∗∗∗ 62.302∗∗∗ 14.182
(7.777) (9.554) (11.437) (17.510)
rett−1 22.459
∗∗∗ 19.699∗∗∗ 11.274∗∗∗ 15.508∗∗∗
(2.437) (2.439) (2.912) (3.900)
acrt 7.536
∗∗∗ 5.881∗∗∗ 1.577 −9.258∗∗∗
(1.508) (1.491) (1.716) (2.387)
Constant 53.216∗∗∗ 53.266∗∗∗ 53.985∗∗∗ 54.006∗∗∗
(0.364) (0.393) (0.444) (0.473)
Observations 195 195 195 195
R2 0.407 0.347 0.354 0.395
Panel B
Dependent Variable: Mean Optimism
Autocorrelation/Past Return: Not Demeaned/Raw
# Years: 8 10 12 15
rett−1 ∗ acrt 27.480∗∗∗ 27.969∗∗∗ 37.260∗∗∗ 38.512∗∗∗
(5.457) (9.554) (8.595) (14.552)
rett−1 21.741
∗∗∗ 21.645∗∗∗ 16.179∗∗∗ 6.895
(1.907) (2.123) (3.332) (6.165)
acrt 6.269
∗∗∗ 5.886∗∗∗ 2.623 −6.854∗∗∗
(1.131) (1.491) (1.643) (2.561)
Constant 49.690∗∗∗ 49.647∗∗∗ 50.601∗∗∗ 53.653∗∗∗
(0.386) (0.435) (0.664) (1.110)
Observations 195 195 195 195
R2 0.613 0.539 0.501 0.392
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 1.14: Younger vs. Older Aggregate Market Survey Results
This table examines the relationship between the difference between younger and older people’s
forecasts of the aggregate stock market and the interaction between past return and recent levels of
autocorrelation. The dependent variable is the difference between optimism level for younger
respondents (age less than 55) and older respondents (age 55+), where optimism is the response to a
survey question about the percentage chance of aggregate stock market increase in the next year. The
independent variables are the past 12 month return on the market, the recent level of autocorrelation
in the market (over the past 8, 10, 12, or 15 years), and their interaction. Panel A uses the demeaned
measure of autocorrelation and past year return in excess of the mean return, while Panel B uses the
not demeaned measure of autocorrelation and raw return over the past year.
Panel A
Dependent Variable: Difference in Optimism
Autocorrelation/Past Return: Demeaned/Relative to Recent Window
# Years: 8 10 12 15
rett−1 ∗ acrt 6.083∗ 11.156∗∗∗ 14.975∗∗∗ 19.279∗∗∗
(3.516) (3.645) (4.387) (7.278)
rett−1 5.486
∗∗∗ 4.753∗∗∗ 3.602∗∗∗ 1.858
(1.102) (0.930) (1.117) (1.621)
acrt 3.444
∗∗∗ 5.470∗∗∗ 5.840∗∗∗ 7.406∗∗∗
(0.682) (0.569) (0.658) (0.992)
Constant 6.425∗∗∗ 6.406∗∗∗ 6.331∗∗∗ 5.966∗∗∗
(0.164) (0.150) (0.170) (0.197)
Observations 195 195 195 195
R2 0.190 0.365 0.365 0.302
Panel B
Dependent Variable: Difference in Optimism
Autocorrelation/Past Return: Not Demeaned/Raw
# Years: 8 10 12 15
rett−1 ∗ acrt 2.536 8.224∗∗∗ 9.440∗∗ 25.266∗∗∗
(3.319) (3.152) (3.827) (5.863)
rett−1 2.697
∗∗ 3.001∗∗∗ 3.121∗∗ −3.747
(1.160) (1.047) (1.483) (2.484)
acrt −0.031 3.126∗∗∗ 3.828∗∗∗ 3.247∗∗∗
(0.688) (0.611) (0.732) (1.032)
Constant 6.116∗∗∗ 5.511∗∗∗ 5.200∗∗∗ 5.500∗∗∗
(0.235) (0.214) (0.296) (0.447)
Observations 195 195 195 195
R2 0.045 0.252 0.340 0.341
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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1.7 Appendix 1A: Alternate Specifications for Earnings Fore-
casts
1.7.1 Industry Rank Measure
I explore an alternate measures of earnings, industry rank. Industry rank is defined as:
indrankj,t :=
rank(earningsj,t)[within industry − year]
Total Number of F irms in Same Industry in Y ear t
where I use the Fama-French 12 industry classification. A firm whose earningsj,t is higher
than 70% of firms in the same industry in year t will have an indrankj,t of 0.7. Notably, a
firm can have a much larger indrank than rank if a firm outperformed its industry peers but
its industry as a whole performed much worse than other industries. Compared to rank, The
indrank measure is less impacted by industry-wide fluctuations in earnings. Figure A1 shows
density plots for the industry rank variable.
The extrapolation experience variable for industry rank is calculated as:
indrankj,τ = α+ β1indrankj,τ−1 + εj,τ → expiri,t := β̂1
For the regression using the industry rank measure, both earnings and exp are changed to
be in their industry rank counterparts:
forecasti,j,m = α+ β1indrankj,t−1 ∗ expiri,j,t + β2indrankj,t−1 + β3expiri,j,t
+ controls+ γ1Analyst+ γ2Firm−Month+ εi,j,m
Columns (1) and (2) of Table A3 show results using the industry rank variable. Consistent
with results in the main body of the paper, the coefficient on the interaction term is positive
and significant across both specifications.
1.7.2 Within-Industry Experience
It may be reasonable that analysts rely only on their experience covering firms in the same
industry when forecasting earnings for a specific firm. In order to account for this, I construct
an alternate measure of extrapolation experience at the analyst-industry-year level rather than
the analyst-year level. Industry is characterized according to the Fama-French 12 industry
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classification. For each analyst i in year t covering a firm in industry k, I take the list of all
firm-years (j,τ) previously covered by the analyst in the same industry k and run the following
regression:
earningsj,τ = α+ β1earningsj,τ−1 + εj,τ → expi,k,t := β̂1
Thus, each analyst has a different measure of extrapolation experience in each industry-year
(k,t). I repeat baseline analysis on relative forecast using this within-industry measure of
extrapolation and present the results in columns (3) and (4) of Table A3. The coefficient
of interest on the interaction term is positive and significant, and similar in magnitude.
1.7.3 EPS Relative to Experienced Value
Analysts may also rely on their experience to form beliefs about the level of the previous
earnings announcement. For example, an analyst who has only covered firms with negative
earnings in the past may think of an earnings level of 0 as “high”, while a different analyst who
has only covered firms with positive earnings in the past may think of 0 as “low”.
In order to formally test this idea, I construct a measure of experienced earnings for each
analyst-year (i,t) as the mean of all earnings levels for firms (j,τ) they have covered in the past:
expearningsi,t = mean(earningsj,τ )
I then calculate the relative past earnings at the analyst-firm-year level as the difference between
the past earnings level of a firm and the experienced earnings level of the analyst issuing the
forecast:
relativeearningsi,j,t−1 = earningsj,t−1 − expearningsi,t
I repeat the baseline analysis but replace earnings with relative earnings:
forecasti,j,m = α+ β1relativeearningsi,j,t−1 ∗ expi,j,m + β2relativeearningsi,j,t−1
+ β3expi,j,m + controls+ γ1Analyst+ γ2Firm−Month+ εi,j,m
Results, presented in columns (5) and (6) of Table A3 are similar.
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1.7.4 Alternate Surprise Definitions
In this section, I construct alternate measures of earnings surprise that have been used in
the literature. The measure of surprise used in the paper was




using forecasts made between 2 and 30 days before the announcement date.
Table A4 shows results using different measures of surprise. Panel A shows results using the
firm baseline, while Panel B shows results using the industry baseline.
In columns (1) and (2), I take the median forecast instead of the mean:




In the regression, the control variables that use mean values are replaced with their median
value counterparts.
In columns (3) and (4), the measure of surprise is the difference between the actual an-
nounced value and the mean forecasted value made between 2 and 30 days before the an-
nouncement date, scaled by the price of the firm 3 days before announcement (remember that
earningsj,t refers to EPS scaled by price 3 days before):




Using both alternate measures of surprise, the coefficient of interest on the interaction term
remains negative and significant across all specifications.
1.8 Appendix 1B: Alternate Specifications for Individual In-
vestor Trading Behavior
1.8.1 Value-Weighted Trending Experience
The measure of trending experience in the main body of the paper is the equal-weighted
trend variable for all stocks held in an investor’s portfolio at the beginning of the year. I
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calculate an alternative value-weighted experience measure as:
expvwi,t =
∑
j∈holdings trendj,t ∗ capj∑
j∈holdings capj
where capj is the dollar amount of holdings of a stock j in the investor’s portfolio during the
experience period. This measure places a higher weight on the stocks investor i has more money
invested in, and may pay closer attention to. Figure A2 plots the distribution of the expvwi,t
variable, which has a mean of 0.52 and a standard deviation of 0.08.
I run the same regression as in the main body of the paper, but replace expi,t with expvwi,t.
The regression is run separately for purchases and sales:
retj,m = α+ β1expvwi,t + controls+ γ1Firm+ εj,m
Results for purchases are shown in Table A5 Panel A. Moving from the 10th percentile to
the 90th percentile is associated with purchasing a stock that has a 0.182 ∗ 0.167 = 304 basis
point higher past month return. Results for sales are shown in Table A5 Panel B. Moving from
the 10th to the 90th percentile is associated with selling a stock with a 0.180 ∗ 0.026 = 47 basis
point lower past month return.
1.8.2 Adjusting For Market Return
In the main body of the paper, I use the raw stock return when calculating the trend variable.
It is possible that investors evaluate stocks relative to the market rather than solely on the basis
of raw return. In this section, I present results using a trend variable that is adjusted for market
return. The construction of the main variables are similar in every other way:
trendmj,t−1 =
∑12
m=1 1(retmj,m>=0|retmj,m−1>=0) + 1(retmj,m<0|retmj,m−1<0)
12
where retmj,m is the market-adjusted return of stock j in month m. Trending experience of
household i in year t is calculated as:
expmi,t = mean(trendmj,t−1)
I run the same regression as the main body of the paper, but replace expi,t with expmi,t.
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retmj,m is the market-adjusted return of the stock over the past month. The regression is run
separately for purchases and sales:
retmj,m = α+ β1expmi,t + controls+ γ1Firm+ εj,m
Results for purchases are shown in Table A6 Panel A. Moving from the 10th percentile to
the 90th percentile is associated with purchasing a stock that has a 0.129 ∗ 0.087 = 112 basis
point higher past month return. Results for sales are shown in Table A6 Panel B. Moving
from the 10th to the 90th percentile is associated with selling a stock with a stock that has a
0.129 ∗ 0.027 = 73 basis point lower past month return.
1.8.3 Aggregating to the Household-Year Level
In all previous analysis, each observation corresponded to a single transaction made by a
household. In this section, I aggregate transactions to the household-year level, and test if
households with higher trending experience will on average purchase stocks with higher past
month return, and on average sell stocks with lower past month return. Furthermore, I test if
households with higher trending experience will be more likely to purchase stocks with positive
past month return, while being more likely to sell stocks with lower past month return. Each
observation will correspond to a household-year pair.
The main test I ran in the paper was:
retj,m = α+ β1expi,t + controls+ γ1Firm+ εj,m
There are a few tweaks necessary to run this regression at the household-year level. The
dependent variable in the original regression corresponded to the return in the past month
of a single stock transacted on by the household. At the aggregate level, I build two measures
that capture the past month return of the average stock transacted on by the household. The
first measure, avgreti,t, is constructed as the mean return over the past month of all stocks
bought or sold by household i in year t. The second measure, avgposi,t is the proportion of
stocks bought or sold by household i in year t that had a positive return.
At the household-year level, I run the following regressions (separately for purchases and
sales):
avgreti,t = α+ β1expi,t + controls+ εj,m
58
avgposi,t = α+ β1expi,t + controls+ εj,m
The controls are the same as the controls used in the original regression, except I take the mean
of values that are different for each transaction (such as transaction size). Only households
that engaged in at least five transactions of the specific type (buy or sell) over the course of the
year are included. I am not able run specifications that include a firm fixed effect because each
observation corresponds to transactions involving more than one firm.
Table A7 Panel A shows results for purchases. The dependent variable in columns (1) and
(2) is the average return of a bought stock in the past month, while the dependent variable in
columns (3) and (4) is the proportion of stocks purchased by a household that had a positive
return in the past month. The coefficient on expi,t is positive and significant across all speci-
fications. A household with higher trending experience will on average purchase a stock that
had a higher past month return, and be more likely to purchase a stock with a positive past
month return.
Table A7 Panel B shows results for sales. The coefficient on expi,t is negative and significant
for all specifications. Consistent with the results in the main body of the paper, the magnitude
of the coefficients is slightly lower for sales than for purchases.
1.9 Appendix 1C: Alternate Specifications for Survey on Ag-
gregate Market
The measure of extrapolation experience used in the main body of the paper is the auto-
correlation (either demeaned or not demeaned) of the aggregate stock market over the years of
financial experience the survey taker reported.
It is possible that people simply categorize years as “good” or “bad”, and are less mindful




Total Y ears F inancial Experience
“Good” is either defined as a return larger than the median annual return in the years of
financial experience of the survey taker (analogous to the demeaned autocorrelation measure)
or a return larger than 0 (analogous to the not demeaned autocorrelation measure).
59
I run the same analysis on optimism, numerical estimate, and error using this new measure
of extrapolation experience. The results, shown in Table A8, are largely similar.
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1.10 Appendix 1D: Additional Figures and Tables
Figure A1: Extrapolation Experience Density Plot for Earnings Analysts Using In-
dustry Rank
This figure shows a density plot for extrapolation experience using the industry rank measure in the
earnings analyst setting. The dashed blue line represents the mean of the distribution.
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Figure A2: Trending Experience Density Plot for Individual Investors (Value-
Weighted)
This figure shows density plots for trending experience in the individual investor trading setting using
value-weighted trending experience. The dashed blue line represents the mean of the distribution.
62
Table A1: Earnings Analyst Variable Definitions
This table presents definitions for the variables taken from the I/B/E/S earnings analyst dataset.
Variable Definition
Earnings Announced earnings per share divided by price of the firm 3 days
before announcement
Rank Rank of earnings for a firm in a given year
Industry Rank Rank of earnings within a firm’s industry (Fama French 12 indus-
try classification) in a given year
Extrapolation Experience (Earn-
ings)
Coefficient on year τ − 1 earnings when regressing year τ earnings
on year τ − 1 earnings for all previously observed earnings by an
analyst
Extrapolation Experience (Rank) Coefficient on year τ −1 rank when regressing year τ rank on year
τ − 1 rank for all previously observed earnings by an analyst
Extrapolation Experience (Industry
Rank)
Coefficient on year τ − 1 industry rank when regressing year τ in-
dustry rank on year τ−1 industry rank for all previously observed
earnings by an analyst
Extrapolation Experience (Within
Industry)
Coefficient on year τ −1 rank when regressing year τ rank on year
τ − 1 earnings for all previously observed earnings by an analyst
within the same industry
Years of Experience Number of years since the first year in which a particular analyst
issued a forecast in the dataset
Unique Firms Previously Covered Number of unique firms for which an analyst has previously issued
a forecast
Firm-Years Previously Covered Number of firm-years that an analyst has covered previously
Firms Currently Covering Number of firms an analyst issued a forecast on in the current year
Forecast Forecast given by an analyst for a firm
Relative Forecast Difference between an analyst’s forecast for a firm and the mean
forecast for that month
Days Before Next Announcement Number of days before the announcement the forecast was issued
Error Absolute value of the difference between the forecasted earnings
and the actual realized earnings
Analysts Covering Number of analysts issuing a forecast for a firm in a given month
Months Before Next Announcement Number of months before the next announcement
Earnings Surprise Difference between actual earnings and mean forecast made be-
tween 2 and 30 days before announcement
Earnings Surprise Sign Indicator equal to 1 for positive earnings surprise and 0 otherwise
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Table A2: Gallup and Michigan Survey Variable Definitions
This table presents definitions for the variables from the Gallup aggregate market survey dataset and
the Michigan Survey of Consumers Dataset.




Annual autocorrelation of the aggregate stock market calculated over
the years of financial experience that the individual has.
Extrapolation Experience
(Not Demeaned)
Annual autocorrelation of the aggregate stock market over the years of
financial experience that the individual has, assuming mean return of 0.
Optimism Response to: On a five-point scale, as far as the general condition of the
economy is concerned, how would you rate the performance of the stock
market over the next 12 months? (1: lowest, 5: highest)
Estimate Response to: Thinking about the stock market more generally, what
overall rate of return do you think the stock market will provide investors
during the coming twelve months? (Available 1999-2003.4)
Financial Experience Number of years of financial experience reported by survey taker
Past Year Return Return on the aggregate stock market over the past 12 months at time
of survey
Relative Past Year Return Difference between the level of experienced return and the return on the
aggregate stock market over the past 12 months
Error Absolute value of the difference between estimate and the realized return
on the stock market in the next 12 months
Age Age of survey taker
Gender Indicator for gender: 0 for female, 1 for male
Income Indicator for yearly salary: 0 for < $100,000, 1 for >= $100,000
Holdings in Stocks Indicator for amount invested in stock market: 0 < $100,000, 1 for >=
$100,000
Employment Status Indicator for employment status: 0 for unemployed, 1 for employed
Retirement Status Indicator for retirement status: 0 for unretired, 1 for retired
Panel B: Michigan Survey
Variable Definition
Optimism Mean response within age-group to: Suppose that tomorrow someone
were to invest one thousand dollars in a mutual fund known as a diver-
sified stock fund. What do you think is the percent chance that this one
thousand dollar inevstment will increase in value in the year ahead?
Mean Optimism Mean optimism aggregated across the three age bins, weighted by the
number of respondents in each bin
Optimism Difference Difference in optimism between the oldest bin and the two younger bins
N-Year Autocorrelation (De-
meaned)
Autocorrelation of the stock market over the past N years
N-Year Autocorrelation (Not
Demeaned)
Autocorrelation of the stock market over the past N years, assuming a
mean return of 0.
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Table A3: Individual Forecast Regression Results for Alternate Specifications
This table examines the relationship between the forecast made by an analyst and the interaction between the past earnings announcement for the firm and the
extrapolation experience of the analyst. The dependent variable is the analyst’s forecast for a firm’s next earnings announcement scaled by the firm’s price on
the day before the forecast. The independent variables are the firm’s past earnings (earningsj,t−1), the analyst’s extrapolation experience (expi,t), and their
interaction. Columns (1) and (2) show results using the industry rank measure (see Appendix A1). Columns (3) and (4) show results using within-industry
experience (see Appendix A2). Columns (5) and (6) show results using earnings relative to experienced value (see Appendix A3). All specifications include a
firm-month fixed effect, so forecasts are only compared to other forecasts given for the same firm in the same month. Controls include the log of the number of
firms covered by the analyst, the log of the number of years experience the analyst has, their interactions with the firm’s past earnings level, and the number of
days before announcement the forecast was made. Standard errors are clustered at the analyst level.
Dependent variable: Forecast (x100)
earnings & exp in: Industry Rank Within-Industry Relative to Experience
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
earningsj,t−1 ∗ expi,t 0.140∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗ 0.330∗ 0.366∗ 0.310∗ 0.373∗∗
(0.056) (0.058) (0.198) (0.208) (0.161) (0.181)
expi,t −0.046 −0.086∗∗ −0.027∗∗ −0.037∗∗∗ −0.010 −0.007
(0.033) (0.039) (0.011) (0.013) (0.006) (0.010)
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm-Month Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES
Analyst Fixed Effect NO YES NO YES NO YES
Observations 2,506,239 2,059,322 2,059,322 2,506,239 2,506,239 2,506,239
R2 0.976 0.977 0.977 0.977 0.976 0.977
Note: SE clustered by analyst ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table A4: Earnings Surprise Results for Alternate Specifications
This table examines the relationship between earnings surprise and the interaction between the past
earnings announcement for the firm and the difference between the extrapolation experience of analysts
issuing forecasts and a baseline. In Panel A, the baseline is the firm’s past earnings persistence. In
Panel B, the baseline is the earnings persistence in the firm’s industry in the past year. The dependent
variable is the level of earnings surprise. In columns (1) and (2), surprise is defined as the difference
between the value of the actual announcement (scaled by price 3 days before announcement) and the
median EPS forecast made between 2 and 30 days before announcement (scaled by price on day of the
forecast). In columns (3) and (4), surprise is defined as the difference between the actual realized value
and the mean forecast scaled by price 3 days before announcement. The independent variables are the
firm’s past earnings level (earningsj,t−1), the difference between the mean (or median) extrapolation
experience of analysts issuing a forecast between 2 and 30 days before announcement and the baseline
(diffexpj,t), and their interaction. Control variables include the log of the number of analysts issuing a
forecast, the log of the market cap of the firm, the log of the mean (median) number of years
experience of analysts covering, the log of the mean (median) number of firms covered by analysts
covering, and their interactions with the firm’s past earnings level. Standard errors are double-clustered
by firm and announcement date.
Panel A: Using Firm’s Past Earnings Experience as Baseline
Dependent Variable: Surprise
surp defined as: Using Median Scaled by PRCt−3
earnings & diffexp in: Level Rank Level Rank
(1) (2) (3) (4)
earningsj,t−1 ∗ diffexpj,t −0.014∗ −0.005∗ −0.022∗∗∗ −0.004∗
(0.007) (0.002) (0.008) (0.003)
earningsj,t−1 0.114 0.002 0.074 −0.0004
(0.121) (0.013) (0.074) (0.010)
diffexpj,t 0.0005 0.002
∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.002∗
(0.0004) (0.001) (0.0004) (0.001)
Controls YES YES YES YES
Observations 13,541 13,554 13,541 13,554
R2 0.043 0.004 0.019 0.005
Panel B: Using Industry Earnings Persistence as Baseline
Dependent Variable: Surprise
surp defined as: Using Median Scaled by PRCt−3
earnings & diffexp in: Level Rank Level Rank
(1) (2) (3) (4)
earningsj,t−1 ∗ diffexpi,t −0.024∗∗∗ −0.006∗∗∗ −0.024∗∗∗ −0.006∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002)
earningsj,t−1 0.047 −0.008 0.007 −0.006
(0.041) (0.006) (0.037) (0.005)
diffexpi,t 0.001
∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.001∗ 0.002∗∗
(0.0003) (0.001) (0.0003) (0.001)
Controls YES YES YES YES
Observations 38,957 38,957 38,957 38,957
R2 0.042 0.008 0.024 0.010
Note: SE double clustered by firm and announcement date ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table A5: Results Using Value-Weighted Experience
This table examines the relationship between the past month return of a newly transacted stock and
the value-weighted trending experience of the household making the transaction. The analysis is
conducted at the transaction-level and only includes transactions made by households that held at least
five common stocks in their portfolio at the beginning of the year. Panel A shows results for purchases,
and Panel B shows results for sales. The dependent variable is the past month return of a stock bought
or sold for the first time by a household. The independent variable is the value-weighted trending
experience of the household (expvwi,t). Control variables include the log of the size of the transaction,
the log of the number of positions held in the household’s portfolio at the beginning of the year, and
the log of the size of the portfolio at the beginning of the year. Columns (3) and (4) add demographic
controls for the household, which include the log of the age, the gender, and the log of the number of
years trading experience. Standard errors are double-clustered by household and stock.
Panel A: Purchases
Dependent variable: Past Month Return
(1) (2) (3) (4)
expi,t 0.167
∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.013) (0.018) (0.015)
Constant 0.026 −0.047
(0.016) (0.032)
Controls YES YES YES YES
Demographic Controls NO NO YES YES
Firm FE NO YES NO YES
Observations 182,181 182,181 83,360 83,360
R2 0.005 0.235 0.006 0.283
Panel B: Sales
Dependent variable: Past Month Return
(1) (2) (3) (4)
expi,t −0.026∗∗ −0.046∗∗∗ −0.026∗ −0.048∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.009) (0.013) (0.012)
Constant 0.102∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.016)
Controls YES YES YES YES
Demographic Controls NO NO YES YES
Firm FE NO YES NO YES
Observations 179,277 179,277 82,681 82,681
R2 0.025 0.160 0.027 0.205
Note: SE clustered by household and stock ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table A6: Results Using Market-Adjusted Returns to Calculate Experience
This table examines the relationship between the past month return of a newly transacted stock and
the trending experience (calculated using market-adjusted returns) of the household making the
transaction. The analysis is conducted at the transaction-level and only includes transactions made by
households that held at least five common stocks in their portfolio at the beginning of the year. Panel
A shows results for purchases, and Panel B shows results for sales. The dependent variable is the past
month market-adjusted return of a stock bought or sold for the first time by a household. The
independent variable is the trending experience of the household (expmi,t). Control variables include
the log of the size of the transaction, the log of the number of positions held in the household’s
portfolio at the beginning of the year, and the log of the size of the portfolio at the beginning of the
year. Columns (3) and (4) add demographic controls for the household, which include the log of the
age, the gender, and the log of the number of years trading experience. Standard errors are
double-clustered by household and stock.
Panel A: Purchases
Dependent variable: Past Month Return
(1) (2) (3) (4)
expmi,t 0.087
∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.016) (0.024) (0.020)
Constant 0.045∗∗∗ −0.024
(0.017) (0.033)
Controls YES YES YES YES
Demographic Controls NO NO YES YES
Firm FE NO YES NO YES
Observations 182,181 182,181 83,360 83,360
R2 0.002 0.241 0.004 0.290
Panel B: Sales
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Past Month Return
(1) (2) (3) (4)
expmi,t −0.057∗∗∗ −0.054∗∗∗ −0.048∗∗∗ −0.048∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.011) (0.016) (0.016)
Constant 0.094∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.016)
Controls YES YES YES YES
Demographic Controls NO NO YES YES
Firm FE NO YES NO YES
Observations 179,277 179,277 82,681 82,681
R2 0.024 0.167 0.027 0.212
Note: SE clustered by household and stock ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table A7: Results for Aggregated Transactions
This table examines the relationship between the average return of a stock bought or sold in the month
prior to the transaction and the trending experience of the household making the transaction. Each
observation corresponds to a household-year, and only households that made at least five new
purchases or sales over the course of the year are included in the sample. Panel A shows results for
purchases, and Panel B shows results for sales. The dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is the
average return over the past month of the newly bought or sold stocks. The dependent variable in
columns (3) and (4) is the proportion of stocks bought or sold by a household that had a positive
return over the past month. The independent variable is the trending experience of the household
(expi,t). Control variables include the log of the mean transaction size, the log of the number of
positions held in the household’s portfolio at the beginning of the year, and the log of the size of the
portfolio at the beginning of the year. Demographic controls include the log of the age, the gender, and
the log of the number of years trading experience. Standard errors are clustered by household.
Panel A: Purchases
Dependent Variable: Average Past Month Return Percent Positive Return
(1) (2) (3) (4)
expi,t 0.177
∗∗∗ 0.168∗∗∗ 0.408∗∗∗ 0.370∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.024) (0.039) (0.058)
Constant 0.033∗∗ −0.070∗∗ 0.412∗∗∗ 0.113
(0.015) (0.034) (0.034) (0.076)
Controls YES YES YES YES
Demographic Controls NO YES NO YES
Observations 12,598 5,782 12,598 5,782
R2 0.020 0.022 0.011 0.018
Panel B: Sales
Dependent Variable: Average Past Month Return Percent Positive Return
(1) (2) (3) (4)
expi,t −0.039∗∗∗ −0.047∗∗ −0.275∗∗∗ −0.310∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.018) (0.037) (0.055)
Constant 0.078∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗∗ 0.627∗∗∗ 0.898∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.023) (0.033) (0.072)
Controls YES YES YES YES
Demographic Controls NO YES NO YES
Observations 12,524 5,775 12,524 5,775
R2 0.049 0.061 0.036 0.051
Note: SE clustered by household ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table A8: Survey Results for Aggregate Returns for Alternate Specifications
This table examines the relationship between forecasts of aggregate market return and the interaction
between past return and extrapolation experience. The measure of extrapolation experience is the
proportion of years in the survey taker’s financial experience where a “good” return followed a “good”
return or a “bad” return followed a “bad” return. In columns (1)-(3), a “good” year is defined as a
return higher than the individual’s median experienced return, and the measure of past return is the
past 12 month return in the aggregate stock market relative to the individual’s experienced level of
market return. In columns (4)-(6), a “good” return is defined as a return higher than 0, and the the
measure of past return is the raw return on the market over the past 12 months. The dependent
variable in columns (1) and (4) is the survey taker’s level of optimism for the market in the next 12
months on a 1-5 scale. The dependent variable in columns (2) and (5) is the numerical estimate for
stock market returns in the next 12 months. The dependent variable in columns (3) and (6) is the
absolute value of the difference between the numerical estimate and the actual realized return over the
next 12 months. Control variables include the survey respondent’s number of years of financial
experience (and years of experience squared), age (and age squared), indicators for gender, high
income, high market holdings, employment status, retirement status, and their interactions with past
12 month return. Standard errors are clustered by survey date.
Dependent Variable Optimism Estimate Error Optimism Estimate Error
“Good”/Past Return: >Median/Relative to Experience >0/Raw
rett−1 ∗ expt 1.122∗∗∗ 0.231∗∗∗ 1.092∗∗∗ 1.407∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗ 0.563∗∗
(0.372) (0.057) (0.282) (0.443) (0.061) (0.253)
rett−1 −0.364 −0.050 −0.943∗∗∗ −0.367 0.031 −0.820∗∗∗
(0.393) (0.039) (0.187) (0.437) (0.063) (0.250)
expt −0.353∗∗∗ −0.008 0.158∗∗∗ 0.240∗∗∗ 0.015 0.155∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.010) (0.044) (0.082) (0.012) (0.059)
rett−1 ∗ FinExp 0.073∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗ 0.010 0.001 0.011∗∗
(0.010) (0.002) (0.005) (0.006) (0.002) (0.004)
rett−1 ∗ FinExp2 −0.001∗∗∗ −0.0001∗∗∗ −0.0001∗ −0.0001 0.00001 −0.0001∗
(0.0002) (0.00003) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.00002) (0.0001)
rett−1 ∗Age −0.001 0.001 0.002 0.015 0.0001 0.002
(0.012) (0.002) (0.002) (0.013) (0.001) (0.002)
rett−1 ∗Age2 −0.00003 −0.00001 −0.00002 −0.0002 −0.00001 −0.00002
(0.0001) (0.00001) (0.00002) (0.0001) (0.00001) (0.00002)
rett−1 ∗Holdings 0.123∗∗ 0.012∗ −0.006 0.108∗ 0.014∗∗ −0.008
(0.056) (0.006) (0.009) (0.059) (0.006) (0.007)
Constant 3.689∗∗∗ 0.191∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗ 3.218∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗ 0.105∗
(0.061) (0.009) (0.028) (0.072) (0.013) (0.054)
Other Demographic Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Non-Interacted Terms YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 90,586 37,654 37,654 90,586 37,654 37,654
R2 0.039 0.075 0.099 0.044 0.079 0.075






How people choose investments is an area that has long been of interest to researchers.
Mutual funds are a natural empirical setting to study this question, as we are able to observe
past performance (fund returns) as well as investor decisions (fund flows). In the mutual fund
literature, it has been widely documented that a fund’s performance from up to twelve months
prior attracts flows, although they are more impacted by the recent past (Sirri and Tufano
(1998), Coval and Stafford (2007)). More recent literature has shown that investors adjust
their assessment of a fund’s performance for market risk (Barber et al. (2016), Berk and van
Binsbergen (2016)).
In this paper, I use the relationship between past performance and fund flows to study how
investors make comparisons within and across categories. The data comes from Morningstar, the
largest provider of mutual fund information to potential investors. In order to aid individual
investors in their search between tens of thousands of mutual funds, Morningstar created a
widely-used classification system.1 Based on its holdings over the past three years, a fund is
assigned to one of nine possible categories: Large Value, Large Blend, Large Growth, Mid Value,
Mid Blend, Mid Growth, Small Value, Small Blend, or Small Growth. See Figure 1 for a visual
representation of Morningstar’s classification system.
The two dimensions along which funds are sorted (market capitalization and book to market
1See Morningstar for in-depth description.
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ratio of their holdings) have been shown empirically to be related to an asset’s risk and returns
(Fama and French (1992), Fama and French (2015)). Therefore, this categorization can help
an investor narrow down her search to only funds that match the risk and return profile she is
looking for.
Morningstar category is salient to investors because Morningstar markets it as the best way
to judge a fund’s investment style, and many mutual fund investors rely heavily on Morningstar.
For example, Ben-David et al. (2020) find that when Morningstar revised its fund rating
methodology to include adjustments for Morningstar Category, there was a real impact on the
performance of stock market factors such as momentum. Morningstar has a snapshot page for
each mutual fund that contains information relevant to potential investors (see Figure 2 for an
example). The fund’s Morningstar category is shown at the top of the page. Risk and return
of the fund relative to its category are highlighted in the snapshot.
Each month, Morningstar also reports the average return of funds within each category
(henceforth “benchmark return”). Figure 3 shows an example of how Morningstar reports
this data. This paper studies the impact of the benchmark return on flows into funds of its
category and closely related categories. Classic style investing (Barberis and Shleifer (2003))
would predict that a mutual fund style that performs well would attract flows into all funds of
that style. In their model, investors possess limited attention and do not evaluate an asset’s
individual quality, but rather associate fund quality with the quality of its style. I test the
Barberis and Shleifer model in the mutual fund setting by studying the relationship between an
individual fund’s flows and the recent benchmark returns of the Morningstar category the fund
was assigned to. Consistent with style investing, I find a positive relationship: if the benchmark
return over the past 12 months moves from the 10th to the 90th percentile, a fund experiences
1.06% higher fund flows in the next month, which represents a 0.26 standard deviation increase
in flows in the sample.
In the classic style investing framework, investors have no ability to distinguish between
assets of the same style. In this paper, I hypothesize that by holding style constant, comparisons
between assets of the same style actually become easier. This can be particularly true in the
mutual fund setting, where Morningstar claims that funds sorted into the same category share
the same risk profile. On Morningstar, it is possible look at only the subset of funds that are a
part of a certain category, and evaluate their past returns relative to each other and the category
benchmark return. See Figure 4 for an example.
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I formally test this idea by studying the relationship between fund flows and benchmark
return while controlling for the fund’s own return. After controlling for the fund’s own return,
I find a negative relationship between benchmark returns and fund flows. This suggests that
investors compare a fund’s returns to returns of other funds in the same category. Consider a
Large Value fund with a return over the past 12 months of 10%. This fund attracts more signif-
icantly more fund flows if the benchmark return of the Large Value category is 5%, compared
to the case where the benchmark return of the category is 15%. The effect is economically
meaningful: following a 10th to 90th percentile increase in category benchmark returns over the
past 12 months, fund flows decrease by 2.22%, or a 0.55 standard deviation drop in flows in the
sample.
A potential confounding effect in the previous analysis is a market-wide factor influencing
fund returns of all different styles that investors use as a comparison for individual fund returns.
In that case, the negative relationship between fund flows and benchmark return could be
driven by a negative relationship between fund flows and the market-wide component of returns.
In order to address this, I specifically study funds at the “edge” of categories. These are
funds assigned a particular category by Morningstar with holdings most similar to funds in
another category (henceforth, counterfactual category). I first confirm that both past and future
returns of edge funds are similarly correlated with benchmark returns of their own category and
benchmark returns of their counterfactual category. So, the fund is similarly exposed to risks
from both categories, making the counterfactual return a valid benchmark to compare to. I
then show that investors compare edge funds more to their assigned Morningstar category than
their counterfactual category. In particular, an increase in category benchmark returns over the
past 12 months from the 10th to 90th percentile is correlated with a 1.81% decrease in fund
flows, while the same increase in counterfactual benchmark returns is only correlated with a
0.36% decrease. The difference between the two (1.45%, 0.33 standard deviation of flows in the
sample) is economically and statistically significant.
Finally, I study heterogeneity in decision-making by retail and institutional investors. I
classify share classes of funds into “retail share classes” and “institutional share classes”, where
institutional share classes require a larger initial investment but charge smaller fees. I find
that both retail and institutional investors engage in within-style investing behavior. For both
groups, the relationship between benchmark returns and fund flows is positive before controlling
for the fund’s own returns, but becomes negative after controlling for the fund’s own returns.
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The coefficients for the retail and institutional groups are similar in magnitude to each other,
and they are similar in magnitude to the whole sample. However, I do find a difference in
behavior between retail and institutional investors when comparing flows for funds at the edge
of a category. Retail investors compare edge funds’ returns significantly more to the benchmark
return, while discounting comparisons to the counterfactual benchmark return. Institutional
investors recognize that edge funds’ holdings and risk exposures are just as similar to funds
in their counterfactual category as they are with funds in their assigned Morningstar category.
They do not compare an edge fund’s return more to the benchmark than the counterfactual
benchmark.
This paper relates to the literature on categorical thinking. The majority of papers in this
area study agents with limited attention or processing power who use coarse categories to evalu-
ate complicated objects. Mullainathan (2002) writes a formal model and shows that categorical
thinking can help individuals process complicated information reasonably well, though it can
lead to predictable biases. Barberis and Shleifer (2003) study the idea in a financial setting, us-
ing a model that incorporates categorical thinkers to explain empirical facts such as within-style
comovement and the profitability of momentum and value strategies. Barberis et al. (2005)
formally test this idea using inclusions into the S&P 500 index, and show that stocks added to
the index comove more with other stocks in the index after inclusion. This paper adds another
aspect to categorical thinking that is previously unexplored: because objects within a category
are similar along their main dimension, it may become easier to compare them to each other
along other dimensions.
This paper also adds to the literature using mutual fund flows to study investor behavior.
A large portion of the literature is focused on studying how past mutual fund performance
impacts flows, and finds a robust positive relationship (Coval and Stafford (2007), Barber et al.
(2016), Berk and van Binsbergen (2016)). Studies have also found that investors react strongly
to salient characteristics. For example, Morningstar star rating (Reuter and Zitzewitz (2010),
Ben-David et al. (2020)), Morningstar sustainability rating (Hartzmark and Sussman (2019)),
and inclusion in Wall Street Journal’s “Category Kings” list (Kaniel and Parham (2017)) have
large effects on fund flows. This paper lies in the intersection of these two areas, testing how a
salient characteristic (Morningstar category) can impact the relationship between past return
and flows.
A related paper is Pomorski (2004). Pomorski finds a positive relationship between fund
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flows and past returns of other mutual funds with the same self-identified benchmark before
controlling for the fund’s own returns, but a negative relationship after controlling for the fund’s
own returns. My paper has a few distinct advantages. First, the category measure in this paper
is issued by a third party, and based on a fund’s holdings rather than a self-identified objective.
This gets around the issue of firms strategically specifying a weaker benchmark index that does
not match its style in order to attract flows (Sensoy (2008)). Morningstar is widely-used by
investors, so Morningstar categories are a very salient fund characteristic. Second, because the
category is determined by fund holdings, it is possible to identify funds from each category with
holdings most similar to another category. Analysis of these funds is particularly interesting
because it addresses the concern that investors are comparing funds to a systematic component
of returns rather than only its category benchmark. In addition, we can show that investors
mistakenly compare funds too much to salient categories. Third, I am able to classify funds as
either catering to “retail” or “institutional” investors, and study differences in behavior between
the two groups. Finally, the sample in this paper runs through 2018.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data in detail. Section 3
states the hypotheses. Section 4 runs through methodology and results. Section 5 contains a
discussion of potential applications and Section 6 concludes.
2.2 Data
All of the data for this paper was gathered from Morningstar Direct in December 2018.
Mutual fund data in Morningstar begins in 1992, but is scarce before 1998. The data used for
the main analysis in this paper runs between January 1998 and November 2018. I download the
following variables from the Morningstar Direct US equity open end mutual funds database:
• Fund Name: The name of the mutual fund. This is at the share class level, so for
example, Fidelity Advisor Large Cap Growth A and Fidelity Advisor Large Cap Growth
B are treated as separate funds. For all of the analysis in the paper, I combine all share
classes of the same fund. To find past returns and flows at the fund level, I calculate the
average across all of the fund’s share classes, value-weighted by their total net assets.
• Assets: The total net assets of a fund (monthly).
• Return: The return of a fund (monthly).
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• Fund Flow: The net flow in dollar amounts into or out of a fund (monthly). Following
Coval and Stafford (2007), net flow is scaled by the fund’s total net assets at the beginning
of the month to get the main measure of flow used throughout this paper.
• Morningstar Category: The style category assigned to the fund by Morningstar based
on the fund’s holdings in the past three years. There are nine styles: Large Cap Growth,
Large Cap Blend, Large Cap Value, Mid Cap Growth, Mid Cap Blend, Mid Cap Value,
Small Cap Growth, Small Cap Blend, Small Cap Value.
• Value-Growth Score: A score assigned by Morningstar based on the fund’s holdings
which is used to determine Morningstar Category and style box designations. A higher
score indicates a fund holds more “growth” stocks, while a lower score indicates a fund
holds more “value” stocks.
• Cap Score: A score assigned by Morningstar based on the fund’s holdings which is used
to determine Morningstar Category and style box designations. A higher score indicates a
fund holds more large-cap stocks, while a lower score indicates a fund holds more small-cap
stocks.
• Category Benchmark Returns: The mean return of a fund within a Morningstar
Category (monthly).
• Morningstar Rating: A quality measure assigned by Morningstar based on past per-
formance. It ranges from 1 star (low) to 5 stars (high). This measure has a significant
impact on fund flows (Reuter and Zitzewitz (2010), Ben-David et al.. (2020)).
Only funds with a valid entry for each of the above variables in a given month are included
in the final dataset. In addition, I remove ETFs and index funds from the sample, and further
restrict to only funds with at least 10 million total net assets. Monthly returns and scaled fund
flows are winsorized at the 99% level.
Figure 5 shows a time-series of the number of funds in each Morningstar Category. The
number of funds increases from around 500 in 1998 to over 1,500 in 2008, then stays steady
between 2008 and 2018. The relative proportion of funds in each of the categories remains
relatively stable throughout the time period. The “Large” and ”Growth” categories make up
the largest groups in the sample. Table 1 shows summary statistics for the dataset sorted by
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Morningstar Category. In total, there are 356,778 fund-months in the sample. The mean firm-
month has a return of 0.66% and a mean flow of -0.21%. Funds in the “Large” category have
larger total net assets than those in the “Small” category, but perform slightly worse. “Value”
funds tend to higher monthly flows than “Blend” or “Growth” funds.
Table 2 Panel A shows summary statistics for Morningstar category monthly benchmark
returns. The Small Growth category has the highest mean monthly return between 1998 and
2018, but also the highest standard deviation of monthly returns. The Large Value and Large
Blend categories have the lowest mean return and lowest standard deviation of returns in the
sample. Table 2 Panel B shows a correlation table for benchmark returns. In general, the
correlation between two categories that are next to each other (i.e. Large Value and Large
Blend) is relatively higher, while the correlation between two categories further away from
each other (i.e. Large Value and Small Growth) is relatively lower. There is a strong market
component that impacts the return of all styles. The largest pairwise correlation is 0.978 between
Small Blend and Small Value, while the smallest pairwise correlation is 0.750 between Large
Value and Small Growth.
2.3 Hypotheses
Flows in and out of a fund reveal which mutual funds investors believe are positive net
present value opportunities at a given time (Berk and van Binsbergen (2016)). This is because
the price of a mutual fund is fixed at the price of its underlying assets and the charged fee.
When the price of an asset is fixed, we observe demand for the asset through volume (in this
case, flows). For a detailed discussion of the revealed preference argument for mutual fund
flows, see Berk and van Binsbergen (2016). Throughout the paper, I use flows as the dependent
variable when testing which mutual funds look more attractive to investors.
I first test the classic style investing hypothesis from Barberis and Shleifer (2003). Under this
theory, investors possess limited attention and evaluate an asset based on the performance of the
style that it is associated with. Assets belonging to styles that have performed well in the past
(relative to other styles) attract more interest from investors regardless of the asset’s individual
performance. In my setting, style investing predicts that when a Morningstar Category performs
well, all of the funds within the category look more attractive to investors and attract more
flows:
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Hypothesis 1 : There is a positive relationship between a fund’s flows and the benchmark
return of its Morningstar Category.
In this paper, I am also interested in comparisons between funds of the same category. When
one characteristic is held constant, it may become easier to compare the funds on the basis of
their other characteristics. For example, consider an investor choosing between Fund A and
Fund B, where A has outperformed B in the recent past. If A and B are in different categories,
the investor may attribute A’s relative outperformance to the different risk profiles between
the funds. If A and B are in the same category, however, their “strategy” and “risk” are held
constant in the eyes of an inattentive investor, making it easier to compare the funds on the
basis of their past performance. This leads to the second main prediction:
Hypothesis 2 : After controlling for a fund’s own returns, there is a negative relationship
between fund flows the benchmark return of its Morningstar Category.
Hypothesis 2 states that a fund will attract more flows if it performed well when others in
its category performed poorly, compared to the case where others in its category also performed
well. This hypothesis is different from what would be predicted by classic style investing (Bar-
beris and Shleifer (2003)). Style investing would predict a positive relationship between fund
flows and category benchmark return, even after controlling for the fund’s own return. This is
because a style performing better in the Barberis and Shleifer model makes all assets within
the style more attractive to investors. I hypothesize that although investors compare between
styles, they compare within styles as well. Assets with the same style are more easily compared
to each other: if a distinguishing characteristic is held constant, it becomes easier to compare
along other dimensions.
If there is a market-wide factor that influences returns of funds of all different styles, we
could find the above result if investors are comparing funds to all other funds. This is because
the negative correlation between fund flows and benchmark returns could come from the portion
of benchmark returns that is correlated with the market-wide factor. In order to address this
potential confounding factor, I exploit a feature of Morningstar categories that allows us to
distinguish funds within a particular category that are most similar to funds of another category.
Although Morningstar sorts funds into nine distinct and salient categories, it does so by first
assigning a “value-growth” and ”cap” score to each fund’s holdings. For each category in each
month, I find the funds with the most extreme scores along either the value or cap dimension,
and call these funds the “edge” of the category. For example, mutual funds sorted into the Small
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Value category with the highest cap score are on the edge between Small Value (benchmark)
and Mid Value (counterfactual benchmark). See Section 4.3 for a detailed explanation of the
construction of edges.
I first test and confirm that the returns of funds at the edge of a category are no more
correlated with their benchmark return than their counterfactual benchmark return, both in
past 12 months and the next 12 months. This would mean that the edge funds’ holdings and
risk profile are no more similar to their assigned category than they are to their counterfactual
category. However, I hypothesize that investors compare these funds more to their category
than their counterfactual category:
Hypothesis 3 : For funds at the edge of a Morningstar Category, the negative relationship
between the fund’s flows and the benchmark return of its Morningstar Category is stronger than
the negative relationship between the fund’s flows and the counterfactual benchmark return.
In the above example, benchmark return is the return of an average fund in the Small Value
category and counterfactual benchmark return is the return of an average fund in the Mid
Value category. Taken together with hypothesis 2, this would suggest that investors compare
a fund more to the category it is sorted into compared to the one it is not, even if there is
no difference in correlation between the fund’s returns and the benchmark or counterfactual
benchmark returns.
2.4 Methodology and Results
Following Coval and Stafford (2007), my main measure of flows is net fund flows scaled by




The revealed preference argument for fund flows states that a higher flowi,t indicates a more
attractive fund at time t, because more investors identified it as a positive net present value
opportunity. I use flowi,t as the dependent variable in all of my regressions in order to test for
the impact of category benchmark returns on investors’ perceptions of a fund’s desirability.
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2.4.1 Category Returns and Fund Flows
I first test for the relationship between category benchmark returns and flows for funds
within the category. For a fund i in time t, I run a regression of the following form:
flowi,t = α+β1bmreturni,t−1+β2bmreturni,t−2+...+β12bmreturni,t−12+γ1flowi,t−1+γ2flowi,t−2+
...+ γ12flowi,t−12 + δ1ratingi,t + δ2log(assetsi,t) + ψ1Fund+ ψ2Category + ψ3Month+ εi,t
(2.1)
where bmreturni,t−τ is the category benchmark return in month τ − t of the Morningstar
category that fund i belongs to. I use lagged returns and flows up to 12 months in the past.
While recent returns and flows have been shown to be more correlated with current period
flows, returns and flows from the more distant past have also been shown to impact flows as
well (Coval and Stafford (2007), Barber et al. (2016)). Controls include the fund’s Morningstar
rating and the fund’s total net assets. The specification is run with fund, category, and time
fixed effects. Standard errors are double-clustered by fund and time.
Hypothesis 1 predicts a positive relationship between bmreturni,t−τ and flowi,t. According
to the style investing hypothesis, a style that outperforms will attract extra flows into all funds in
the style. The results of this regression are presented in column (1) of Table 3. The coefficient on
bmreturn is positive and significant for the four most recent months, with more recent months
having the highest coefficient. The specification controls for past flows (Coval and Stafford
(2007)) and Morningstar ratings (Ben-David et al. (2020)), which have both been shown to
have a positive relationship with current period flows.
I run an alternate specification that aggregates past benchmark returns and past flows over
a lookback period of either three, six, or 12 months. Compared to using single month values
for returns and flows, this strategy reduces the amount of noise in the independent variables
and allows for easier interpretation of the results. I run the following specification for lookback
periods of τ=3,6, and 12 months both as a pooled regression with fixed effects and a Fama-
Macbeth (1973) regression:
flowi,t = α+β1bmreturni,t−τ→t−1+γ1flowi,t−τ→t−1+δ1ratingi,t+δ2log(assetsi,t)+ψ1Fund
+ ψ2Category + ψ3Month+ εi,t (2.2)
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The results of the pooled regression are shown in columns (2)-(4) of Table 3. The coefficient
on bmreturn is positive and significant for all three lookback periods, with similar magnitude.
Using a lookback period of three months, moving from the 10th to 90th percentile of benchmark
return is associated with a 0.95% (0.23 standard deviations) higher flow into a fund within that
category in the following month. For lookback periods of six and 12 months, moving from
the 10th to 90th percentile of benchmark return over the lookback period is associated with a
0.93% (0.23 standard deviations) and 1.06% (0.26 standard deviations) increase in fund flows
respectively.
For the Fama-Macbeth regression approach, I estimate a cross-sectional regression each
month. I then calculate the time series average of the coefficients and report standard errors
as the time series standard error of the mean. Standard errors are Newey-West adjusted with
12 lags. The main distinction between the Fama-Macbeth and pooled approach is that the
Fama-Macbeth regression focuses solely on explaining cross-sectional differences in flows, while
the pooled regression coefficients are also influenced by time-series variation in overall fund
flows. The results of the Fama-Macbeth specifications are shown in columns (5)-(7) of Table
3. The Fama-Macbeth regression coefficients are similar in magnitude to the pooled regression
for all three lookback periods. This indicates that the observed results are driven mostly by
cross-sectional differences in benchmark return each month.
2.4.2 Controlling for Own Return
I run the same regression as the previous section, but add in a control for the fund’s own
past return:
flowi,t = α+β1bmreturni,t−1+β2bmreturni,t−2+...+β12bmreturni,t−12+γ1flowi,t−1+γ2flowi,t−2+
...+ γ12flowi,t−12 + η1returni,t−1 + η2returni,t−2 + ...+ η12returni,t−3
+ δ1ratingi,t + δ2log(assetsi,t) + ψ1Fund+ ψ2Category + ψ3Month+ εi,t (2.3)
Hypothesis 2 predicts a negative relationship between bmreturni,t−τ and flowi,t. This would
mean that people compare fund returns to returns of other funds in the same category. For
a given level of past fund return, the fund receives higher flows from investors if its category
benchmark return was low rather than high.
The results are shown in column (1) of Table 4. After controlling for a fund’s own past
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returns (which have a positive and significant coefficient for all months up to t − 11), the
coefficients on lagged category benchmark returns becomes negative for all months up to t−12.
For the sake of space, only the coefficients on the first four lags are shown in the table.
I then aggregate past fund return, past category benchmark return, and past flow over
lookback periods of three, six, or 12 months and run the following specification as either a
pooled regression with fixed effects or a Fama-Macbeth regression:
flowi,t = α+ β1bmreturni,t−τ→t−1 + γ1flowi,t−τ→t−1 + η1returni,t−τ→t−1 + δ1ratingi,t
+ δ2log(assetsi,t) + ψ1Fund+ ψ2Category + ψ3Month+ εi,t (2.4)
The results of the pooled regression are presented in columns (2)-(4) in Table 4. For lookback
periods of three, six, and 12 months, there is a negative relationship between category bench-
mark return and current month fund flows after controlling for the fund’s own past return.
Holding the fund’s own past returns constant, an increase in the category benchmark return
over the past three months from the 10th to the 90th percentile is associated with a 1.05%
(0.26 standard deviations) decrease in fund flows. For lookback periods of six and 12 months,
the decrease in fund flows following a 10th to 90th percentile increase in category benchmark
returns is 1.48% (0.36 standard deviations) and 2.22% (0.55 standard deviations), respectively.
Columns (5) to (7) of Table 4 present results using the Fama-Macbeth specification. The
coefficient of interest on past benchmark return is negative and significant for all three lookback
windows, and the magnitude of the coefficient is larger than it was for the pooled regression.
This indicates that the majority of the comparison effect is taking place in the cross-section,
and the impact of time-series variation of overall fund flows is low.
2.4.3 Category Edges
Next, I evaluate how investors behave for funds within a category that have holdings most
similar to another category. For each of the nine categories in each month, I find the 10% of
funds (up to 10) with the most extreme cap and value-growth scores. For example, for the
Large Value category, the 10% of funds with the smallest cap score are classified as being on
the edge of Mid Value, and the 10% of funds with the highest value-growth score are classified
as being on the edge of Large Blend. Categories at the corners of the box (Large Value, Large
Growth, Small Value, Small Blend) have only two edges, while those at the sides (Mid Value,
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Mid Growth, Large Blend, Small Blend) have three edges and the category in the middle (Mid
Blend) has four edges. I assign each fund at the edge of a category a “counterfactual” category,
which is the category on the other side of the edge.
It is difficult to come up with a story of strategic manipulation by funds to be placed in a
weaker category. Morningstar categories are based on holdings in the past three years, whereas
fund flows are most impacted by past returns and past category benchmark returns over the
past one year. Strategic manipulation would require a fund to foresee which categories will un-
derperform three years in the future. The fund would then have to adjust their current holdings
in a way to be categorized in one of the underperforming categories, while still performing well
themselves. In order for the fund to ensure they are placed at the edge of the weaker category
rather than the edge of the stronger category, the fund would need full knowledge of Morn-
ingstar’s methodology for assigning value-growth and cap scores, as well as knowledge about
where Morningstar will assign the cutoff for each category three years in the future. Therefore,
the category assignations of funds at the edges of categories is plausibly exogenous.
I first test the relationship between a fund’s returns and the returns of its benchmark and
counterfactual benchmark categories. I regress each fund’s returns over different windows (past
12 months, past 6 months, past 3 months, past 1 month, next 1 month, next 3 months, next 6
months, next 12 months) on the benchmark returns of its category over the same time period
and the benchmark returns of its counterfactual category over the same time period:
returni,t→t±τ = α+β1bmreturni,t→t±τ+β2cfbmreturni,t→t±τ+ψ1Fund+ψ2Edge+ψ3Month+εi,t
(2.5)
Table 5 Panel A shows the results of the horse race regression for past returns, and Table
5 Panel B shows the results for future returns. They indicate that the returns of a fund at
the edge of a category are similarly or even more correlated with funds of its counterfactual
category than they are with funds of its assigned category, both in the past and going forward.
This could be due to the fact that Morningstar bases its category assignations on holdings in
the past three years, so the funds at the edge of a Morningstar category may have switched
strategies without switching Morningstar categories. Consistent with this, the coefficient on
past benchmark return increases relative to the coefficient on past counterfactual benchmark
return as the window extends further back. Looking at only the past month, the coefficient
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on counterfactual benchmark return is almost twice as high as the coefficient on benchmark
return. Using the past 12 month return, however, there is no significant difference between the
two coefficients. Appendix 2A contains a detailed exploration of firms that have a different style
box designation than their Morningstar category. For the purposes of this section, the important
takeaway is that investors should not favor comparing funds at the edge of a category to its
assigned category. If more correlated returns indicate more correlated risk-taking, comparing
edge funds with their counterfactual category is reasonable.
The results of the previous section show a negative relationship between benchmark return
and flow after controlling for a fund’s own return, which is evidence that investors compare a
fund’s return to the return of its benchmark. Next, I test if investors compare funds more to
other funds within the same category than funds outside of its category, even when it might
make more sense to compare to funds outside of its category. To do so, I examine the relationship
between fund flows, benchmark returns, and counterfactual benchmark returns for funds at the
edge of a category. This is the subset of funds whose holdings are most similar to funds on the
other side of the edge, and whose returns I previously showed are actually more correlated with a
different category than its own. Therefore, comparing edge funds’ returns to the counterfactual
benchmark return is just as reasonable as comparing to the benchmark return of the Morningstar
category it was sorted in to. To test which group investors are actually comparing edge fund
returns to, I run a regression of the following form:
flowi,t = α+η1returni,t−τ→t−1+β1bmreturni,t−τ→t−1+θ1cfbmreturni,t−τ→t−1+γ1flowi,t−τ→t−1
+ δ1ratingi,t + δ2log(assetsi,t) + ψ1Fund+ ψ2Category + ψ3Month+ εi,t (2.6)
I examine the effect over different lookback periods τ= 3, 6, or 12 months. Returns are aggre-
gated over periods between three and 12 months to examine the effect over the different time
periods that past returns have been found to impact fund flows. I run the above specification a
pooled regression with edge, fund, and time fixed effects as well as a Fama-Macbeth regression.
The results of the regression are presented in Table 6. Consistent with Hypothesis 3, the
coefficients on bmreturn are more negative than the coefficients on cfbmreturn. Columns (1)-
(3) show the results using a pooled regresssion specification for lookback periods of three, six,
and 12 months respectively. Using a lookback period of three months, moving from the 10th
to 90th percentile of benchmark return is associated with a 0.90% decrease in fund flows, while
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moving from the 10th to 90th percentile of counterfactual benchmark return is only associated
with a 0.22% decrease in fund flows. The difference between the two (0.68%) represents 0.17
of the standard deviation of flows in the sample. For lookback periods of six an 12 months,
the difference in magnitude between benchmark and counterfactual is 1.02% (0.25 standard
deviations) and 1.44% (0.35 standard deviations) respectively.
Results using a Fama-Macbeth specification are shown in columns (5)-(7) in Table 6. The
difference between the coefficients on benchmark and counterfactual benchmark return is nega-
tive and significant for all three lookback windows, and the magnitude of the difference is even
larger than it was in the pooled regression. This indicates that the majority of the observed
effect is driven by cross-sectional comparisons of fund returns.
2.4.4 Retail vs. Institutional Investors
Next, I study if retail and institutional investors differ in the extent to which they engage in
within-style comparisons. I classify fund share classes into those most commonly invested in by
retail investors and those most commonly invested in by institutional investors. Institutional
share classes typically require a large minimum investment (typically around $200,000) but
charge lower fees. Funds with share classes “I”, “X”, “Y”, “Z”, and “Inst” as classified as
institutional share classes, and the rest are classified as retail share classes. If a fund has
multiple share classes that are classified as either retail or institutional, they are aggregated
each month by value-weighting share classes by their total net assets. So, a single fund can
have both a “retail share class fund” and a “institutional share class fund” in the same month.
I restrict the sample to only retail and institutional share class funds with at least five million
in total net assets.
I repeat the analysis in the previous sections separately for retail and institutional share
class funds. First, I run regression (2) to test the relationship between benchmark returns and
flows separately for retail and institutional investors. The results for retail investors are shown
in columns (1)-(3) of Table 7 Panel A, and the results for institutional investors are shown in
columns (1)-(3) of Table 7 Panel B. For all three lookback periods of three, six, and 12 months,
the coefficients on benchmark return for retail and institutional investors have similar sign and
magnitude.
Next, I add in a control for the own funds’ return, as in regression specification (4). The
results for retail investors are shown in columns (4)-(6) of Table 7 Panel A, and the results
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for institutional investors are shown in columns (4)-(6) of Table 7 Panel B. The coefficient on
benchmark return becomes negative and significant for both retail and institutional investors
for all three lookback periods. This indicates that both types of investors engage in within-style
comparisons when choosing which fund to invest in. The magnitude of the coefficients for retail
and institutional investors is similar for three and six month periods, but the coefficient for
the 12 month lookback period is more negative for institutional investors. Retail investors may
evaluate fund quality by recent returns, while institutional investors take more distant returns
into account when choosing a fund.
Finally, I test if retail and institutional investors treat funds at the category edges differently.
I run regression specification (6) separately for the two groups. Results for retail investors are
shown in columns (7)-(9) of Table 7 Panel A. The difference in the coefficient on benchmark
return and counterfactual benchmark return is negative and significant, indicating that retail
investors compare edge funds more to their own category than the counterfactual category for
all three lookback periods. Results for institutional investors is shown in columns (7)-(9) of
Table 7 Panel B. For institutional investors, there is no significant difference between the coeffi-
cients on benchmark return and counterfactual benchmark return. Institutional investors may
recognize that edge funds have similarities to both their category and counterfactual category,
and compare individual fund performance to both groups.
In summary, the results indicate that both retail and institutional investors compare funds
to others within their category. However, retail investors are more reliant on categories assigned
by Morningstar which may not be an accurate representation of the fund’s current holdings.
2.5 Discussion
Trading by mutual funds can have an impact on the returns of individual stocks (Coval
and Stafford (2007), Lou (2012)) as well as the returns of commonly studied factors such as
size and value (Huang et al. (2019)). Recent literature has provided robust evidence for factor
momentum: factors that performed well in the past year tend to outperform in the next month
(Gupta and Kelly (2019), Arnott et al. (2019), Ehsani and Linnainmaa (2020)).
The results of this paper suggest that Morningstar category designations may contribute to
momentum in the size and value factors. First of all, there is a positive relationship between
category benchmark returns and fund flows before controlling for the fund’s own return. Because
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mutual funds invest in stocks similar to their current holdings (Lou (2012)), flows into well
performing categories can further push up prices of stocks with that style, producing factor
momentum. The results for funds at the edge of categories suggest something more interesting.
When two adjacent categories have different returns over the past year, the funds in the worse
performing category that are most similar to funds in the better performing category will attract
a disproportionate amount of inflows. This subset of funds has similar returns to the better
performing category, but benefits from being compared to the worse performing category.
For example, consider the case where the return to the Large Value category over the past
year was 10%, the return to the Large Blend category was 5%, and the return to the Large
Growth category was 0%. Within the Large Blend category, there will naturally be some funds
that are closer in holdings to Large Value funds, and some funds that are closer in holdings
to Large Growth funds. Because the Large Value category outperformed the Large Growth
category in the past year, funds within the Large Blend category that are most similar to Large
Value funds likely outperformed those most similar to Large Growth funds. My results suggest
that investors compare funds more to those within their assigned Morningstar category, so the
funds within Large Blend that look most like Large Value funds will receive a disproportionate
amount of the flows destined for the Large Blend category. These funds then invest the flows
in similar stocks to their current holdings (more likely to be Large Value stocks than Large
Growth stocks), further pushing up their price. In summary, flows to intermediate categories
tilt towards funds within the category that are most similar to a better performing category.
This comes at the expense of funds most similar to a worse performing category. Because of this,
factor momentum can result from mutual fund flows even if aggregate flows into the different
categories remains relatively stable over time.
Another potential area that the results of this paper can be applied to is a test of Berk
and Green (2004). They develop a model that attributes the lack of persistence in mutual
fund returns to decreasing returns to scale. Better performing mutual funds with more skilled
managers attract flows from rational investors to the point where all funds have the same
expected future return. A key assumption of the model is that fund size is negatively related to
future fund returns, holding all else equal. The main issue with testing Berk and Green (2004)
is that fund size is endogenously related to future returns through (unobserved) manager skill.
A proper test of the theory would require an exogenous shock to fund size. Previous studies
have taken a variety of approaches and exploited a host of quasi-natural experiments to get
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around this issue, with mixed results (Chen et al. (2004), Reuter and Zitzewitz (2010), Phillips
et al. (2014), McLemore (2014), Golez and Shive (2015), Pastor et al. (2015)).
The results of this paper point to a potential exogenous source of flows. Flows to funds
at the edge of a Morningstar category are greatly impacted by the benchmark return of its
category, and less impacted by the benchmark return of its counterfactual category. Consider
two funds with nearly identical holdings and past returns of 7% at the edge of Large Value and
Large Growth. Fund A was sorted into Large Value which had a return of 5% in the past year,
and Fund B was sorted into Large Blend which had a return of 10% in the past year. Because
fund A’s 7% return looks favorable compared to the 5% return of its benchmark category, it
will attract flows from investors. On the other hand, investors compare fund B’s identical 7%
return to a larger category benchmark return of 10%, and are less likely to invest. As a result,
Fund A increases in size while Fund B decreases in size due only to the Morningstar category
they were assigned to.
The main assumptions here are that the holdings of funds at the edge of categories are
similar, and that there is no strategic manipulation by funds to be assigned to one side of the
edge rather than the other. By construction, the holdings of edge funds are similar to each
other along the size and value dimensions. It is possible they differ along other dimensions,
but they would have to differ systematically in a way that is correlated with being assigned
to one category over another category. Category is assigned by a third party (Morningstar),
making strategic manipulation difficult (see section 4.3 for discussion). In addition, the source of
exogenous flows in this paper is category benchmark returns, which are impossible to manipulate
by an individual fund. This is a distinct advantage over something like Morningstar ratings,
which are correlated with the fund’s own past returns. Therefore, the effect studied in this
paper could plausibly be a good setting to test Berk and Green (2004).
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I first find evidence consistent with style investing (Barberis and Shleifer
(2003)) in the mutual fund setting: high category benchmark returns are correlated with higher
inflows to all funds in the category. Digging a little deeper, I find that investors engage in
within-style comparisons as well. Specifically, a fund attracts extra flows if it performs well
relative to other funds in its category. I supplement this evidence with an exploration of funds
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whose category assignations are plausibly exogenous, and find that investors compare funds
more to their assigned category than their similar but unassigned category. While both retail
and institutional investors engage in within-style comparisons, institutional investors are better
at deducing the best category to compare a fund to. The results of this paper suggest that
categories can aid comparisons between complicated objects in multiple ways. It becomes easier
to compare objects from different categories through their category qualities. At the same time,
it also becomes easier to compare objects from the same category along other dimensions because
a main characteristic is held constant.
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2.7 Tables and Figures
Figure 2.1: Morningstar Categories
This figure shows the Morningstar category classification system. Mutual funds are sorted into one of
nine possible categories based on the average size and value of their holdings.
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Figure 2.2: Morningstar Fund Snapshot
This figure shows an example of a snapshot for a Morningstar page for a mutual fund. The red boxes
highlight areas displaying information relevant to the fund’s Morningstar category.
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Figure 2.3: Morningstar Category Benchmark Returns
This figure shows an example of how Morningstar reports category benchmark returns.
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Figure 2.4: Morningstar Fund Returns
This figure shows an example of how Morningstar reports mutual fund returns for funds within a
category.
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Figure 2.5: Number of Funds Each Month By Category
This figure shows a histogram of the number of funds in each Morningstar Category in the sample between 1998 and 2018.
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Table 2.1: Fund Level Summary Statistics by Morningstar Category
This table shows summary statistics for the dataset at the fund-month level sorted by Morningstar
Category between January 1998 and November 2018.
Mean SD 10% 25% 50% 75% 90%
All (N=356,778)
TNA ($1,000,000) 1,386.68 5,327.49 32.48 88.53 294.53 1,002.19 2,801.37
Return (%) 0.66 4.95 -5.57 -1.82 1.05 3.55 6.14
Flow (%) -0.21 4.06 -3.02 -1.45 -0.45 0.66 2.88
Large Value (N=56,337)
TNA ($1,000,000) 2,130.51 7,024.45 41.30 104.24 372.98 1,347.93 4,183.02
Return (%) 0.56 4.25 -4.63 -1.59 0.94 3.00 5.40
Flow (%) -0.19 3.82 -2.71 -1.31 -0.40 0.63 2.60
Large Blend (N=64,655)
TNA ($1,000,000) 1,615.56 5,282.24 34.82 87.00 308.04 1214.58 3593.50
Return (%) 0.54 4.35 -5.11 -1.69 0.97 3.14 5.47
Flow (%) -0.44 3.60 -2.80 -1.40 -0.51 0.40 2.12
Large Growth (N=69,321)
TNA ($1,000,000) 1,884.83 8,401.22 29.64 86.50 330.66 1,210.05 3,639.06
Return (%) 0.63 4.76 -5.61 -1.74 0.97 3.54 5.99
Flow (%) -0.31 3.95 -2.95 -1.46 -0.54 0.50 2.62
Mid Value (N=16,755)
TNA ($1,000,000) 1,185.98 2,160.63 30.90 94.46 348.99 1,167.13 3,271.33
Return (%) 0.77 4.60 -4.74 -1.51 1.11 3.39 5.81
Flow (%) 0.25 4.25 -2.89 -1.37 -0.23 1.24 4.00
Mid Blend (N=20,131)
TNA ($1,000,000) 810.48 1,700.69 25.99 73.07 246.23 899.49 2,085.00
Return (%) 0.72 4.89 -5.14 -1.74 1.12 3.60 6.05
Flow (%) -0.14 4.15 -3.23 -1.54 -0.45 0.77 3.34
Mid Growth (N=39,903)
TNA ($1,000,000) 1,043.41 2,364.82 31.27 90.42 277.76 961.11 2,435.19
Return (%) 0.69 5.69 -6.16 -2.15 1.15 4.00 6.64
Flow (%) -0.16 4.00 -2.88 -1.44 -0.46 0.66 2.91
Small Value (N=20,375)
TNA ($1,000,000) 740.90 1,378.60 32.95 79.40 257.07 743.04 2,013.45
Return (%) 0.76 5.18 -5.58 -1.96 1.09 3.87 6.53
Flow (%) 0.14 4.66 -3.39 -1.52 -0.31 1.13 4.06
Small Blend (N=29,610)
TNA ($1,000,000) 705.60 1,344.64 33.83 87.42 268.79 701.64 1,622.36
Return (%) 0.81 5.21 -5.81 -1.99 1.19 4.01 6.61
Flow (%) -0.04 4.37 -3.35 -1.48 -0.34 0.93 3.51
Small Growth (N=39,691)
TNA ($1,000,000) 649.73 1,508.03 30.66 83.46 223.91 584.70 1,351.44
Return (%) 0.78 6.02 -6.87 -2.48 1.32 4.46 7.24
Flow (%) -0.27 4.56 -3.66 -1.67 -0.49 0.77 3.26
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Table 2.2: Morningstar Category Benchmark Return Summary Statistics
Panel A shows summary statistics for Morningstar Category benchmark monthly returns between
January 1998 and November 2018. Panel B shows a correlation table between Category benchmark
monthly returns.
Panel A: Summary Statistics
N Mean SD 10% 25% 50% 75% 90%
Large Value 251 0.57 4.10 -4.22 -1.68 0.97 3.06 5.42
Large Blend 251 0.56 4.22 -5.14 -1.78 1.09 3.25 5.51
Large Growth 251 0.63 4.85 -5.79 -1.90 0.96 3.70 6.20
Mid Value 251 0.74 4.46 -4.19 -1.44 1.13 3.49 5.74
Mid Blend 251 0.73 4.68 -4.49 -1.74 1.31 3.86 5.98
Mid Growth 251 0.75 5.62 -6.24 -2.04 1.07 4.29 6.67
Small Value 251 0.77 4.94 -5.19 -1.84 1.06 3.95 6.33
Small Blend 251 0.78 5.25 -5.56 -2.15 1.08 4.37 6.86
Small Growth 251 0.81 6.15 -6.92 -2.61 1.38 4.60 7.66
Panel B: Correlation Table
LV LB LG MV MB MG SV SB SG
LV 1.000
LB 0.959 1.000
LG 0.853 0.962 1.000
MV 0.973 0.932 0.838 1.000
MB 0.933 0.962 0.931 0.963 1.000
MG 0.783 0.899 0.959 0.812 0.934 1.000
SV 0.893 0.864 0.791 0.954 0.944 0.820 1.000
SB 0.870 0.893 0.868 0.928 0.970 0.913 0.978 1.000
SG 0.750 0.853 0.908 0.799 0.918 0.978 0.856 0.942 1.000
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Table 2.3: Category Benchmark Returns and Flows
This table examines the relationship between fund flows and the average past returns of the
Morningstar Category that the fund is assigned to. The dependent variable is flows into a fund in a
particular month scaled by the total net assets of that fund. In column (1), the independent variables
are the benchmark returns of the Morningstar category associated with the fund over the past 12
months. For the sake of space, only the coefficients on the first four lags are reported. In columns (2)
to (7), the independent variable is the total benchmark return over the lookback period of the
associated Morningstar category. Control variables include fund flows over the lookback period, the
fund’s Morningstar rating, and total net assets of the fund. Fund, time, and Morningstar category fixed
effects are included in all specifications. Columns (1) to (4) use a pooled regression approach, and
standard errors are double-clustered by fund and time. Columns (5) to (7) use a Fama-MacBeth
regression approach, and standard errors are Newey-West adjusted with 12 lags.
Dependent variable: Next Month Fund Flows
Specification: Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled FM FM FM
Lookback (τ) : N/A 3 months 6 months 12 months 3 months 6 months 12 months
















∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗
















∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.191∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001)
rating 0.565∗∗∗ 0.692∗∗∗ 0.631∗∗∗ 0.667∗∗∗ 0.487∗∗∗ 0.426∗∗∗ 0.420∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.020) (0.019) (0.021) (0.017) (0.017) (0.021)
log(assets) −0.561∗∗∗ −0.533∗∗∗ −0.586∗∗∗ −0.699∗∗∗ −0.098∗∗∗ −0.101∗∗∗ −0.119∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.029) (0.012) (0.012) (0.015)
Fund FE Y Y Y Y N N N
Time FE Y Y Y Y N N N
Category FE Y Y Y Y N N N
Observations 334,819 351,463 345,943 334,819 251 251 251
R2 0.296 0.284 0.276 0.249 0.263 0.257 0.231
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 2.4: Category Benchmark Returns and Flows Controlling for Own Return
This table examines the relationship between fund flows and the average past returns of the
Morningstar Category that the fund is assigned to, after controlling for the fund’s own past returns.
The dependent variable is flows into a fund in a particular month scaled by the total net assets of that
fund. In column (1), the independent variables are the benchmark returns of the Morningstar category
associated with the fund over the past 12 months and the return of the fund over the past 12 months.
For the sake of space, only the coefficients on the first four lags are reported. In columns (2) to (7), the
independent variable is the total benchmark return over the lookback period (in months) of the
associated Morningstar category and the total return over lookback period of the fund. Additional
control variables include fund flows over the lookback period, the fund’s Morningstar rating, and total
net assets of the fund. Fund, time, and Morningstar category fixed effects are included in all
specifications. Columns (1) to (4) use a pooled regression approach, and standard errors are
double-clustered by fund and time. Columns (5) to (7) use a Fama-MacBeth regression approach, and
standard errors are Newey-West adjusted with 12 lags.
Dependent variable: Next Month Fund Flows
Specification: Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled FM FM FM
Lookback (τ) : N/A 3 months 6 months 12 months 3 months 6 months 12 months











bmrett−τ→t−1 −0.052∗∗∗ −0.054∗∗∗ −0.048∗∗∗ −0.090∗∗∗ −0.084∗∗∗ −0.088∗∗∗
















∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.011) (0.009) (0.008)
rating 0.433∗∗∗ 0.632∗∗∗ 0.526∗∗∗ 0.488∗∗∗ 0.417∗∗∗ 0.296∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.020) (0.018) (0.020) (0.016) (0.015) (0.029)
log(assets) −0.491∗∗∗ −0.491∗∗∗ −0.515∗∗∗ −0.602∗∗∗ −0.094∗∗∗ −0.092∗∗∗ −0.104∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.025) (0.026) (0.028) (0.011) (0.011) (0.014)
Flow Control Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Fund FE Y Y Y Y N N N
Time FE Y Y Y Y N N N
Category FE Y Y Y Y N N N
Observations 334,819 351,463 345,943 334,819 251 251 251
R2 0.304 0.289 0.285 0.262 0.272 0.272 0.256
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 2.5: Fund Return Correlation With Benchmark and Counterfactual Bench-
mark
This table examines the relationship between the return of a fund at the edge of a category, the
benchmark return of its Morningstar category, and the benchmark return of its counterfactual category.
An “edge” is defined as the 10% of funds (up to 10) in a category with the most extreme size or value
score, as defined by Morningstar. See section 4.3 for a detailed description of how how edges are
constructed. This table shows the results of a horse race regression over different time windows. Panel
A examines time windows of 1,3,6, and 12 months before the current date. Panel B examines time
windows of 1,3,6, and 12 months after the current date. Standard errors are double-clustered by fund
and date.
Panel A: Past Returns
Dependent variable: Fund Returns t-τ → t− 1
Window: -1 Month -3 Months -6 Months -12 Months
(1) (2) (3) (4)
bmrett−τ→t−1 0.338
∗∗∗ 0.351∗∗∗ 0.413∗∗∗ 0.498∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.033) (0.039) (0.052)
cfbmrett−τ→t−1 0.642
∗∗∗ 0.655∗∗∗ 0.618∗∗∗ 0.542∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.035) (0.038) (0.047)
bmret− cfbmret −0.304∗∗∗ −0.304∗∗∗ −0.205∗∗∗ −0.044
(0.049) (0.054) (0.059) (0.077)
Fund FE Y Y Y Y
Time FE Y Y Y Y
Edge FE Y Y Y Y
Observations 55,224 54,436 53,292 50,930
R2 0.865 0.872 0.875 0.866
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Panel B: Future Returns
Dependent variable: Fund Returns t → t+ τ
Window: +1 Month +3 Months +6 Months +12 Months
(1) (2) (3) (4)
bmrett→t+τ 0.325
∗∗∗ 0.335∗∗∗ 0.374∗∗∗ 0.346∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.034) (0.045) (0.039)
cfbmrett→t+τ 0.642
∗∗∗ 0.666∗∗∗ 0.649∗∗∗ 0.622∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.033) (0.036) (0.044)
bmret− cfbmret −0.317∗∗∗ −0.331∗∗∗ −0.275∗∗∗ −0.276∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.052) (0.066) (0.067)
Fund FE Y Y Y Y
Time FE Y Y Y Y
Edge FE Y Y Y Y
Observations 54,481 53,245 51,527 48,422
R2 0.865 0.873 0.879 0.876
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 2.6: Category Benchmark Returns and Flows for Edges
This table examines the relationship between fund flows for funds at the “edge” of a Morningstar
category and the average past returns of the Morningstar category that the fund was assigned to, the
average past returns of the Morningstar category on the other side of the edge, and the fund’s own past
returns. An “edge” is defined as the 10% of funds (up to 10) in a category with the most extreme size
or value score, as defined by Morningstar. See section 4.3 for a detailed description of how how edges
are constructed. The dependent variable is flows into a fund in a particular month scaled by the total
net assets of that fund. Independent variables are the fund’s own return, the benchmark return of the
fund’s Morningstar category, and the benchmark return of the fund’s “counterfactual” Morningstar
category. Controls include fund flows over the lookback period, the fund’s Morningstar rating, and
total net assets of the fund. Columns (1)-(3) use a pooled regression approach, and standard errors are
double-clustered by fund and time. Columns (4)-(6) use a Fama-Macbeth regression approach, and
standard errors are Newey-West adjusted with 12 lags.
Dependent variable: Next Month Fund Flows
Lookback (τ) : 3 Months 6 Months 12 Months 3 Months 6 Months 12 Months
Specification: Pooled Pooled Pooled FM FM FM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
rett−τ→t−1 0.112
∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ 0.175∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.008) (0.013) (0.011) (0.009)
bmrett−τ→t−1 −0.043∗∗∗ −0.049∗∗∗ −0.039∗∗∗ −0.079∗∗∗ −0.091∗∗∗ −0.056∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.009) (0.007) (0.015) (0.031) (0.019)
cfbmrett−τ→t−1 −0.011 −0.014∗ −0.008 −0.017 −0.003 −0.008
(0.011) (0.008) (0.006) (0.014) (0.015) (0.010)
flowt−τ→t−1 0.152
∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.192∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
rating 0.685∗∗∗ 0.579∗∗∗ 0.553∗∗∗ 0.403∗∗∗ 0.282∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.037) (0.041) (0.030) (0.041) (0.047)
log(assets) −0.617∗∗∗ −0.664∗∗∗ −0.766∗∗∗ −0.119∗∗∗ −0.128∗∗∗ −0.111∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.059) (0.069) (0.015) (0.024) (0.023)
bmret− cfbmret −0.032∗ −0.035∗∗∗ −0.031∗∗∗ −0.062∗∗∗ −0.088∗ −0.048∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.012) (0.009) (0.019) (0.043) (0.016)
Fund FE Y Y Y N N N
Time FE Y Y Y N N N
Edge FE Y Y Y N N N
Observations 54,085 52,899 50,545 251 251 251
R2 0.351 0.348 0.330 0.309 0.311 0.287
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 2.7: Results for Retail Investors vs. Institutional Investors
This table examines the previous results separately for retail investors (Panel A) and institutional investors (Panel B). Columns (1)-(3) show the relationship
between fund flows and category benchmark returns. Columns (4)-(6) show the relationship between fund flows and category benchmark returns after
controlling for the fund’s own return. Columns (7)-(9) show the relationship between fund flows, category benchmark returns, and counterfactual category
benchmark returns for funds at the edge of a category. Results are shown for lookback periods of three, six, and 12 months. Standard errors are
double-clustered by fund and time.
Panel A: Retail Investors
Dependent variable: Next Month Fund Flows
Sample: All All All All All All Edges Edges Edges
Lookback (τ) : 3 Months 6 Months 12 Months 3 Months 6 Months 12 Months 3 Months 6 Months 12 Months
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
rett−τ→t−1 0.103
∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008)
bmrett−τ→t−1 0.053
∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ −0.048∗∗∗ −0.051∗∗∗ −0.043∗∗∗ −0.041∗∗∗ −0.049∗∗∗ −0.038∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.012) (0.009) (0.007)
cfbmrett−τ→t−1 −0.011 −0.009 −0.008
(0.011) (0.008) (0.006)
flowt−τ→t−1 0.172
∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.170∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.006) (0.003) (0.002)
rating 0.705∗∗∗ 0.643∗∗∗ 0.682∗∗∗ 0.644∗∗∗ 0.537∗∗∗ 0.504∗∗∗ 0.727∗∗∗ 0.620∗∗∗ 0.583∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.019) (0.022) (0.021) (0.019) (0.021) (0.042) (0.042) (0.046)
log(assets) −0.618∗∗∗ −0.652∗∗∗ −0.750∗∗∗ −0.576∗∗∗ −0.582∗∗∗ −0.654∗∗∗ −0.782∗∗∗ −0.790∗∗∗ −0.898∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.029) (0.032) (0.028) (0.029) (0.031) (0.066) (0.071) (0.078)
bmret− cfbmret −0.030∗ −0.040∗∗∗ −0.030∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.012) (0.009)
Fund FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Category FE Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N
Edge FE N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Y Y Y
Observations 322,689 317,316 306,747 322,689 317,316 306,747 52,690 51,563 49,343
R2 0.291 0.277 0.243 0.296 0.285 0.255 0.359 0.350 0.328
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 7 (cont.): Results for Retail Investors vs. Institutional Investors
Panel B: Institutional Investors
Dependent variable: Next Month Fund Flows
Sample: All All All All All All Edges Edges Edges
Lookback (τ) : 3 Months 6 Months 12 Months 3 Months 6 Months 12 Months 3 Months 6 Months 12 Months
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
rett−τ→t−1 0.099
∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.010) (0.007) (0.021) (0.018) (0.013)
bmrett−τ→t−1 0.057
∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ −0.043∗∗∗ −0.065∗∗∗ −0.073∗∗∗ −0.025 −0.030∗ −0.048∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.008) (0.005) (0.012) (0.010) (0.009) (0.022) (0.016) (0.014)
cfbmrett−τ→t−1 −0.027 −0.036∗∗ −0.018
(0.019) (0.016) (0.011)
flowt−τ→t−1 0.109
∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.007) (0.004) (0.002)
rating 1.253∗∗∗ 1.127∗∗∗ 1.098∗∗∗ 1.197∗∗∗ 1.009∗∗∗ 0.867∗∗∗ 1.198∗∗∗ 1.046∗∗∗ 0.888∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.040) (0.039) (0.043) (0.038) (0.036) (0.080) (0.075) (0.079)
log(assets) −0.848∗∗∗ −0.831∗∗∗ −0.871∗∗∗ −0.821∗∗∗ −0.778∗∗∗ −0.786∗∗∗ −1.061∗∗∗ −0.994∗∗∗ −0.962∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.037) (0.037) (0.039) (0.037) (0.036) (0.098) (0.091) (0.094)
bmret− cfbmret 0.002 0.006 −0.029
(0.030) (0.024) (0.020)
Fund FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Category FE Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N
Edge FE N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Y Y Y
Observations 181,518 177,125 168,500 181,518 177,125 168,500 39,720 38,611 36,401
R2 0.149 0.145 0.134 0.150 0.148 0.139 0.204 0.203 0.200
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
102
2.8 Appendix 2A: Morningstar Category vs. Style Box
Morningstar provides another category designation (“style box”) that is based only on a
fund’s current holdings. It takes on the same possible values as Morningstar Category (Large
Value, Large Blend, Large Growth, Mid Value, Mid Blend, Mid Growth, Small Value, Small
Blend, Small Growth). Style box is quicker to update than Morningstar category, which takes
the past three years’ holdings into account. In the fund snapshot, all comparisons are made
with Morningstar category so style box is not as salient to investors (see Figure 2).
Morningstar category and style box are the same for 79% of the fund-months in the sample,
but for cases where they are not the same, style box may actually be a better descriptor of
fund strategy than Morningstar category. For funds with a different Morningstar category and
style box, the fund’s returns over the past year and over the next year are similarly, if not more,
correlated with their benchmark style box return as they are with their benchmark Morningstar
category return (see Table A1).
However, because Morningstar category is more salient to investors, they may be more likely
to compare a fund to its Morningstar category than its style box:
Hypothesis 4 : For funds with a different Morningstar Category and style box designation,
the negative relationship between the fund’s flows and the benchmark return of its Morningstar
Category is stronger than the negative relationship between the fund’s flows and the benchmark
return of its style box.
To test hypothesis 4, I run the following regression using both a pooled and Fama-Macbeth
regression approach:
flowi,t = α+η1returni,t−τ→t−1+β1bmreturni,t−τ→t−1+θ1sbreturni,t−τ→t−1+γ1flowi,t−τ→t−1
+ δ1ratingi,t + δ2log(assetsi,t) + ψ1Fund+ ψ2Category + ψ3Month+ εi,t
The prediction is that β1 < θ1, which would mean that benchmark Morningstar category returns
impact a fund’s flows more than benchmark style box returns. The results are shown in Table
A2 for lookback periods of three, six, and 12 months. Consistent with the hypothesis, β1 < θ1
for all specifications.
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2.9 Appendix 2B: Additional Tables
Table A1: Fund Return Correlation With Morningstar Category Benchmark and
Style Box Benchmark
This table examines the relationship between the returns of a fund, the benchmark return of its
Morningstar category, and the benchmark returns of its style box. This table shows the results of a
horse race regression over different time windows. Panel A examines time windows of 1,3,6, and 12
months before the current date. Panel B examines time windows of 1,3,6, and 12 months after the
current date. Standard errors are double-clustered by fund and date.
Panel A: Past Returns
Dependent variable: Fund Returns t-τ → t− 1
Window: -1 Month -3 Months -6 Months -12 Months
(1) (2) (3) (4)
bmrett−τ→t−1 0.499
∗∗∗ 0.518∗∗∗ 0.572∗∗∗ 0.615∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.043) (0.045) (0.049)
sbrett−τ→t−1 0.564
∗∗∗ 0.554∗∗∗ 0.505∗∗∗ 0.464∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.029) (0.032) (0.038)
bmret− sbret −0.066 −0.035 0.066 0.151∗
(0.066) (0.067) (0.070) (0.079)
Fund FE Y Y Y Y
Time FE Y Y Y Y
Category FE Y Y Y Y
Observations 88,155 85,567 82,108 75,787
R2 0.880 0.886 0.890 0.885
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Panel B: Future Returns
Dependent variable: Fund Returns t → t+ τ
Window: +1 Month +3 Months +6 Months +12 Months
(1) (2) (3) (4)
bmrett→t+τ 0.474
∗∗∗ 0.464∗∗∗ 0.494∗∗∗ 0.495∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.030) (0.035) (0.033)
sbrett→t+τ 0.572
∗∗∗ 0.585∗∗∗ 0.556∗∗∗ 0.524∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.024) (0.028) (0.033)
bmret− sbret −0.098∗ −0.122∗∗ −0.062 −0.029
(0.057) (0.047) (0.053) (0.055)
Fund FE Y Y Y Y
Time FE Y Y Y Y
Category FE Y Y Y Y
Observations 86,894 84,825 81,935 76,893
R2 0.880 0.887 0.891 0.888
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table A2: Morningstar Category vs. Style Box
This table examines the relationship between fund flows for funds with different Morningstar category
and style box designations. The dependent variable is flows into a fund in a particular month scaled by
the total net assets of the fund. The independent variables are the fund’s own return, the benchmark
return of the fund’s Morningstar category, and the benchmark return of the fund’s style box. Controls
include fund flows over the lookback period, the fund’s Morningstar rating, and total net assets of the
fund. Columns (1)-(3) use a pooled regression approach, and standard errors are double-clustered by
fund and time. Columns (4)-(6) use a Fama-Macbeth regression approach, and standard errors are
Newey-WEst adjusted with 12 lags.
Dependent variable: Next Month Fund Flows
Lookback (τ) : 3 Months 6 Months 12 Months 3 Months 6 Months 12 Months
Specification: Pooled Pooled Pooled FM FM FM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
rett−τ→t−1 0.109
∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗ 0.175∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.013) (0.011) (0.009)
bmrett−τ→t−1 −0.055∗∗∗ −0.062∗∗∗ −0.051∗∗∗ −0.064∗∗∗ −0.070∗∗∗ −0.076∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.007) (0.006) (0.013) (0.017) (0.012)
sbrett−τ→t−1 −0.003 −0.005 −0.002 −0.031∗∗∗ −0.024∗ −0.027∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.007) (0.004) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
flowt−τ→t−1 0.153
∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.189∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
rating 0.651∗∗∗ 0.555∗∗∗ 0.523∗∗∗ 0.387∗∗∗ 0.250∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.029) (0.033) (0.027) (0.024) (0.034)
log(assets) −0.537∗∗∗ −0.560∗∗∗ −0.640∗∗∗ −0.100∗∗∗ −0.097∗∗∗ −0.133∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.048) (0.054) (0.013) (0.014) (0.024)
bmret− sbret −0.053∗∗∗ −0.056∗∗∗ −0.049∗∗∗ −0.033∗ −0.046∗∗ −0.049∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.011) (0.009) (0.019) (0.023) (0.015)
Fund FE Y Y Y N N N
Time FE Y Y Y N N N
Category FE Y Y Y N N N
Observations 73,163 71,635 68,627 251 251 251




Prospect Theory Risk Aversion and
Returns
3.1 Introduction
Kahneman and Tversky’s prospect theory (1979) showed through a series of laboratory
tests that people often do not evaluate risk according to expected utility theory. Rather than
evaluating choices over final wealth outcomes, prospect theory proposes that investors derive
utility from gains and losses on individual investments, with different risk attitudes over gains
than losses. Three main components of prospect theory include loss aversion at the zero reference
point, diminishing sensitivity as the absolute size of the gain or loss increases, and risk-averse
behavior over gains and risk-seeking behavior over losses. Figure 1 shows a typical prospect
theory value function. Over the years, prospect theory has been successfully applied in many
creative ways to explain different aspects of financial markets, providing evidence that these
non-expected utility maximizers can affect the economy as a whole.
Motivated by prospect theory and the disposition effect, Grinblatt and Han (2005) show
that a stock’s capital gains overhang (CGO), or the amount of unrealized gains or losses on the
stock, can predict subsequent returns with a positive sign. Under prospect theory, investors are
risk-averse over gains and risk-seeking over losses. As a result, investors may be subject to the
disposition effect, showing a higher tendency to sell stocks at a gain than at a loss. Grinblatt
and Han argue that stocks with a high CGO are undervalued due to a mass of people selling it
at a gain, and show that these stocks subsequently earn a higher return. On the other hand,
stocks with a low CGO are overvalued as a result of excess holding pressure, and subsequently
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earn a lower return.
Barberis, Mukherjee, and Wang (2016) take a different approach, also motivated by prospect
theory. They posit that investors take a stock’s past return distribution into account when
making their investment decision, and show that stocks that look more attractive to people
with prospect theory preferences (positively skewed stocks, for example) may be overvalued
even after adjusting for traditional risk factors. Consequently, the stocks with a high prospect
theory value tend to perform worse in the future, while stocks with a low prospect theory value
become undervalued and perform better going forward.
Both of these papers provide evidence that if a subset of investors evaluate utility according
to prospect theory, there can be a substantial impact on asset prices. In this paper, I examine
investors currently holding a stock, and the effect they could have on asset prices if they have
prospect theory preferences. In particular, I create a measure of “prospect theory risk aversion”
(PTRA) that captures how hesitant a prospect theory investor is to take a fair gamble along
each point of the curve. The idea is that two prospect theory investors holding the same asset
will have different risk attitudes toward the asset if they have different levels of current gains
or losses on the investment.
The PTRA function is graphed in Figure 2. Because of the loss aversion component of
prospect theory, the point at which the agent is most hesitant to take a fair gamble is near the
zero gain/loss reference point. The PTRA function is positive and decreasing over the entire
gains region due to a combination of risk-aversion over gains and diminishing sensitivity. In the
losses region, the investor goes from very risk-averse around zero to very risk-seeking around
a small loss because while the investor is risk-seeking over losses, the prospect theory curve is
most steep around zero. As the level of losses increases, PTRA approaches 0 due to diminishing
sensitivity. Section 2 contains a detailed description of the PTRA measure.
I predict, and show through a set of time-series and Fama-MacBeth regressions, that stocks
with a low value of PTRA tend to outperform stocks with a high value of PTRA. The intuition is
that high PTRA stocks have more risk-averse investors who exert excess selling pressure, leading
to underperformance in the next period as a result. On the other hand, low PTRA stocks have
higher holding pressure from their current investor base, leading to overperformance in the next
period. The intuition is similar to Coval and Stafford (2007) and Lou (2012), who show that
holding or selling pressure induced by mutual fund flows can have direct effects on asset prices.
The trading strategy earns significantly positive returns after controlling for a host of factors
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previously shown to be correlated with returns, including the 5 Fama-French factors (Fama and
French (2015), momentum, and short-term reversal. The results are strongest in the short term
(within three months). Consistent with a mechanism of price pressure from irrational investors,
there is a reversal in returns in the long run (two to five years).
Another prediction of the paper follows that of Wang, Yu, and Yan (2014), who study the
relationship between CGO and the risk-return relationship. In my contest, I predict that low
PTRA stocks will display the traditional positive relationship between risk and returns, but the
relationship will be negative for high PTRA stocks. The intuition is similar to the one above.
Low PTRA stocks have a mass of risk-seeking investors who exert excess selling pressure on
low-risk stocks and holding pressure on high-risk stocks. On the other hand, high PTRA stocks
have a mass of risk-averse investors who exert excess holding pressure on low-risk stocks and
selling pressure on high-risk stocks. I confirm this prediction empirically by examining portfolios
double-sorted on PTRA and and a proxy for a stock’s riskiness.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 of the paper contains a discussion of the
PTRA measure. Section 3 shows data sources and methodology. Section 4 provides empirical
evidence through time-series and Fama-MacBeth tests. Section 5 concludes.
3.2 Prospect Theory Risk Aversion
From Tversky and Kahneman (1992), a typical prospect theory utility function is given by:
PT (x) =

x0.88, for x ≥ 0
−2.25 ∗ (−x)0.88, for x < 0
(3.1)
where x is the level of gains or losses relative to a reference point. The shape of this function
is shown in Figure 1.
The prospect theory curve is characterized by three main characteristics:
1. Loss aversion at the reference point. This can be seen by the coefficient of −2.25 in the
losses region compared to the coefficient of 1 in the gains region.
2. Risk aversion over gains and risk-seeking over losses. The function is concave in the gains
region and convex in the losses region.
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3. Diminishing sensitivity, meaning agents are less risk-averse as their level of gains increases
and less risk-seeking as their level of losses increases. The exponent on x is less than 1 for
both gains and losses.
I measure the level of “prospect theory risk aversion” (PTRA) of an investor at each point
in the prospect theory curve as the amount she would be willing to pay in order to avoid a fair
gamble of size g:
PTRA(x, g) =
(PT (x+ g) + PT (x− g))
2
− PT (x) (3.2)
The PTRA measure using g = 100 is shown in Figure 2.
The three components of prospect theory highlighted above will dynamically interact to
determine how hesitant the agent is to take the fair gamble. I now examine this in more detail
for each region of the curve.
• Large losses: x < −g < 0
The investor is risk-seeking over this entire region, but the level of risk-seeking decreases as her
level of losses increases due to diminishing sensitivity.
• Small losses: −g ≤ x < 0
The investor goes from extremely risk-seeking (when |x| = g) to extremely risk-averse (when
x = 0). For reference, see Figure 3 Panel A, where x1 and x2 are in the slight loss region
with −g < x1 < x2 < 0. Intuitively, the gamble from reference point x1 seems attractive to
the investor because winning the gamble covers the entirety of the steepest part of the curve.
Due to diminishing sensitivity, the effects of losing the gamble are not as large. However, as
the reference point gets closer to zero, to point x2, more of the steep portion of the convex
part of the curve is now to the left of the reference point, so the investor would suffer a lot of
disutility from losing the gamble. Furthermore, the upside of winning the gamble decreases as
the reference point approaches 0 from the left, as the outcome of winning the gamble moves
into the portion of the gains curve that is less steep due to diminishing sensitivity. Therefore,
the investor becomes more and more risk-averse as the reference point moves from x = −g to
x = 0, and she is extremely risk-averse around x = 0 due to loss aversion.
• Small gains: 0 < x ≤ g
The investor is very risk-averse over this entire region and that level of risk aversion is amplified
due to loss aversion. For reference, see Figure 3 Panel B, where x1 and x2 are in the slight gain
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region with 0 < x1 < x2 < g. At x1, the investor is very risk-averse because losing the gamble
would cause her to move down the entirety of the steepest part of the convex portion of the
curve. Conversely, winning the gamble is not as attractive because the curve is more steep over
losses than it is over gains. As the investor gets further away from the kink to x2, the level of
risk aversion drops off more quickly than it would as a result of diminishing sensitivity alone.
In this region, the difference between PT (x1 − g) and PT (x2 − g) is very large compared to
the difference between PT (x1) and PT (x2) because x1 − g and x2 − g are in the steepest part
of the loss region of the curve. As a result, the gamble is more attractive to the investor at
reference point x1 than x2, so she becomes less risk-averse as she moves away from 0 towards
larger gains. Furthermore, because the steepest part of the entire curve (over both gains and
losses) is in the slight losses region, the difference between PT (x1 − g) and PT (x2 − g) will be
larger in the slight losses region than in any part of the gains region. Therefore, for 0 < x ≤ g,
the level of risk aversion drops off faster than it would from diminishing sensitivity alone.
• Large gains: x > g > 0
The investor is risk-averse over this entire region, but the level of risk aversion decreases as level
of gains increases due to diminishing sensitivity.
In summary, the level of PTRA is decreasing as we move from the large losses region to
the small losses region, sharply increasing over the small losses region, and decreasing over the
entire gains region.
In the original Tversky and Kahneman (1992) paper, prospect theory was calibrated in dol-
lar amounts. In this paper, I am interested in effects on asset prices, which requires thinking
about prospect theory in the returns space. In addition, the same level return may be inter-
preted differently for a high variance stock compared to a low variance stock. In order to better
compare between stocks with different levels of return volatility, I normalize returns by histor-
ically calculated standard deviations of return. I interpret each dollar in the prospect theory
curve as 0.01 standard deviations of return, so that the reference point of 100 corresponds to a
1 standard deviation gain on the stock. I make the size of the gamble taken equal to the yearly
standard deviation of returns for a specific stock. In this way, the investor believes that she is
making a larger bet when investing in a high variance stock, and a smaller bet when investing
in a low variance stock. Therefore, the same magnitude gain/loss is perceived as larger for a low
variance stock than a high variance stock. Because I am only interested in relative differences
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between stocks in the cross-section, I normalize the measure of PTRA to have a maximum value
of 1. The PTRA function is shown in Figure 2. It attains a maximum of 1 very close to x = 0,
and reaches a minimum of −0.286 at around x = −100 (loss equal to 1 standard deviation of
returns).
3.3 Data and Methodology
In order to find the average PTRA of the investors holding a specific asset, I require a
measure of the reference point of each agent that is holding the asset. Then, I can map their
gains/losses to PTRA before taking the average in order to find the PTRA of the representative
agent. Data on all individual investor holdings is not available, so I will use modified versions
of measures of reference price used by Grinblatt and Han (2005) and Frazzini (2006). Grinblatt
and Han (2005) infer a stock’s reference price by looking at past returns and trading volume,
while the Frazzini (2006) measure of reference price is based on mutual fund holdings.
3.3.1 Data
Data is collected from standard sources in early 2017. To construct the Grinblatt and
Han measure of reference price, I require weekly data on stock returns and trading volume.
Daily data on these variables between 1962 and 2016 is collected from the CRSP database
and aggregated up to the weekly level. For the Frazzini measure of reference price, I use the
Thomson Reuters Mutual Fund Holdings (s12) database, which includes holding information
from registered mutual funds between 1980 and 2016. In addition, monthly stock return data
is taken from the CRSP database. I restrict the sample to stocks with share code 10 or 11, a
price greater than $5, and a valid return each time period over the past five years.
To perform long-short portfolio analysis, I get data on the 5 Fama-French factors (Rm-
Rf, SMB, HML, RMW, and CMA) as well as momentum (MOM) and short-term reversal
(ST) factors from Ken French’s website. For the Fama-MacBeth regressions, all returns and
accounting data are taken from CRSP and Compustat.
3.3.2 Using Grinblatt and Han (2005) Measure of Reference Price







[1− Vt−n+τ ])Pt−n (3.3)
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where Pt is the stock price at time t and Vt is the stock’s turnover ratio at time t. The turnover
ratio is measured as the trading volume divided by total number of shares outstanding.
This measure of reference price at time t is a function of previous prices, weighted by how
many shares bought at each time t− n are still being held at time t. The term in parentheses
can be interpreted as the probability that a share of the stock purchased at time t− n was not
traded between t − n and t. This adds an implicit assumption that each share of a stock is
equally likely to be sold as any other share. While this probably does not hold true in practice,
I do not distort the selling probability function in an effort to keep the measure as simple as
possible. The other measure of reference price I explore (detailed in the next section) does not
rely on this assumption, and there is high correlation between the two measures. This gives
some assurance that the proportional selling assumption is not greatly impacting the results.
To get a measure of average PTRA for a specific stock, I first map gains/losses (in standard
deviations of returns) to PTRA before computing the weighted average. So, the measure of








[1− Vt−n+τ ])F (rt−n,t, σt)
)
(3.4)
where F (•) maps gains/losses x and bet size σ (the stock’s yearly standard deviation of returns)
to PTRA via the function shown in Figure 2. Because F (•) is not monotonic in reference price,
I must first map gains/losses to PTRA before calculating the weighted average.
Following Grinblatt and Han (2005), I use weekly data over the past five years to calculate
reference price. Only stocks with a valid return each week for the past five years are considered.
To calculate weekly turnover, I divide weekly trading volume by the total shares outstanding
on the stock. On each week t, I calculate the proportion of shares still being held from each
week between t− 1 and t− 260, assuming that all shares are equally likely to be sold. The total
proportion held over the past five years is normalized to equal 1. I then find the holding period
return (HPR) between week t−n and t for all n between 1 and 260. This holding period return
is divided by the yearly standard deviation of the stock at time t (calculated over the past five
years) in order to get the number of standard deviations gained or lost (SDGL) between week
t− n and t. For all n between 1 and 260, the SDGL is mapped to a value of PTRA. Then, the
weighted PTRA of each stock at time t is calculated as as an average of PTRA values weighted
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by the percentage of shares still held between time t− n and t.
See below for a simple example illustrating how the weighted PTRA of a stock at time t
is calculated. The example only uses the past five time periods, whereas the measure used in
the paper looks back 260 weeks. In the example, I assume that the returns on this asset have
an annual standard deviation of 25% in each period. When calculating the real measure, this
value is calculated separately for each time period using returns over the past five years.
Time Return Turnover Held Scaled Held HPR SDGL PTRA
t 0.9
t-1 1.2 10% 0.10 0.18 0.90 -0.40 0.30
t-2 0.7 20% 0.18 0.32 1.08 0.32 0.84
t-3 1.4 15% 0.11 0.19 0.76 -0.98 -0.28
t-4 1.1 5% 0.03 0.05 1.06 0.24 0.90
t-5 1.0 25% 0.15 0.26 1.16 0.64 0.57
I will go through the calculations of the Held, Scaled Held, HPR, SDGL, and PTRA variables
in detail for time t− 4.
• Held is calculated as the turnover in a specific period multiplied by 1− turnover in all
subsequent periods. So, for period t−4, we get 0.05∗(1−0.15)∗(1−0.20)∗(1−0.10) = 0.03.
Heldt,t−n is the proportion of a stock’s investors at time t that purchased the stock at
time t− n
• Scaled Held is calculated as held divided by the sum of held over all t−n. So, for period
t − 4, we get 0.030.10+0.18+0.11+0.03+0.15 = 0.05. In this example, there is a large difference
between held and scaled held because we are only looking back 5 periods. When calculating
using weekly returns going back 260 periods, the difference between the two variables is
minimal. This ensures that the total Held in each time period is equal to 1.
• HPR is calculated as the cumulative return between t−n+ 1 and t. So, for period t− 4,
we get 1.4 ∗ 0.7 ∗ 1.2 ∗ 0.9 = 1.06.
• SDGL is calculated as HPR − 1 divided by the annual standard deviation of the stock.
So, for period t− 4, we get 1.06−10.25 = 0.24.
• PTRA is calculated by mapping SDGL using the PTRA function above. For a gain of
0.64 standard deviations, we get a PTRA value of 0.57.
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The PTRA of this stock at time t is found as an average of the PTRA values of people holding
beginning at times t−1 through t−5, weighted by the Scaled Held variable. The time t PTRA
of this stock is (0.18)(0.30) + (0.32)(0.84) + (0.19)(−0.28) + (0.05)(0.90) + (0.26)(0.57) = 0.46.
For each stock in the CRSP database with a valid weekly return in each week for the past
five years, I calculate a PTRA value each week. I use data beginning in 1962 so PTRA values
are calculated for stocks between 1967 and 2016. The time-series means of the 10th, 50th, and
90th percentile of the PTRA measure are shown in Figure 4.
Table 1 reports the mean and standard deviations over the entire time period for the 10th,
50th, and 90th percentiles. There is sizeable variation in the PTRA measure over time. Large
dips in the measure tend to occur following market crashes, such as those in 1974 and 2008.
Large drops tend to push investors into the loss region, where they are more risk-seeking ac-
cording to prospect theory. As the market recovers, more people move into the gains region
where they are more risk-averse, increasing the level of PTRA.
3.3.3 Using Frazzini (2006) Measure of Reference Price
Frazzini (2006) constructs a measure of reference price using mutual fund holdings. The






where Pt is the stock price at month t, St,t−n is the number of shares purchased at t−n that are
still held at time t, and φ is a normalizing constant. Number of shares still held is calculated
on a first-in first-out basis. Holdings from all mutual funds are aggregated to get a measure of
reference price at the stock-level.
To calculate my measure of PTRA, I first map the gain/loss of each share of stock held by
mutual funds to its PTRA. I then take the value-weighted sum to find the average PTRA for






F (rt−n,t, σt) (3.6)
St−n,t represents the total number of shares that entered the portfolio at time t − n that are
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still held at time t. I divide by the total number of shares held to calculate the average PTRA
on a share of that specific stock.
As this measure of PTRA directly observes holdings, it does not run into the issue we cannot
measure heterogeneity in who is more likely to sell or hold onto the stock at each point in time.
However, it does assume that mutual fund holdings are representative of the market as a whole.
I use Thomson Reuters (s12) data on mutual fund holdings between 1980 and 2016. I assume
that a stock that first appears in the portfolio of a mutual fund in month m of year y was bought
by the mutual fund in month m at the price of the stock at the end of month m. I track the
initial buying month of each share of stock until it no longer appears in the portfolio. Holdings
are calculated on a first-in first-out basis, so if a mutual fund’s position in a stock decreases, I
assume that it liquidated shares of stock that it bought at the earliest reference date. At each
time t, shares of each stock held by a mutual fund are aggregated by their initial purchase date.
I then calculate the cumulative return on the stock between the initial purchase date and time
t before mapping that gain/loss to PTRA. The PTRA of a stock at time t is then calculated
as the average of the PTRAs from each of the initial purchase dates, weighted by the number
of shares still held from each previous date. Holdings data is available on a quarterly basis,
in March, June, September, and December of each year. I assume that the fund holdings of
a stock remain the same in the two months where data is not available after each reporting
date. For each stock, a new PTRA is calculated monthly using it price in that month. The
dataset starts in 1980, but I start the calculation of the PTRA measure in 1985 to allow for
some variation in initial purchase dates in the sample. The time-series mean of the 10th, 50th,
and 90th percentile of the PTRA measure is shown in Figure 5.
Table 1 reports mean and standard deviations over the entire time period for the 10th, 50th,
and 90th percentile, as well as correlation with the GH measure over the time period that both
measures are available (1985-2016). The mean and standard deviations of the two measures
are similar, and the correlation between them is high. This provides reassurance that even




The main prediction of this paper is that a stock’s level of prospect theory risk aversion
will predict its returns in the next period with a negative sign. High PTRA stocks are held
by more risk-averse investors who exert excess selling pressure, leading to lower returns next
period. Conversely, low PTRA stocks are held by more risk-seeking investors who exert excess
holding pressure, leading to higher returns next period. If the effect is driven by price pressure
from unsophisticated investors, I expect to see a reversal over longer periods.
3.4.1 Portfolio Tests
Using Grinblatt and Han Measure of Reference Price
Each week between 1967 and 2016, I sort stocks into ten portfolios based on PTRA con-
structed with the GH measure of reference price. I calculate equal-weighted and value-weighted
returns for each portfolio, as well as for a portfolio long the lowest PTRA stocks and short the
highest PTRA stocks. Portfolios are held for three months (13 weeks). Following Jegadeesh and
Titman (1993) and Lou (2012), I take equal-weighted average returns across portfolios formed
in different weeks over the holding period.
The first row of Table 2 shows excess returns for each of the ten portfolios, as well as the
long-short portfolio. For both equal-weighted and value-weighted portfolios, there is a negative
relationship between PTRA and returns. The long-short portfolio earns about 0.12% excess
returns per week, equivalent to 6.24% per year. The magnitude is similar for equal-weighted
and value-weighted portfolios.
The second row of Table 2 reports alphas from a regression using the Fama-French 3-factor
model, which controls for market (RMRF), size (SMB), and value (HML) factors. The alpha
earned by the long-short portfolio remains similar in magnitude after controlling for these fac-
tors. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 3 show factor loadings on the three Fama and French factors
for the long-short portfolio. The portfolio has negative loadings on the market and size factors,
and a positive loading on the value factor.
The third row of Table 2 additionally controls for the momentum (MOM) factor. The
4-factor alpha of the long-short portfolio is significantly positive, and is slightly higher in mag-
nitude than the 3-factor alpha. Columns (3) and (4) of Table 3 show that the portfolio has
a negative loading on the momentum factor. This may be because stocks with a low value of
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PTRA are more likely to be those in the loss region which have experienced poor returns in the
past, while stocks with a high value of PTRA are more likely to be in the gains region and have
experienced good returns in the past.
The final row adds in controls for Fama and French’s profitability (RMW) and investment
(CMA) factors, as well as a short-term reversal (ST) factor. Under both equal-weighting and
value-weighting, the alpha of the long-short portfolio remains significantly positive after con-
trolling for these factors, although the magnitude of the value-weighted portfolio drops slightly.
Columns (5) and (6) show the portfolio has a significantly positive loading on both the RMW
and CMA factors. After adjusting for these 7 factors known to be correlated with returns,
the equal-weighted portfolio earns a 7-factor alpha of 0.12% per week, or 6.24% per year. The
value-weighted portfolio earns a 7-factor alpha of 0.06% per week, or 3.12% per year.
Using Frazzini Measure of Reference Price
I run similar analysis for PTRA constructed with the Frazzini measure of reference price.
PTRA for each stock is calculated monthly between 1985 and 2016. Because fund holdings data
is available quarterly and PTRA measure is calculated monthly, the portfolios are rebalanced
monthly and held for three months. Stocks must be held by a mutual fund to have a valid
measure of PTRA, limiting the sample. The pool of available stocks is smaller, so I split the
sample into five portfolios rather than 10.
Table 4 shows the excess return, 3-factor alpha, 4-factor alpha, and 7-factor alpha of the five
portfolios sorted on PTRA using the Frazzini measure of reference price. Excess returns and
alphas are monotonically decreasing from the low PTRA portfolio to the high PTRA portfolio.
The final column of Table 4 shows the excess return and alphas of a portfolio long low PTRA
stocks and short high PTRA stocks. Both the equal-weighted and value-weighted long-short
portfolios earn significantly positive excess returns. The equal-weighted portfolio has an excess
return of 0.31% per month (3.77% per year), while the value-weighted portfolio has an excess
return of 0.45% per month (5.41% per year).
The return of the long-short portfolio remains significantly positive, and actually increases
in magnitude slightly after controlling for the 7-factor model. The equal-weighted portfolio has
a 7-factor alpha of 0.39% per month, or 4.62% per year, while the value-weighted portfolio
has a 7-factor alpha of 0.53% per month, or 6.32% per year. This is because the long-short
portfolio has a negative loading on many of the common factors studied in the literature. Table
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5 shows loadings on each of the seven factors, and indicates that the portfolio has a negative
and significant loading on the size and momentum factors.
3.4.2 Fama-MacBeth Regressions
Next, I run Fama-MacBeth regressions to test the power of the PTRA measure to predict
returns in the cross section, while controlling for other variables known to predict returns. The
other predictors that I control for are:
• Short Term Return (Weekly: R−4,−1; Monthly: R−1): Return over the past month,
expected to predict returns with a negative sign.
• Medium Term Return (Weekly: R−52,−5; Monthly: R−12,−2): Return over months
-12 to -2, expected to predict returns with a positive sign.
• Long Term Return (Weekly: R−156,−53; Monthly: R−36,−13): Return over months
-36 to -13, expected to predict returns with a negative sign.
• Short Term Turnover (Weekly: Turnover−4,−1; Monthly: Turnover−1): Con-
structed as the average turnover over the past month, where turnover is calculated as
trading volume divided by total shares outstanding. Expected to predict returns with a
positive sign.
• Medium Term Turnover (Weekly: Turnover−52,−5; Monthly: Turnover−12,−2):
Constructed as the average turnover over months -12 to -2, where turnover is calculated
as trading volume divided by total shares outstanding. Expected to predict returns with
a negative sign.
• Book to Market Ratio (B/M): Constructed as the ratio of book value to market value,
where book value of a stock is its book value at the end of the previous year. Expected
to predict returns with a positive sign.
• Market Cap (Log(Cap)): Constructed as the log of the market cap, where market
cap is calculated as the price of a share multiplied by the number of shares outstanding.
Expected to predict returns with a negative sign.
• Beta (Beta): The stock’s beta calculated using past 2 years’ returns (weekly) or past 5
years’ returns (monthly). Expected to predict returns with a positive sign.
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• Capital Gains Overhang (CGO): The stock’s capital gains overhang, as defined in
Grinblatt and Han (2005). Expected to predict returns with a positive sign.
Standard Fama-Macbeth regression techniques are used. For the measure of PTRA calcu-
lated using the GH measure of reference price, I run a cross-sectional regression every week
between the first week of 1967 and the final week of 2016. In each regression, the dependent
variable is the return on the stock in the next week. The independent variable is the stock’s
PTRA. Controls include the variables listed above that have been shown to predict returns.
The main prediction is that the coefficient on PTRA is negative and significant.
In Table 6, I report time-series averages of the coefficients on each variable. Column (1) of
Table 6 shows the results of the Fama-Macbeth regression before adding controls. The coefficient
on PTRA is negative and significant. Using the GH measure, the difference between the 10th
percentile and the 90th percentile PTRA is about 0.52. This suggests that low PTRA stocks
outperform high PTRA stocks by 0.52 ∗ 0.0031 = 0.16% per week or 8.32% per year. Columns
(2)-(4) add in control variables. The coefficient on PTRA drops in magnitude, but remains
negative and significant. After adding all of the controls, low PTRA stocks outperform high
PTRA stocks by 0.052 ∗ 0.0010 = 0.05% per week or 2.70% per year. This magnitude is similar
to the one found in the portfolio tests in section 4.1.
Table 7 shows the results of the Fama-Macbeth regressions using PTRA calculated with
the Frazzini measure of reference price. The methodology is similar to above, except cross-
sectional regressions are run every month (as opposed to week) and the dependent variable in
each regression is the return of the stock in the next month (as opposed to next week). Column
(1) shows the results before the inclusion of any control variables. The coefficient on PTRA
is negative and significant. The difference between the 10th percentile and the 90th percentile
PTRA is about 0.60, so low PTRA stocks outperform high PTRA stocks by 0.60∗0.0060 = 0.36%
per month or 4.32% per year. The coefficient on PTRA remains negative and significant after
the inclusion of control variables, as shown in Columns (2)-(4). After the inclusion of controls,
low PTRA stocks outperform high PTRA stocks by 0.60 ∗ 0.0024 = 0.14% per month or 1.73%
per year.
It may seem counterintuitive that PTRA predicts returns with a negative sign while CGO
predicts returns with a positive sign. However, PTRA and CGO are actually negatively cor-
related for the majority of reference prices. The mapping between reference price and CGO is
monotonically increasing for the entire curve. On the other hand, the mapping between refer-
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ence price and PTRA is decreasing for the large losses region and for the entire gains region.
The slight losses region is the only area where PTRA is increasing with reference price.
3.4.3 January Effects
The returns on the bottom decile PTRA stocks in January may be particularly high due to
a December tax-selling effect, as bottom decile PTRA stocks are more likely to have suffered
a capital loss in the previous year. This extra selling pressure in December could cause their
returns to rebound in January. In order to test if tax-selling reasons are driving the results, I
split the sample into January and non-January months.
I calculate long-short portfolio excess returns and alphas separately for January and February-
December. The results are shown in Table 8. Panel A shows the results using PTRA constructed
with the GH measure of reference price, while Panel B shows the results using PTRA constructed
with the Frazzini measure of reference price. Returns and alphas remain positive and significant
when using only February-December returns, and are similar in magnitude to the whole sample.
3.4.4 Long Run Reversals
If the returns of the long-short portfolio are due to irrational holding or selling pressure by
prospect theory investors, we should observe a return reversal over the long term. A similar
phenomenon is found in Coval and Stafford (2007) and Lou (2012), where mispricings caused
by mutual fund flows correct over the long term. I directly test this by observing returns up to
five years after portfolio formation.
Figure 6 shows cumulative weekly returns and alphas of the value-weighted portfolio long low
PTRA stocks and short high PTRA stocks, using the GH measure of reference price to calculate
PTRA. Cumulative excess returns of the portfolio peaks around 75 weeks after formation at 6%,
then drops steadily afterwards. Cumulative 4-factor alpha reaches a peak at around 50 weeks,
and is completely reversed by 200 weeks. Cumulative 7-factor alpha peaks at 25 weeks, and
becomes negative just after 50 weeks post portfolio formation. The pattern of returns observed is
consistent with price pressure by irrational investors with prospect theory preferences influencing
prices in the short run, but correcting over the long term.
Figure 7 shows returns over the longer term for the value-weighted portfolio sorted by PTRA
using the Frazzini measure of reference price. The pattern is similar- cumulative excess returns
and alphas peak around the one year mark, and steadily decline afterwards. By 3-5 years after
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portfolio formation, the portfolio return is almost entirely reversed.
3.4.5 Risk-Return Relationship
Wang, Yu, and Yan (2014) study the relationship between CGO and the risk-return relation,
and posit that stocks with a higher CGO will have a more risk-averse investor-base, while
those with a lower CGO will have a more risk-seeking investor-base. I use similar intuition to
make predictions about the risk-return relationship for stocks with different levels of PTRA. I
hypothesize that low PTRA stocks are held by risk-seeking investors who exert excess selling
pressure on less risky stocks and excess holding pressure on more risky stocks. This leads to
a positive risk-return relationship for low PTRA stocks. For high PTRA stocks, the opposite
would be true. High PTRA stocks are held by risk-averse investors who exert excess selling
pressure on more risky stocks and excess holding pressure on less risky stocks. As a result, the
risk-return relationship for high PTRA stocks is negative.
To test this prediction, I first sort stocks on PTRA, and then on a measure of riskiness of
the stock. I report results using the standard deviation of the stock’s returns over the past five
years as the proxy for risk. In unreported analysis, I proxy for risk with the standard deviation
over the past two years and beta of the stock with the market, with similar results.
Table 9 shows results using PTRA constructed with the GH measure of reference price.
Standard deviation is calculated as the weekly standard deviation of the stock’s returns over
the past five years. As before, portfolios are rebalanced weekly and held for a total of 13
weeks. Panel A shows results for equal-weighted portfolios, while Panel B shows results for
value-weighted portfolios. I find results that broadly support the hypothesis. For low PTRA
stocks, excess return increases from the lowest standard deviation bin to the highest standard
deviation bin. For high PTRA stocks, the effect is reversed. Excess return decreases from the
lowest standard deviation bin to the highest standard deviation bin. The difference between the
returns of the SD(t)-SD(b) portfolio for low PTRA stocks and the returns of the SD(t)-SD(b)
portfolio for high PTRA stocks is positive and significant, with a magnitude of around 0.14%
per week or 7.28% per year. This difference remains significant after controlling for the 3-factor,
4-factor, and 7-factor model.
Table 10 shows results using PTRA constructed with the Frazzini measure of reference price.
Standard deviation is calculated as the monthly standard deviation of the stock’s returns over
the past five years. Portfolios are rebalanced monthly and held for three months. The results are
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similar to above: returns and alphas are positively correlated with risk for low PTRA stocks,
and negatively correlated with risk for high PTRA stocks. The difference in returns for the
SD(t)-SD(b) portfolio is around 0.50% per month, or 6.00% per year.
3.5 Conclusion
In this paper, I provide evidence that some subset of stock holders evaluate utility based
on prospect theory preferences, and that they can have an effect on stock returns in the cross-
section. For each stock, I find the level of returns earned by its current shareholders, and evaluate
how risk-averse they would be under prospect theory preferences. Two different methods are
used to proxy for shareholder reference price, one based on past trading volume and the other
on mutual fund holdings.
I find that stocks held by investors who currently have a high PTRA tend to underperform
compared to stocks with a held by investors with a low PTRA. I attribute this to excess selling
pressure by risk-averse investors. Consistent with this idea, returns reverse over the longer
term. I additionally test the risk-return relationship of stocks with different levels of PTRA.
The traditional positive correlation between risk and return holds for low PTRA stocks, but
the relationship is negative for high PTRA stocks.
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3.6 Tables and Figures
Figure 3.1: Typical Prospect Theory Value Function.
This figure shows a typical prospect theory value function, using the calibration from Tversky
and Kahneman (1992). The investor is slightly risk-averse over gains, slightly risk-seeking over
losses, and loss-averse around the 0 reference point.
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Figure 3.2: Sample Prospect Theory Risk Aversion Function.
This figure shows an example of a PTRA function formed using the calibration of prospect
theory in Tversky and Kahneman (1992). The investor is most risk-averse in the slight gains
area of the curve, and most risk-seeking in the slight loss region. The investor displays slight
risk-averse tendencies over large gains, and slight risk-seeking tendencies over large losses.
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Figure 3.3: Comparison Between Two Reference Points Along the PTRA Curve
Panel A: Initial Reference Point in Slight Loss Region
x1 and x2 are two reference points in the slight loss region. Agents are offered a fair gamble of
size g. If the agent wins the gamble, she ends up at either x1 + g or x2 + g. If the agent loses
the gamble, she ends up at x1 − g or x2 − g
Panel B: Initial Reference Point in Slight Gain Region
x1 and x2 are two reference points in the slight gain region. Agents are offered a fair gamble of
size g. If the agent wins the gamble, she ends up at either x1 + g or x2 + g. If the agent loses
the gamble, she ends up at x1 − g or x2 − g
125
Figure 3.4: Time Series of Cross-Sectional Percentiles of the PTRA Using GH Measure of Reference Price.
This figure shows the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentile over time of the PTRA measure calculated using the GH measure of reference price. The
measure is constructed every week between the first week of 1967 and the final week of 2016, for a total of 2,630 weeks. Only stocks with a valid
return each week in the past 5 years are considered. See Section 3.2 for a detailed description of the PTRA measure.
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Figure 3.5: Time Series of Cross-Sectional Percentiles of PTRA Using Frazzini Measure of Reference Price.
This figure shows the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentile over time of the PTRA measure calculated using the Frazzini measure of reference price.
The measure is constructed every month between January 1985 and November 2016, for a total of 383 months. See Section 3.3 for a detailed
description of the PTRA measure.
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Figure 3.6: Long-Short Portfolio Returns Over Longer Periods (GH Reference Price)
This figure shows the cumulative excess return, 3-factor alpha, 4-factor alpha, and 7-factor
alpha of a value-weighted portfolio long low PTRA stocks and short high PTRA stocks over a
time period of up to 5 years. PTRA is measured using the GH measure of reference price, and
returns are calculated weekly.
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Figure 3.7: Long-Short Portfolio Returns Over Longer Periods (Frazzini Reference
Price)
This figure shows the cumulative excess return, 3-factor alpha, 4-factor alpha, and 7-factor
alpha of a value-weighted portfolio long low PTRA stocks and short high PTRA stocks over a
time period of up to 5 years. PTRA is measured using the Frazzini measure of reference price,
and returns are calculated monthly.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics for PTRA Measures
This table shows time-series means and standard deviations of the 10th, 50th, and 90th
percentiles of PTRA constructed using the GH measure and Frazzini measure of reference
price. The GH measure of reference price is constructed weekly between the first week of 1967
and the final week of 2016 for a total of 2,630 weeks. The Frazzini measure of reference price
is constructed quarterly between January 1985 and November 2016 for a total of 383 months.
Only stocks that had a valid return each time period in the past 5 years are considered.
PTRA is normalized to have a maximum possible value of 1 and a minimum possible value of
-0.28. Correlation between the two measures during time periods where both are available is
also reported.
Percentile GH Mean GH SD Frazzini Mean Frazzini SD Correlation
10th 0.186 0.081 0.140 0.063 0.632
50th 0.450 0.099 0.435 0.079 0.321
90th 0.701 0.097 0.730 0.077 0.038
130
Table 3.2: Time-Series Tests on Decile Portfolios Sorted on PTRA (GH Measure of Reference Price)
This table reports excess returns and alphas on portfolios of stocks sorted on PTRA, where PTRA is constructed using the GH measure of
reference price. The construction of this measure is discussed in detail in Section 3.2. Each week, all stocks with a valid return each week for the
past 5 years are sorted into deciles based on PTRA, from b (low PTRA) to t (high PTRA). Portfolios are rebalanced every week and held for a
total of 13 weeks. To deal with overlapping portfolios in each holdings week, I follow Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and Lou (2012) and take the
equal-weighted average return across portfolios formed in different weeks. 3-Factor alpha controls for Fama and French’s market (RMRF), size
(SMB), and value (HML) factors. 4-factor alpha adds a control for momentum (MOM). 7-factor alpha adds controls for Fama and French’s
profitability (RMW) and investment (CMA) factors, as well as a short-term reversal (ST) factor. The sample runs from the first week of 1967 to
the final week of 2016, for a total of 2,630 weeks. Reported returns and alphas are at the weekly level. T-statistics are reported in parentheses.
Returns significantly different from 0 at the 10% level are bolded.
b 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 t L-H Portfolio
Low PTRA High PTRA
Excess Return EW 0.221 0.233 0.231 0.222 0.212 0.195 0.179 0.174 0.154 0.109 0.113
(5.15) (5.45) (5.38) (5.11) (4.89) (4.48) (4.07) (3.89) (3.34) (2.12) (4.36)
VW 0.202 0.180 0.168 0.148 0.140 0.121 0.104 0.122 0.123 0.076 0.127
(4.23) (4.09) (3.93) (3.46) (3.25) (2.80) (2.36) (2.74) (2.70) (1.44) (3.67)
3-Factor α EW 0.069 0.077 0.074 0.068 0.060 0.043 0.028 0.025 0.004 -0.038 0.110
(4.30) (6.11) (6.79) (5.78) (5.95) (4.17) (2.61) (2.29) (0.41) (-3.05) (4.97)
VW 0.059 0.049 0.044 0.027 0.022 0.004 -0.014 -0.002 -0.001 -0.041 0.101
(3.13) (3.66) (4.16) (2.91) (2.30) (0.42) (-1.15) (-0.12) (-0.05) (-2.07) (3.20)
4-Factor α EW 0.110 0.102 0.095 0.088 0.078 0.060 0.042 0.035 0.010 -0.037 0.150
(7.42) (8.52) (9.07) (7.77) (8.12) (5.87) (3.91) (3.30) (1.08) (-2.95) (7.03)
VW 0.082 0.055 0.049 0.034 0.030 0.014 -0.003 0.009 0.003 -0.041 0.124
(4.39) (4.07) (4.65) (3.67) (3.17) (1.36) (-0.24) (0.66) (0.20) (-2.09) (3.95)
7-Factor α EW 0.071 0.066 0.057 0.054 0.042 0.024 0.006 -0.001 -0.016 -0.044 0.118
(4.73) (5.61) (5.66) (4.79) (4.57) (2.40) (0.58) (-0.08) (-1.71) (-3.37) (5.55)
VW 0.043 0.028 0.027 0.008 -0.005 -0.024 -0.039 -0.028 -0.018 -0.015 0.059
(2.23) (2.04) (2.55) (0.81) (-0.51) (-2.36) (-3.11) (-2.06) (-1.26) (-0.75) (1.87)
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Table 3.3: Factor Loadings on Long-Short Portfolio (GH Reference Price)
This table reports factor loadings for the portfolio long low PTRA stocks and short high
PTRA stocks, where PTRA is constructed using the GH measure of reference price. Portfolios
are rebalanced every week and held for a total of 13 weeks. The factors are the market
(RMRF), size (SMB), value (HML), momentum (MOM), profitability (RMW), investment
(CMA), and short-term reversal (ST). The sample runs from the first week of 1967 to the final
week of 2016, for a total of 2,630 weeks. Reported returns and alphas are at the weekly level.
T-statistics are reported in parentheses.
Dependent variable:
Long-Short Excess Return
(EW) (VW) (EW) (VW) (EW) (VW)
Constant 0.110∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ 0.059∗
(4.97) (3.20) (7.03) (3.95) (5.55) (1.87)
RMRF −0.165∗∗∗ −0.039∗∗∗ −0.198∗∗∗ −0.058∗∗∗ −0.143∗∗∗ 0.022
(-16.08) (-2.66) (-19.74) (-3.94) (-13.89) (1.43)
SMB −0.222∗∗∗ −0.323∗∗∗ −0.225∗∗∗ −0.325∗∗∗ −0.130∗∗∗ −0.197∗∗∗
(-12.34) (-12.67) (-13.08) (-12.83) (-7.61) (-7.77)
HML 0.352∗∗∗ 0.491∗∗∗ 0.270∗∗∗ 0.442∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗∗ 0.305∗∗∗
(19.47) (19.11) (14.94) (16.59) (9.74) (9.60)
MOM −0.190∗∗∗ −0.113∗∗∗ −0.221∗∗∗ −0.161∗∗∗







Observations 2,630 2,630 2,630 2,630 2,630 2,630
R2 0.279 0.183 0.343 0.195 0.416 0.280
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 3.4: Time-Series Tests on Quintile Portfolios Sorted on PTRA (Frazzini Reference Price)
This table reports excess returns and alphas on portfolios of stocks sorted on PTRA, where PTRA is constructed using the Frazzini measure of
reference price. The construction of this measure is discussed in detail in Section 3.3. Each month, stocks are sorted into quintile portfolios, from
b (low PTRA) to t (high PTRA). Portfolios are rebalanced every month and held for a total of 3 months. To deal with overlapping portfolios in
each holdings month, I follow Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and Lou (2012) and take the equal-weighted average return across portfolios formed
in different months. 3-Factor alpha controls for Fama and French’s market (RMRF), size (SMB), and value (HML) factors. 4-factor alpha adds a
control for momentum (MOM). 7-factor alpha adds controls for Fama and French’s profitability (RMW) and investment (CMA) factors, as well as
a short-term reversal (ST) factor. The sample runs from January of 1985 to November of 2016, for a total of 383 months. Reported returns and
alphas are at the monthly level. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. Returns significantly different from 0 at the 10% level are bolded.
b 4 3 2 t L-H Portfolio
Low PTRA High PTRA
Excess Return EW 1.027 1.006 0.903 0.814 0.714 0.314
(4.24) (4.29) (3.76) (3.32) (2.79) (3.22)
VW 0.925 0.820 0.729 0.686 0.473 0.451
(3.83) (3.65) (3.33) (2.98) (1.93) (3.23)
3-Factor α EW 0.241 0.250 0.137 0.054 -0.025 0.266
(3.28) (4.33) (2.36) (0.95) (-0.41) (3.12)
VW 0.217 0.153 0.068 0.002 -0.214 0.430
(2.53) (2.99) (1.25) (0.03) (-2.64) (3.13)
4-Factor α EW 0.391 0.320 0.191 0.073 -0.040 0.432
(6.41) (5.78) (3.35) (1.27) (-0.65) (5.94)
VW 0.320 0.173 0.062 -0.027 -0.232 0.552
(3.91) (3.34) (1.13) (-0.45) (-2.82) (4.08)
7-Factor α EW 0.264 0.176 0.047 -0.055 -0.121 0.385
(4.74) (3.89) (0.99) (-1.09) (-2.06) (5.18)
VW 0.258 0.108 -0.022 -0.089 -0.270 0.527
(3.09) (2.11) (-0.40) (-1.55) (-3.31) (3.78)
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Table 3.5: Factor Loadings on Long-Short Portfolio (Frazzini Reference Price)
This table reports factor loadings on the portfolio long low PTRA stocks and short high
PTRA stocks, where PTRA is constructed using the Frazzini measure of reference price.
Portfolios are rebalanced every month and held for a total of 3 months. The factors are the
market (RMRF), size (SMB), value (HML), momentum (MOM), profitability (RMW),
investment (CMA), and short-term reversal (ST). The sample runs from January of 1985 to
November of 2016, for a total of 383 months. Reported returns and alphas are at the monthly
level. T-statistics are reported in parentheses.
Dependent variable:
Long-Short Excess Return
(EW) (VW) (EW) (VW) (EW) (VW)
Constant 0.266∗∗∗ 0.430∗∗∗ 0.432∗∗∗ 0.552∗∗∗ 0.385∗∗∗ 0.527∗∗∗
(3.12) (3.13) (5.94) (4.08) (5.18) (3.78)
RMRF −0.025 0.014 −0.075∗∗∗ −0.023 −0.049∗∗∗ 0.004
(-1.26) (0.45) (-4.42) (-0.72) (-2.60) (0.13)
SMB −0.111∗∗∗ −0.207∗∗∗ −0.100∗∗∗ −0.199∗∗∗ −0.082∗∗∗ −0.212∗∗∗
(-3.91) (-4.54) (-4.23) (-4.50) (-3.07) (-4.24)
HML 0.273∗∗∗ 0.096∗ 0.196∗∗∗ 0.039 0.131∗∗∗ −0.038
(8.98) (1.96) (7.47) (0.81) (3.70) (-0.57)
MOM −0.203∗∗∗ −0.149∗∗∗ −0.217∗∗∗ −0.164∗∗∗







Observations 383 383 383 383 383 383
R2 0.268 0.077 0.487 0.134 0.500 0.147
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
134
Table 3.6: Fama-MacBeth Regressions (GH Measure of Reference Price)
This table reports the results of Fama-MacBeth regressions where the cross-sectional
regressions are run every week between the first week of 1967 and the final week of 2016. In
each week, the dependent variable is the return on the stock in the next week. PTRA is
constructed using the GH measure of reference price. Ret−4,−1 is the cumulative return on the
stock from week -4 to week -1. Ret−52,−5 is the cumulative return on the stock from week -52
to week -5. Ret−156,−53 is the cumulative return on the stock from week -156 to week -53.
Turnover−4,−1 is the average weekly turnover between weeks -4 and -1, calculated as trading
volume divided by shares outstanding. Turnover−52,−5 is the average weekly turnover
between week -52 and week -5. B/M is the book to market ratio, using book value at the end
of the previous year. Log(Cap) is the log of the market capitalization of the stock. Beta the
beta of the stock’s return with the market return, calculated using weekly returns in the past
two years. CGO is a measure of capital gains overhang as in Grinblatt and Han (2005).
Reported R2 is the mean R2 of the cross-sectional regressions.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PTRA -0.0031∗∗∗ -0.0020∗∗∗ -0.0013∗∗∗ -0.0010∗∗∗
























Constant 0.0040∗∗∗ 0.0035∗∗∗ 0.0034∗∗∗ 0.0044∗∗∗
(9.40) (10.17) (10.62) (5.81)
R2 0.005 0.028 0.041 0.064
Weeks 2,629 2,629 2,629 2,629
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 3.7: Fama-MacBeth Regressions (Frazzini Measure of Reference Price)
This table reports the results of Fama-MacBeth regressions where the cross-sectional
regressions are run every month between January 1985 and November 2016. In each month,
the dependent variable is the return on the stock in the next month. PTRA is constructed
using the Frazzini measure of reference price. Ret−1 is the return on the stock in the previous
month. Ret−12,−2 is the cumulative return on the stock from month -12 to month -2.
Ret−36,−12 is the cumulative return on the stock from month -36 to month -12. Turnover−1 is
the previous month’s turnover, calculated as trading volume divided by shares outstanding.
Turnover−12,−2 is the average monthly turnover between month -12 and month -2. B/M is
the book to market ratio, using book value at the end of the previous year. Log(Cap) is the
log of the market capitalization of the stock. Beta is the beta of the stock’s return with the
market return, calculated using monthly returns in the past five years. CGO is a measure of
capital gains overhang as in Frazzini (2006). Reported R2 is the mean R2 of the
cross-sectional regressions.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PTRA -0.0060∗∗∗ -0.0045∗∗∗ -0.0030∗∗∗ -0.0024∗∗
























Constant 0.0143∗∗∗ 0.0131∗∗∗ 0.0131∗∗∗ 0.0126∗∗
(6.07) (6.15) (6.96) (2.06)
R2 0.003 0.025 0.041 0.063
Months 383 383 383 383
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 3.8: Long-Short Portfolio Returns in January and Non-January Months
This table reports excess returns and alphas on a portfolio long low PTRA stocks and short
high PTRA stocks split by January and non-January months. Panel A uses the GH measure
of reference price. Portfolios are rebalanced weekly between the first week of 1967 to the final
week of 2016 and held for 13 weeks. Reported returns and alphas are at the weekly level.
Panel B uses the Frazzini measure of reference price. Portfolios are rebalanced monthly
between January 1985 and November 2016 and held for 3 months. Reported returns and
alphas are at the monthly level. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. Returns significantly
different from 0 at the 10% level are bolded.
Panel A: GH Reference Price
Jan (EW) Feb-Dec (EW) Jan (VW) Feb-Dec (VW)
Excess Return 0.330 0.093 0.150 0.125
(3.15) (3.51) (1.00) (3.55)
3-factor α 0.225 0.090 0.089 0.094
(2.14) (4.05) (0.59) (2.98)
4-factor α 0.187 0.133 0.081 0.124
(1.93) (6.18) (0.53) (3.90)
7-factor α 0.176 0.097 0.078 0.059
(1.75) (4.56) (0.51) (1.87)
Panel B: Frazzini Reference Price
Jan (EW) Feb-Dec (EW) Jan (VW) Feb-Dec (VW)
Excess Return 0.588 0.320 0.685 0.456
(2.16) (3.36) (1.95) (3.26)
3-factor α -0.033 0.277 0.024 0.439
(-0.15) (3.28) (0.07) (3.16)
4-factor α 0.266 0.436 0.084 0.562
(1.40) (6.01) (0.25) (4.11)
7-factor α 0.077 0.395 -0.023 0.555
(0.46) (5.32) (-0.06) (3.95)
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Table 3.9: Double-Sorted Portfolios on PTRA and STDEV (GH Reference Price)
This table reports excess returns of portfolios sorted first on PTRA and then on standard
deviation over the past five years. PTRA is constructed using the GH measure of reference
price. Panel A shows results using for equal-weighted portfolios, and Panel B shows results for
value-weighted portfolios. Standard deviation is the weekly standard deviation of a stock over
the past 5 years. Portfolios are rebalanced every week and held for a total of 13 weeks. The
table reports excess returns, 3-factor alphas, and 4-factor alphas, and 7-factor alphas of a
portfolio long the top quintile risky stocks and short the bottom quintile risky stocks for each
PTRA quintile. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. Reported returns and alphas are at
the weekly level. Returns significantly different from 0 at the 10% level are bolded.
Panel A: Equal-Weighted Portfolios
PTRA(b) PTRA(4) PTRA(3) PTRA(2) PTRA(t) Difference
SD(b) 0.197 0.186 0.170 0.158 0.152
SD(4) 0.212 0.214 0.188 0.164 0.146
SD(3) 0.229 0.223 0.204 0.181 0.153
SD(2) 0.248 0.261 0.235 0.195 0.133
SD(t) 0.253 0.253 0.219 0.164 0.073
SD(t)-SD(b) 0.056 0.066 0.050 0.006 -0.080 0.135
(1.35) (1.61) (1.18) (0.14) (-1.60) (3.93)
3-factor α -0.039 -0.025 -0.043 -0.078 -0.147 0.107
(-1.50) (-1.10) (-1.94) (-3.26) (-4.82) (3.29)
4-factor α 0.019 0.014 -0.014 -0.054 -0.125 0.143
(0.78) (0.63) (-0.63) (-2.28) (-4.08) (4.43)
7-factor α -0.001 0.012 -0.010 -0.052 -0.081 0.079
(-0.03) (0.52) (-0.45) (-2.24) (-2.83) (2.44)
Panel B: Value-Weighted Portfolios
PTRA(b) PTRA(4) PTRA(3) PTRA(2) PTRA(t) Difference
SD(b) 0.190 0.154 0.115 0.115 0.118
SD(4) 0.188 0.158 0.139 0.100 0.099
SD(3) 0.193 0.179 0.155 0.123 0.078
SD(2) 0.203 0.207 0.180 0.141 0.107
SD(t) 0.239 0.185 0.181 0.158 0.022
SD(t)-SD(b) 0.049 0.031 0.066 0.043 -0.096 0.145
(0.83) (0.53) (1.14) (0.73) (-1.59) (2.84)
3-factor α -0.068 -0.087 -0.044 -0.052 -0.161 0.092
(-1.56) (-2.13) (-1.12) (-1.32) (-3.68) (1.85)
4-factor α 0.026 -0.013 0.000 -0.013 -0.137 0.162
(0.64) (-0.33) (0.00) (-0.32) (-3.13) (3.36)
7-factor α 0.081 0.038 0.064 0.040 -0.061 0.140
(1.98) (1.01) (1.77) (1.10) (-1.46) (2.76)
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Table 3.10: Double-Sorted Portfolios on PTRA and STDEV (Frazzini Reference
Price)
This table reports excess returns of portfolios sorted first on PTRA and then on standard
deviation over the past five years. Panel A shows results using for equal-weighted portfolios,
and Panel B shows results for value-weighted portfolios. PTRA is constructed using the
Frazzini measure of reference price. Standard deviation is the monthly standard deviation of a
stock over the past 5 years. Portfolios are rebalanced every month and held for a total of 3
months. The table reports excess returns, 3-factor alphas, and 4-factor alphas, and 7-factor
alphas for a portfolio long the top quintile risky stocks and short the bottom quintile risky
stocks for each PTRA quintile. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. Reported returns and
alphas are at the monthly level. Returns significantly different from 0 at the 10% level are
bolded.
Panel A: Equal-Weighted Portfolios
PTRA(b) PTRA(4) PTRA(3) PTRA(2) PTRA(t) Difference
SD(b) 0.909 0.936 0.918 0.823 0.777
SD(4) 1.043 0.933 0.855 0.765 0.746
SD(3) 1.007 1.046 0.922 0.869 0.783
SD(2) 1.023 1.089 0.908 0.928 0.753
SD(t) 1.212 1.085 0.986 0.735 0.560
SD(t)-SD(b) 0.303 0.149 0.068 -0.088 -0.217 0.520
t-stat (1.65) (0.87) (0.38) (-0.49) (-1.11) (4.20)
3-factor α 0.179 0.034 -0.044 -0.162 -0.274 0.453
t-stat (1.11) (0.24) (-0.28) (-1.06) (-1.63) (3.77)
4-factor α 0.282 0.129 0.021 -0.108 -0.243 0.525
t-stat (1.75) (0.89) (0.13) (-0.70) (-1.42) (4.35)
7-factor α 0.365 0.224 0.148 0.001 -0.124 0.490
t-stat (2.20) (1.52) (0.93) (0.01) (-0.71) (3.94)
Panel B: Value-Weighted Portfolios
PTRA(b) PTRA(4) PTRA(3) PTRA(2) PTRA(t)
SD(b) 0.739 0.783 0.651 0.721 0.484
SD(4) 1.104 0.820 0.777 0.565 0.471
SD(3) 0.874 0.961 0.876 0.816 0.502
SD(2) 0.988 1.035 0.979 0.839 0.660
SD(t) 1.184 1.128 1.048 0.833 0.494
SD(t)-SD(b) 0.446 0.345 0.397 0.113 0.010 0.436
t-stat (1.78) (1.44) (1.76) (0.47) (0.05) (2.09)
3-factor α 0.303 0.231 0.312 0.093 -0.053 0.356
t-stat (1.29) (1.08) (1.52) (0.43) (-0.27) (1.70)
4-factor α 0.395 0.335 0.432 0.114 -0.043 0.438
t-stat (1.67) (1.55) (2.10) (0.52) (-0.21) (2.07)
7-factor α 0.522 0.537 0.645 0.327 0.047 0.475
t-stat (2.14) (2.45) (3.09) (1.47) (0.22) (2.16)
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